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BEYOND THE SURFACE: BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ EFFECTIVENESS REGARDING TASKS 
AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA 
ABUBAKAR MOHAMMED ZAYYANA  
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the growing interest on board literature, what makes a board effective is still unclear. Recent 
events highlighting corporate abuse cast doubt on the efficacy of the existing governance codes. 
The main aim of this research is to investigate board effectiveness beyond board demographic 
variables. Specifically, the study examines the systematic relationships between board 
characteristics, board processes, board tasks and corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) 
activities in Nigeria. In this research, corporate social responsibility activities, rather than corporate 
financial performance are considered. This is essential, as in addition to the Nigerian corporate 
governance code requirements, unethical and illegal activities of directors are the genesis of most 
of the previous corporate scandals. Moreover, an effective CSR strategy has the potential to 
influence financial performance in the long-term. 
Building on previous studies, an existing framework has been adapted; however, the results of semi-
structured qualitative interviews show that certain board processes (cognitive conflict and effort 
norms) as well as board tasks (resource provision and strategy advisory)  need to be amended in 
order to suit the Nigerian context. Additionally, the current study employs the theoretical lenses of 
the agency, resource dependency and stakeholder theories to investigate board effectiveness.  
A survey questionnaire generated through Qualtrics software was sent to all directors (1,430) of firms 
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. A response rate of 214 (189 usable), representing fifteen per 
cent of the total sample was received and Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-
SEM) was employed to test the hypothesised relationships. The empirical findings show that board 
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processes variables are more important than board characteristics in regard to board effectiveness 
in Nigeria. Among the board processes variables, knowledge utilisation has the strongest effect on 
board task (control and service), followed by board level of challenge. Commitment amongst board 
members has a significant impact on service task, but not on control task. Both board control and 
service tasks have greater influences on legal and ethical corporate social responsibility activities in 
Nigeria. Finally, board processes do not have mediating effects on the relationship between board 
characteristics and board tasks. However, board (service and control) tasks mediate the link between 
knowledge utilisation and CSR legal and ethical activities, but only service task has an indirect effect 
on the relationship between board commitment and CSR. Surprisingly, these board task variables 
serve as suppressors, rather than mediators on the relationship between board challenge and CSR.  
The current study contributes empirically and theoretically to board literature by examining factors 
responsible for board effectiveness, beyond board characteristics (the usual suspects) in Nigeria. 
Similarly, the study contributes to board processes literature by introducing a new input-process-
output model that includes CSR activities. The findings of this research are expected to provide 
information to boards of directors and policymakers on what boards do to influence board task 
effectiveness and determine the effects of board task on corporate social responsibility activities. 
The study provides evidence which highlights the important need for board scholars to consider other 
variables, such as board processes and tasks, rather than fully relying on board structure when 
investigating board effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, the introduction and background of the research are discussed. It presents a brief 
background to the research and definitions of corporate governance (Section 1.1). The statements 
of the problems that triggered this study are discussed in section 1.2, followed by the research 
questions and objectives in section 1.3. Justifications for conducting this study were given in section 
1.4. Research contributions were highlighted in section 1.5. Finally, this chapter presents the 
structure of this thesis in section 1.6. 
1.1 Brief Research Background 
The importance of good corporate governance (CG) practices are recognised all over the world, as 
it is generally believed that a sound and healthy business environment improves overall economic 
stability and general well-being of a society. The term CG had been unpopular in previous decades, 
but has become an attractive concept especially after the collapse of some big firms. These previous 
corporate scandals were attributed to ineffectiveness of board of directors. The board of directors’ 
effectiveness is crucial in the business environment and in the economic growth of any nation; 
therefore, it is essential to understand what board effectiveness is and what makes a board effective?  
This increasing attention to corporate governance can be viewed coming from different interest 
groups, including the Media; with wide coverage and debate on the topic, reviews and updates of 
corporate governance codes from various governments in both developed and developing nations, 
and introduction of legislation relating to CG by some governments (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002). Academicians have also made abundant contributions to corporate governance, in general 
and board of directors in particular; however, the literature is increasingly fragmented, coming from 
diverse disciplines, such as economics, accounting, finance and management that also use a variety 
of theoretical perspectives. There is no unanimity on what board effectiveness is and the key 
determinants of board effectiveness are vague and varied. 
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Similarly, there is no universal definition of corporate governance. Nevertheless, most of the 
definitions consider one, two or all the principles of corporate governance which include 
transparency, accountability, responsibility and fairness. Sir Adrian Cadbury explains that a 
governance system involves financial and non-financial controls by which corporations are directed 
and controlled (Cadbury, 1992). However, this is a narrow definition; a broader one was given by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as the system that manages the 
relationship between a board, stockholders and other stakeholders, and it serves as a vehicle where 
the objectives of a firm are set and channels of obtaining these objectives and monitoring 
performance are clearly determined (De Andres et al., 2005).  
Additionally, corporate governance is viewed as a relationship between different actors, both within 
and outside the firm which includes board members, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders 
(Maier, 2005). These broader definitions of corporate governance are more acceptable in the 
business world nowadays because corporations, through their boards, are expected to satisfy the 
interest of both shareholders and stakeholders and to operate in ethical and moral behaviors which 
enhance long-term benefits.  
At the centre of corporate governance debate and reforms are the board of directors (Roberts et al., 
2005). As mentioned earlier, the previous corporate crises were attributed to the ineffectiveness of 
these corporate leaders, thus effective boards are expected to mitigate causes of the previous 
scandals. For businesses to flourish, effective boards are essential, especially in Nigeria where 
corruption is endemic (Idemudia and Ite, 2006), there is weak legislation, inadequate social 
amenities and incompetency of board of directors is common in the business environment. 
Previously, Nigerian companies and the government paid minimal attention to issues relating to 
corporate governance, but recent events have brought corporate governance and board of directors 
to the forefront. 
Corporate governance scholars continue to make contributions on board of directors. However, 
these studies mimic the tradition of other researchers from previous studies (Daily et al 2003), where 
 3 
 
the emphasis is on board structure and firm financial performance with minimal considerations on 
the directors functioning and corporate social responsibility activities. There is a growing need for 
comprehensive research on board effectiveness, in which emphasis will be given not only on board 
structure and financial performance, but other variables, such as board processes, board task and 
corporate social responsibility activities. This thesis investigates board effectiveness beyond the 
traditional approach and examines the relationships between board characteristics, processes, 
board task and corporate social responsibility activities in Nigeria.   
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The concept of corporate governance is more salient after the global financial crisis and high-profile 
failures of some big companies, in both developed and developing countries. There is a general 
consensus that poor corporate governance practice, specifically the board of directors’ 
ineffectiveness and unethical activities, led to the previous corporate scandals (Yuksel, 2008; Mallin, 
2010; Lakshan and Wijekoon, 2012).  
Enron, for example, which was founded in 1985, collapsed in December 2001 simply because of 
unethical behaviour of the executives, Arthur Anderson, (the firm’ external auditor), and the board of 
directors (Ailon, 2015). The executives engaged in fraudulent activities and overstated the 
company’s assets, the external auditors connived with the management to defraud the firm, and the 
board members failed to effectively perform their oversight function. 
The crisis affecting the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and some other large UK banks in 2008 show 
clearly the corporate governance abuses by the boards of these banks. Similar to the US banking 
crises, the directors of these UK banks engaged in excessive risk-taking that resulted in higher 
performance in the short-term, so that they could receive huge bonuses. Sir Fred Goodwin, the then 
CEO of RBS, engaged in the extravagance of the bank’s assets and directors received unjustifiable 
remunerations which were far above their performance (Mallin, 2010).  
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Similar corporate scandals were also witnessed in Nigeria. The scandal of Lever Brothers Nigeria 
(LBN) in 1998 is a popular case to cite. The directors of LBN engaged in inside dealings and 
fraudulent business transactions.  According to a documentary report by Ahunwan (2002), Lever 
Brothers engaged in financial transactions with companies in which some directors of LBN held 
shares. Evidence also emerged that a moral hazard arose, as a particular director of the firm had 
over eighteen cars at the expense of the shareholders and almost all major contracts were handled 
by him indirectly. Sources indicate that recruitment and certain crucial decisions of the firm were 
based on favoritism and ethnicity, rather than competency. In 1998, LBN was suspended by the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange for submitting a misleading annual return (Ahunwan, 2002). 
Similarly, between 2006 to 2009, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) declared ten commercial banks 
as insolvent and dismissed eight of these banks management teams for corporate governance 
abuses and unethical activities (Peters and Bagshaw, 2014). Moreover, corrupt behaviours, poor 
governance practices and fraudulent activities were engaged in by the directors of some firms, such 
as Cadbury Nigeria, Halliburton Nigeria and a numbers of banks, including Oceanic Bank, 
Intercontinental Bank and Union Bank. These were reported to be the genesis of their failures 
(Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011; Ejuvbekpokpo, 2013). 
Recently at the Oando’s Nigeria PLC 40th annual general meeting, investors held a protest 
requesting for the immediate resignation of their group CEO, and change of the management team 
as well as the board of the firm, based on allegations of gross mismanagement and corporate 
governance abuses. The aggrieved shareholders completely rejected the higher remuneration 
package enjoyed by the CEO, and they heavily criticised the 2016 annual report and accounts for 
material misstatement, deeming it misleading (Ogwu, 2017). Ernest & Young, the company’s 
auditors, raised concerns about the possibilities of Oando’s continuance as going concern; 33.9 
billion Naira is reported as the comprehensive loss in 2016 and 56.6 billion Naira in 2015 (Ogwu, 
2017). 
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Due to the failure of governments in Nigeria to provide adequate social amenities, corporations are 
implicitly expected to provide those social services by the host community (Eweje, 2007); such 
expectations include provisions of portable water, health facilities, good roads, educational support 
and programmes that reduce the negative effect of their operations to the environment. Failure of 
firms to provide these facilities can lead to situations where by the host community turns against 
them, such as the case of people of Ogoni land in the Niger Delta region and the Dutch Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC).  
The Niger Delta region serves as the main area in Nigeria where activities of oil extraction and 
production take place and it accounts for large amount of the country’s revenue (Ejumudo et al., 
2012). However, the region is extremely underdeveloped with a lack of basic amenities, abject 
poverty and social unrest. SPDC has been exploring oil in the region since 1958 (Eweje, 2007) and 
their activities have destroyed the livelihoods (farming, hunting and fishing) of their host community, 
due to the environmental degradation of farmlands and fishing as a result of oil exploration and 
production (Ejumudo et al 2012). The company has been widely criticised by the community for 
unethical and irresponsible attitudes.  
As such, the company has been facing difficulties due to youth restiveness which has resulted in a 
wide negative campaign, revolts, riots, armed robberies, kidnappings and vandalism of company 
equipment.  Consequently, this has led to a reduction in daily production and sends a dangerous 
signal to potential investors in the region (Eweje, 2007) and by extension to the whole country. It can 
be argued that proper and sufficient CSR initiatives will reduce or eliminate the youth restiveness 
and other disputes between the host community and companies. As such, an effective and 
responsible board should be able to curtail these unethical behaviours which lead to social unrest 
through establishing a sound and an effective social responsibility strategy. 
In all the corporate crises discussed above one thing is common: board ineffectiveness.  The board 
of directors as the main internal corporate governance mechanism, failed to perform their duties 
effectively and are therefore, heavily blamed for the crises. In both developed and developing 
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countries, each of the aforementioned scandals led to increased attention on how to improve the 
existing corporate governance system, in order to ensure boards performed their duties effectively, 
as well as improve firms’ performance. With this, the confidence of investors and the general public 
could be restored. Most recommendations of the corporate governance codes intend to strengthen 
the board’s structure and ensure directors are capable of mitigating the causes of the previous crises. 
However, regardless of the various efforts to improve board structure, there are still cases of 
corporate abuses and board ineffectiveness. Recent happenings of corporate abuse cast doubt on 
the efficacy of these codes. Moreover, despite abundant literature on boards, there is still no 
consensus on what board effectiveness is and what factors are responsible for an effective board. 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
Existing board literature is skewed towards a direct ‘input-output’ approach, where the impacts of 
board characteristics on a firm’s performance, whether financial or social, are directly investigated 
(see Figure 1.1). Notwithstanding, recently there has been a paradigm shift in the board literature 
where some scholars, mostly from developed nations, have employed input-process-output 
approach (see Figure 1.2) to study board effectiveness (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Wan and Ong, 
2005; Bettinelli, 2011). The current study continues in this direction. The main aim of this research 
is to examine board effectiveness beyond the input-output approach and open, for the first time, the 
‘black box’ in order to examine the systematic relationships between individual board characteristics, 
board processes, board task and corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities, with 
evidence from directors of listed firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE).  
This study follows the tradition of board research by considering board effectiveness in relation to 
board task (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Minichilli et al., 2012) and corporate 
social responsibility (Wang and Coffey, 1992; Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
In view of the above aim, this study has the following research objectives: 
RO1: To investigate the influence of individual board characteristics, as outlined in the 
Nigerian corporate governance code, on board processes of the Nigerian listed firms 
 7 
 
RO2: To examine the effect of board processes on board tasks of the Nigerian listed firms 
RO3: To establish the link between board tasks and corporate social responsibility (legal and 
ethical) activities, in the context of the Nigerian listed firms 
RO4: To find the mediating effect of board processes on the relationship between board 
characteristics and board tasks 
RO5: To investigate the indirect effect of board tasks on the relationship between board 
processes and corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities, in the context of 
the Nigerian listed firms  
In order to achieve the stated aim above and address the research objectives, this study has the 
following questions:  
 
RQ1: What is the relationship between board characteristics and board processes of the 
Nigerian listed firms? This involves examination of the effects of board size, board 
composition, board gender diversity and CEO duality on board commitment, challenge and 
knowledge utilisation. 
 
RQ2: What is the empirical relationship between board processes and board tasks (control 
and service tasks) in the Nigerian context?  
 
RQ3: To what extent do board tasks influence corporate social responsibility (legal and 
ethical) activities in the context of the Nigerian listed firms? 
 
RQ4: What is the mediating, indirect effect of board processes on the relationship between 
board characteristics and board task in the Nigerian context? 
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RQ5: What is the mediating, indirect effect of board tasks on the relationship between board 
processes and corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities in Nigeria? 
Table 1.1: Research Objectives and Questions 
Research Objectives (ROs) 
 
Research Questions (RQs) 
RO1: To investigate the influence of individual 
board characteristics, as outlined in the 
Nigerian corporate governance code, on 
board processes of the Nigerian listed firms 
 
RQ1: What is the relationship between board 
characteristics and board processes of the 
Nigerian listed firms? This involves 
examination of the effects of board size, 
board composition, board gender diversity, 
and CEO duality on board commitment, 
challenge and knowledge utilisation. 
 
RO2: To examine the effect of board 
processes on board task of the Nigerian listed 
firms 
 
RQ2: What is the empirical relationship 
between board processes and board task 
(control and service tasks) in the Nigerian 
context?  
 
RO3: To establish the link between board 
tasks and corporate social responsibility 
(legal and ethical) activities, in the context of 
the Nigerian listed firms 
 
RQ3: To what extent do board tasks influence 
corporate social responsibility (legal and 
ethical) activities in the context of the Nigerian 
listed firms? 
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RO4: To find the mediating effect of board 
processes on the relationship between board 
characteristics and board tasks 
 
RQ4: What is the mediating,  indirect effect of 
board processes on the relationship between 
board characteristics and board task in the 
Nigerian context? 
RO5: To investigate the indirect effect of 
board tasks on the relationship between 
board processes and corporate social 
responsibility (legal and ethical) activities, in 
the context of the Nigerian listed firms  
 
RQ5: What is the mediating, indirect effect of 
board task on the relationship between board 
processes and corporate social responsibility 
(legal and ethical) activities in Nigeria? 
 
 
1.4 Rationale for the Study 
Previously, the board of directors’ effectiveness in both developed and emerging economies 
received little attention in the corporate environment and academic circles. However, this has 
changed over time as now many countries have established a good system of corporate governance 
which is expected to guarantee board effectiveness. Moreover, scholars continue to make empirical 
contributions in this regard. Nevertheless, these studies keep on using the traditional approach and 
methodology of earlier findings on board effectiveness, even if such an approach seems obsolete. 
Thus, what is lacking now is a new perspective in board literature.  
Generally, evidence of what makes boards effective is still contradictory. These equivocal evidences 
are due to the input-output approach followed by researchers (Daily et al., 2003), whereby boards 
are treated as a ‘black box’ with considerable efforts to investigate the impact of some board 
characteristics (input), such as board size, diversity, proportion of outside directors and CEO duality 
on firm performance (output).  
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Gabrielsson and Huse (2004), reviewed studies of board effectiveness from six different academic 
sources and reported that 99 out of 127 articles have used an input-output approach. Similarly, a 
narrative (systematic) review of literature conducted in this thesis, (see Chapter 4), evinces that the 
majority of articles reviewed investigates the direct relationship between input and output. These 
kinds of studies use archival data and employed agency theory, either alone or as a leading 
theoretical framework, for example see Dalton et al., (1999), Dahya and McConnell (2005), 
O’Sullivan et al., (2016) and Volonté (2015). Similar studies from emerging markets include Abor 
and Biekpe (2007), Kajola (2008), Babatunde and Olaniran (2009), Ehikioya (2009), Uadiale (2010), 
Ujunwa (2012), Akpan and Amran (2014), Ilaboya and Obaretin (2015) and Wahba (2015).  
Empirical studies from this approach present equivocal findings (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005) and an 
over-reliance on these ‘usual suspects’ led researchers to ignore the influences of board internal 
processes on board-level and firm-level performance. Recently researchers were called to dismantle 
the fortresses (Daily et al., 2003) and open the ‘black box’ to identify the intervening processes 
between board characteristics and corporate performance (Pettigrew, 1992; Huse et al., 2011).  
Additionally researchers should not restrict firm performance on financial performance. Benefits from 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) should also be considered as it enhances firm performance, 
especially in the long-term. Previous studies that investigate the link between board characteristics 
and CSR are mostly from the US and are minimal (Wang and Coffey, 1992; Ibrahim and Angelidis, 
1995; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2017; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Leslie et al., 
2013; Shaukat et al., 2016). There is a dearth of research on this aspect (Coffey and Wang, 1998; 
Webb, 1998; Villiers et al., 2011), especially in developing countries. 
In Nigeria, a handful of studies, such as Uwuigbe and Uadiale (2011) and Oba and Fodio (2014), 
tried to link board structure with CSR. These studies and those conducted in developed economies 
concentrated mostly on an input-output approach, CSR disclosure, and used secondary (archival) 
data as the only source of data. Similarly, these studies continue to present equivocal findings. 
Therefore, more studies are needed to investigate what board structure does to affect social 
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performance instead of which board structure affects CSR performance. In other words, scholars 
should consider the impact of board processes on the relationship between board structure and firm 
(financial or social) performance.  
The few studies that contemplate this approach of considering the influence of board processes are 
mostly from developed economies and are focused on the relationship between board structure, 
processes and board or firm effectiveness (Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli 
et al., 2012). The only exception is the doctoral thesis of Ogbechie (2012) which investigates the 
relationships between board structure, processes and task effectiveness of Nigerian listed firms. 
However, this study did not examine the influence of board task on firm-level effectiveness. Similarly, 
Ogbechie’s work uses limited variables and a traditional analysis tool that does not account for 
measurement error.  
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge no empirical study has been conducted, especially on a 
developing nation, which investigates the systematic relationships between board characteristics, 
board processes, board task, and CSR. Following Li et al., (2008), this study argues that the 
effectiveness of any board characteristic, depends on its positive impact on CSR activities which 
provides long-term corporate performance. Therefore, it is essential for board processes’ scholars 
to consider CSR as the dependent variable.  
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Figure 1.1: Traditional Input-Output Approach 
Source: Daily et al., (2003) 
 
Figure 1.2: New Perspective: Input-Process-Output Approach 
Source: Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
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1.4.1 Importance of the Study to Nigeria 
There was a great hope for Nigeria held by its citizens after attaining independence from Britain in 
1960. However, fifty-eight years later, the country is still heavily underdeveloped with a lack of basic 
social amenities, such as electricity, potable drinking water, health facilities, good roads and effective 
transportation system. Unemployment is rapidly increasing among the youth and people are leaving 
under abject poverty. The country is sharply divided along religious, ethnicity and tribal tensions.  
Another major problem in the country is corruption. Recently, Global Financial Integrity (2015) has 
ranked Nigeria as the 10th biggest exporter of Illicit Financial Flows (IFF) from 2004 to 2013. IFF is 
caused mainly by corruption and is the most damaging economic problem faced by the emerging 
economy. Despite the fact that fighting corruption is one of the three main agendas of the present 
All Progressives Congress (APC) administration, Nigeria has recently ranked as one among the 
most corrupt countries worldwide according to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released by 
Transparency International (2017).  
Generally, existing studies suggest that Nigeria has a long history of corruption and an unethical 
attitude in both government and business activities (Idemudia and Ite, 2006). Moreover, most of the 
previous corporate scandals occurred due to incompetency and questionable, unethical and corrupt 
behaviours of board members. These scandals disrupted the economic stability of the country as it 
destroyed investors’ confidence and led to job losses in a country that is suffering from massive 
youth unemployment. Mr. Akanki in his paper noted that these Nigerian social-economic problems, 
mentioned above, have greater consequences for businesses (Ahunwan, 2002). 
Notwithstanding, Nigeria, as the most populous Black country in the world with a population of over 
180 million, abundant in land and natural resources (CIA, 2014) may serve as a potential for 
investment. This was noted among others by former U.S president Bill Clinton who, however, has 
called for the country to reorganise its house in order to attract more investors (Okike, 2007).  
Nigeria relies entirely on one source of revenue; the country’s economy largely depends on the oil 
sector, as it supplies 95 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings (Amaeshi et al., 2006). However, 
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rather than relying on oil and gas alone, especially with the recent oil price meltdown ($36/barrel), it 
is essential for Nigeria to have a sound corporate environment through effective corporate 
governance in order to attract foreign direct investments which can improve productivity and enhance 
economic growth. 
Furthermore, Nigeria has weak institutions, and at the same time, needs strong foreign investors. 
With a weak legal system operating in Nigeria, foreign investors may be scared to seek legal redress 
when their rights are violated (Collier, 2008). An effective board serves as a mechanism for 
ameliorating this weakness of legal institutions. Similarly, causes of the previous corporate scandals 
and the previous collapse of the Nigerian stock market can be eliminated with effective, ethical and 
incorruptible boards of directors. 
Another worrisome situation is that the government in Nigeria has failed to provide social basic 
amenities and adequate infrastructure for the people. As a result, Nigerians focus more on 
corporations to provide such amenities through CSR (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011). Failure of 
corporations to provide these basic needs of society may cause tensions that are likely to result in 
kidnappings, riots, insecurity and social unrest, which may consequently affect the survival of these 
firms. This can be resolved with effective and responsible boards of directors. 
Corporate governance aims to address two major agency problems: principals-agents and majority-
minority shareholders conflict of interest. These two problems are present in the Nigerian corporate 
environment. Firstly, the classical principals-agents agency problem whereby agents maximizes 
their utilities at the expense of the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), occurs in Nigeria and is 
worsened by the endemic corruption and lack of basic social amenities. Thus the managers (agents) 
use corporation’s assets unjustifiably to provide themselves with these amenities, for example 
electricity, water and health facilities abroad. Moreover, the ownership structure is highly 
concentrated in Nigeria  (Ahunwan, 2002), and the expropriation of the minority by the majority 
shareholders is common in the country, just like other developing nations with similar ownership 
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structures. Therefore, as the key corporate governance players, effective boards are expected to 
mitigate the agency problems mentioned above.  
The Nigerian Corporate Governance Code (2011) and the new proposed National Code intend to 
address the problems mentioned above, while also  ensuring that boards are effective and 
corporations operate effectively in the best interest of multiple principals (stakeholders), rather than 
one single principal (owner). In other words, these codes aim to prevent poor governance practices 
and ensure the effectiveness of the board of directors in performing their tasks and safeguarding the 
interest of stockholders and stakeholders. In this regard Nigerian boards became an interesting 
subject to conduct research on in order to find what actually makes boards effective in curtailing 
these unwarranted behaviours and satisfy the interest of various stakeholders, based on the 
expectation of the country’s corporate governance code.  
Empirical studies on boards in Nigeria are scanty and mostly based on an input-output approach, 
mainly to investigate the relationship between board characteristics and financial performance 
(Kajola, 2008; Babatunde and Olaniran, 2009; Ehikioya, 2009; Uadiale, 2010; Ujunwa, 2012), or 
explore the impact of board characteristics on CSR disclosure (Uwuigbe and Uadiale, 2011; Uwuigbe 
et al., 2011; Oba and Fodio, 2014). These studies mostly used archival data and failed to recognise 
the intervening board processes that influence the relationship between input and output. To the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no empirical study that investigates the relationships 
between board characteristics, board processes, task effectiveness and CSR activities in Nigeria.  
This study believes that board effectiveness is determined by certain process variables that need to 
be understood through different empirical board research. A theoretical framework developed by 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) has been adapted, amended, expanded and empirically tested in Nigeria, 
a developing country. Forbes and colleague developed an input-processes-output framework, but 
did not test it empirically.  Nevertheless, Wan and Ong (2005), Zona and Zattoni (2007) and Bettinelli 
(2011) tested similar frameworks in Singapore and Italy, respectively.  
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However, both scholars used a limited (or none) number of board characteristics. Wan and Ong 
(2005) consider proportion of NEDs and CEO duality as the dependent variables, while Bettinelli 
(2011) uses only board composition, with a proportion of outside directors as proxy, as predictor 
variables. Zona and Zattoni (2007) did not include board structure in their model. Moreover, both 
studies employed similar methodology in their analysis. Bettinelli (2011) and Zona and Zattoni (2007) 
used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis, whereas Wan and Ong (2005) employed 
multiple and hierarchical regressions to test the hypotheses. These methodologies do not perfectly 
account for measurement error and unaccounted measurement errors would attenuate the studies’ 
findings (Brown, 2015).  Additionally, these studies do not consider the influence of board task on 
overall firm performance.  
This current study examines the systematic relationships between board characteristics, board 
processes, board task and corporate social responsibility activities with evidence from directors of 
quoted firms in Nigeria, a developing country. Importantly, a second generation multivariate analysis 
tool (Partial Least Squares-Structural Equation Modelling) which correctly accounts for 
measurement error, has been used as the main data analysis tool. Moreover, this study serves as 
an extension to the work of the previous scholars, as four board characteristics (board size, 
proportion of NEDs, CEO duality and board gender diversity) are considered as the exogenous 
variables. In addition to board task effectiveness, the relationship between board task and firm 
performance (with CSR as the endogenous variable) is examined in this study. Thus, the current 
study investigates board effectiveness at both board and firm levels. 
1.5 Contributions  
In order to ascertain board effectiveness, this study opens the ‘black box’ and examines the 
systematic relationships between board characteristics, board processes, board task and CSR legal 
and ethical activities with empirical evidence from a developing economy, Nigeria. The study makes 
the following contributions: 
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 It contributes empirically and theoretically on board literature by examining factors 
responsible for board effectiveness beyond board characteristics, the usual suspects, in the 
Nigerian corporate environment and its context as a developing nation. 
 
 The study introduces a new model of input-processes-output approach that includes 
corporate social responsibility activities (see Figure 3.8). Most of the studies of this line 
investigate the relationships between board structure, processes and board task 
effectiveness (Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2012). This 
research is an extension of these studies, therefore, making a contribution to the relevant 
literature. 
 The majority of board scholars investigate the influence of the board on either firm-level 
effectiveness (e.g. Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995; Liu  et al., 2015; Ehikioya, 2009; Wahba, 
2015) or board-level effectiveness (e.g. Bettinelli, 2011; Minichilli et al., 2009; and Wan and 
Ong, 2005). This study presents a comprehensive picture of board effectiveness in which 
both the board’s and firm’s levels of effectiveness are considered. 
 The current study provides information to policymakers and to boards of directors on what 
boards do in order to influence their effectiveness and determine the effects of board task on 
corporate social responsibility activities in the Nigerian context. 
 The methodology adopted makes this the first empirical study in Nigeria to use structural 
equation modeling, particularly partial least square-structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) 
to examine direct and indirect relationships of board characteristics, processes, board task 
and corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities of the Nigerian listed firms. 
 
1.6 Research Stages 
The main aim of this research is to investigate board effectiveness beyond the traditional input-output 
approach. Specifically, the study examines the relationships between board characteristics, board 
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internal processes, board task and corporate social responsibility activities. Figure 1.3 below shows 
the stages involved in this research. After the brief research introduction and background, the context 
(Nigeria) under investigation is discussed. The research process continues with discussion of 
corporate governance theories that are suitable for this study, followed by definitions and 
explanations of concepts included in the research model. The next stage (chapter 4) involves 
conducting a narrative (systematic) literature review in which empirical findings from previous 
relevant studies are analysed and literature gaps are identified.  A theoretical framework developed 
by Forbes and Milliken in 1999 is adapted in order to address the research questions and achieve 
the research aim. 
At the next stage, the methodology appropriate to collect and analyse data is identified and 
discussed. The quantitative approach is the main research methodology employed in this study. 
However, some interviews were conducted to determine whether the framework adopted was 
applicable in the Nigerian context. The findings of the interviews lead to necessary amendments to 
the initial framework and literature is consulted to develop the research hypotheses. Subsequent 
stages of the thesis involve quantitative results presentation and discussion, followed by highlighting 
limitations, future directions, implications, and concluding remarks.  
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Figure 1. 3: Research Stages 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is arranged into eight chapters. Following the introductory chapter, a brief 
history of Nigerian corporate governance development is presented in Chapter two. Also, a summary 
of the relevant provisions of the Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission Corporate 
Governance Code (2011) is presented in this chapter. Moreover, the main theories employed for this 
study were also introduced. These theories are agency theory, resource dependency theory, and 
stakeholder theory. The chapter also briefly introduces all the variables included in this study, defines 
the variables and provides a background discussion of each variable. Moreover, the chapter 
discusses the concepts of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.  
Chapter three presents a systemic (narrative) literature review of the selected relevant literature on 
board effectiveness and literature gaps are identified. At the end of the chapter, the research 
conceptual framework and hypotheses to be tested in order to address the research questions are 
presented. In Chapter four, research methodologies used by previous relevant scholars are 
discussed. The research philosophical assumptions, research methodology employed for data 
collection and analysis are also presented in this chapter. The chapter also gives detailed 
explanations and justifications for the chosen analysis tool (partial least squares structural equation 
modeling). Discussions and results of data screening are likewise presented in this chapter and it 
comprises discussions on missing data, non-response bias, common method bias, and normality 
distributions. The chapter summarises the qualitative design process and the main findings from the 
interviews conducted.   
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The next chapter (five) presents the research findings. It starts with the presentation of the 
descriptive analysis of all variables under investigation, followed by the results of the measurement 
(outer) model. It is at this stage that the results of validity and reliability tests are discussed.  Also in 
this chapter, findings from an evaluation of the structural (inner) model are presented. This includes 
results from path coefficients, R squares, effect size, the model predictive relevance (Q2) and the 
significance of the results through bootstrapping analysis. 
Chapter six summarises and discusses the study findings. Research contributions and policy 
implications are highlighted in this chapter. Moreover, the chapter presents concluding remarks and 
identifies the limitations of the current study. Directions for future scholars are offered. Relevant 
supporting documents are attached as appendices. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE RESEARCH CONTEXT, THEORIES AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
2.0 Introduction 
In Chapter one above, the importance of the current study to Nigeria is highlighted. Similarly, 
previous corporate governance abuses of some companies and more recent cases are discussed. 
In this chapter, the history and development of corporate governance in Nigeria are introduced in 
section 2.1. The chapter also presents a summary of relevant provisions of the Nigerian Security 
and Exchange Commission governance code (2011) in section 2.2.  
A board is the highest decision-making body of an organisation and is expected to perform multiple 
tasks. Each task has a different implication for the diverse corporate governance theories available. 
This study uses multiple theories to study the influence of board members on multiple tasks and firm-
level effectiveness. This Chapter discusses the three common corporate governance theories 
employed in this study. Furthermore, the chapter introduces the variables included in this study.   
Board characteristics variables included in this study are: board size (total number of directors), 
board composition (proportion of NEDs), CEO duality (separation of duties between CEO and 
chairman) and board gender diversity (proportion of women directors). The board processes 
examined include commitment (efforts made by directors inside and outside the boardroom), 
challenge (directors’ level of disagreements or differences on opinions and ideas) and knowledge 
utilisation (the extent to which the board utilises the human capital available in the boardroom). The 
ability of directors to perform their monitoring roles (control task) and provide adequate resources to 
the firm (service task) are the two variables considered as board tasks in this study. Legal and ethical 
corporate social responsibility activities are the two CSR dimensions examined in this research. 
Section 2.3 discusses board and theoretical perspectives relevant to this study. Agency theory, 
resource dependency theory and stakeholder theory are the three theories that serve as the 
theoretical lens of this study. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present brief explanations and definitions of 
relevant board characteristics and processes, respectively. Section 2.6 explains briefly the board 
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tasks mostly considered in the literature. Section 2.7 introduces the concepts of corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. A summary of the chapter is presented in section 
2.8. 
2.1 Brief History of Nigerian Corporate Governance  
Nigeria, a country situated in West Africa which borders with Cameron and Chad in the East, Niger 
in the North and Benin in the West. The country is considered to be Africa’s most populous nation 
with over 180 million people and more than 500 ethnic groups situated within the 36 states and the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (see Figure 2.1). Nigeria is the world’s eighth largest oil producer 
(CIA, 2014). The country had been under British colonial rule, but regained independence in 1960. 
This led to many aspects of the country having close ties to Britain including its corporate governance 
system. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Nigeria              
Source: Nigerian High Commission 
 
The first set of companies that started operating in Nigeria were foreign firms registered in England, 
notable among them is the Royal Niger Company (formerly known as National African Company). 
These firms’ shareholders are mostly foreign investors and their activities are guided according to 
the laws and ideologies of the British corporate governance system (Orojo, 1992). It was not until 
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after Nigeria attained independence in 1960 that the Companies Act (1968) was introduced and 
replaced the Companies Ordinance of 1922 which completely served the interest of British investors.  
Later, the Nigerian government came up with policies and strategies aimed to improve indigenous 
ownership. Firstly, only the government could control the ownership of public infrastructures, such 
as electricity, telecommunication, shipping, ports and air travel. Secondly, for the other sectors, the 
government restricted foreign ownership through the Foreign Exchange Control Act (FX Act) of 1962 
and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 1972 (Ahunwan, 2002). Figure 2.2 
summarises the history and development of the Nigerian corporate governance. 
The FX Act (1962) restricted the transfer of shares to non-Nigerians and the NEPD Decree (1972) 
created three types of schedules of enterprises: (1) those exclusively for Nigerians (2) those that 
foreign investors cannot hold more than 40 per cent and (3) those enterprises in which foreign 
investors cannot hold more than 60 per cent. However, in order to ensure sufficient capital is injected 
into the economy and managerial expertise is employed, the Nigerian Privatisation and 
Commercialisation Decree provides an opportunity for foreigners to retain up to 40 per cent of the 
privatised companies. 
In 1990, the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) replaced the Companies Act (1968). It is 
worth mentioning here that the Nigerian corporate governance system cannot completely be 
separated from CAMA. Despite the fact that corporate governance is not an identical concept, certain 
CAMA provisions (see Sections 279 and 280), especially pertaining to the board of directors’ 
responsibilities, are still the foundation of good governance practice in Nigeria (Okike, 2007). 
However, the Act failed to sufficiently address the corporate challenges faced at that time. Therefore, 
the Nigerian government through the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), in conjunction with 
the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), set up a committee of seventeen members headed by 
Atedo Peterside, who was charged with the responsibility of identifying and addressing the 
weaknesses of current governance practices among public businesses in Nigeria and devise a code 
of best corporate governance that meets international best practice. The committee issued their 
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report in 2003 in which provisions are contained that are aimed to strengthen the governance system 
in the country and by which all public listed companies in Nigeria are expected to comply or explain 
otherwise. It is essential to highlight that it was not until 2011 that an updated version of the code of 
best corporate governance practice was introduced and a further revision produced in 2014. 
Corporate abuses and failures of some firms, both within and outside Nigeria, made the SEC (2003) 
Corporate Governance Code inefficient to deal with these challenges. The Nigerian government was 
reluctant to make changes to the then current governance system and this led to certain sectors, 
such as Banking, Insurance, Pensions and Communications industries, establishing their own 
corporate governance codes to address issues not dealt with by the SEC (2003) Code.  
Post consolidation of the Nigerian banking industry in 2005, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) issued 
a code of corporate governance in 2006 and was applicable to all licensed banks and other financial 
institutions operating in Nigeria. The CBN code (2006) recommends that the responsibility of the 
chairmen shall be clearly separated with that of the Managing Director (MD) or CEO, and having 
same family members serving as chairman and CEO/MD of the same bank at a particular point of 
time is also discouraged. The code further requires adequate disclosure and transparency of 
financial statements. The CBN code recommends banks to establish risk management, audit and 
credit committees as a minimum. 
In a similar development, after reform of the Nigerian pension sector, the Nigerian Pension 
Commission (PENCOM) issued their own industrial code of corporate governance in 2008. The 
PENCOM code (2008) places emphasis on a balanced board that comprises of inside and outside 
directors with at least one independent director. The code also recommends the separation of duties 
between chairman and CEO/MD of pension firms, so that an independent and accountable board 
can be achieved. PENCOM (2008) requires boards to organise the firm’s business operations and 
appropriate strategy which ensures the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders are satisfied 
(Aguilera and Cazurra, 2004). 
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In March 2009, the Nigerian Insurance Commission (NAICOM) introduced a code of corporate 
governance and the application of the code was made mandatory for all the insurance companies 
under the supervision of NAICOM. The code charges board of directors to set the firm’s strategy and 
oversee the management activities. It recommends a board size of not less than seven and not more 
than fifteen and should consist of executive and non-executive directors with at least one 
independent director. NAICOM code (2009) emphasises the need boards to have two separate 
individuals to occupy the positions of chairman and MD/CEO. 
The Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) introduced corporate governance best 
international practices for the telecommunication sector in 2014 and compliance was necessary for 
all telecommunication firms operating in Nigeria that are licensed by the NCC (see section 1 of NCC 
code 2014). The code insists that telecommunication firms operate in the best interest of all 
stakeholders and report unambiguous and transparent financial statements to their stakeholders in 
a timely manner. It recommends the separation of duties between chairman and CEO, and urges 
companies to establish board committees that are appropriate in performing their responsibilities. 
These different sectorial corporate governance codes create confusion, as sometimes a particular 
mechanism may have different provisions. Fortunately, the Nigerian government through the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) harmonised these corporate governance codes that are currently 
in existence across many sectors and established the National Code of Corporate Governance.  
The harmonised code was supposed to come into effect from October 2017, but the code was 
suspended due to a court injunction issued that prevented further consideration on the draft copy of 
the new National Corporate Governance Code. Fortunately, the court case is over and the FRC 
reissued a new draft of the harmonised code on 13 June 2018 in Lagos with twenty-eight principles 
of corporate governance and 230 practices on how Nigerian firms should implement the principles. 
As the new National Code is not in use yet, the SEC Code (2011) and its updated versions are still 
in operation for public listed companies. Figure 2.2 summarises the history and development of the 
Nigerian corporate governance. 
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Figure 2.2: History and Development of CG in Nigeria 
Source: Author and Synthesis of the Literature 
 
2.2 Brief Summary of Nigerian SEC Code (2011) 
Corporate governance, in general, and what makes a ‘good board,’ in particular, were neglected in 
Nigeria, as it was not until 2003 that a code of good corporate governance was established and a 
revised version issued in 2011. As mentioned earlier, the country operates a series of CG codes with 
different sectors practicing different codes which include the SEC Code 2011, CG Codes for Nigerian 
banks 2006 (revised in 2012), the Code for Licensed Pensions 2008, the Code for the Insurance 
Commission 2009 and the Code for the Nigerian Communications Commission. Fortunately, the 
government harmonised these codes into the National Code of Corporate Government and the aim 
is to have a unified CG system. However, as mentioned earlier, the provisions of the new code are 
not on commencement yet.  
Primarily, Nigeria practise governance which upholds shareholders’ supremacy more than any other 
country in Africa (Rossouw, 2005). However Nigeria’s corporate governance development shows a 
paradigm shift from extensive shareholders’ wealth maximisation to enlightened shareholders’ value, 
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where interests of other stakeholders are also considered. Provisions of the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Code of Corporate Governance (2011) are set in a way that the companies 
through the board of directors are properly and ethically managed and ensure satisfaction of both 
shareholders and other stakeholders. The code states that “the principal objective of the board is to 
ensure that the company is properly managed” (SEC code 2011, p.8) and operates ethically 
according to Nigeria’s laws. 
For shareholders and stakeholders’ interests to be protected, Nigerian boards are expected to 
provide both monitoring and service roles to the firms. According to the SEC (2011) code: “it is the 
responsibility of the board to oversee the effective performance of the management in order to 
protect and enhance shareholder’s value and to meet the company’s obligations to its employees 
and other stakeholders” (p.8). The interest of stakeholders should be satisfied through effective CSR 
initiatives, which may also improve the overall firm’s performance. The SEC code (2011) code 
recommends the firms to pay adequate attention to the interests of their various stakeholders and 
the boards should “report annually on the nature and extent of its social, ethical, safety, health and 
environmental policies and practices” (p.34).  
Furthermore, the code recommends that the board should set the firm’s strategy and provide 
strategic advice and guidance, and to also ensure that available human and financial resources are 
utilised towards attaining those goals. Similarly the, SEC code (2011) code considers board 
members to be “individuals with upright personal characteristics, relevant core competencies and 
entrepreneurial spirit” (p.10), as such board members serve as means of resources to the firm. 
For boards to achieve these double responsibilities, that is to provide monitoring and service roles 
in order to satisfy the interests of both the owners and other stakeholders, the SEC code (2011) 
Code prescribes board size not to be less than five but more importantly, “of a sufficient size relative 
to the scale of complexity of the company’s operation and be composed in such a way as to ensure 
diversity of experience without compromising independence, compatibility, integrity and availability 
of members to attend meetings” (p.9).  
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The SEC code (2011) stresses that firms are to establish appropriate board committees, in addition 
to audit, risk management and governance/remuneration committees. The board should also have 
an appropriate mixture of executive and non-executive directors with majority board members to be 
NEDs and at least one to be an independent non-executive director (SEC, 2011). Section 5.1b of 
the code emphasises that boards are to be independent of the management and recommends that 
the position of Chairman and CEO shall be separated. Moreover, more than two family members 
should not sit on a particular board at the same time (SEC, 2011). 
The current study’s aim is to investigate the relationships between board characteristics, board 
processes, board task and CSR legal and ethical activities. This is in order to determine exactly what 
makes Nigerian boards effective in performing these tasks (monitoring and service) and satisfying 
the interest of various stakeholders (shareholders inclusive) through CSR initiatives, as required by 
the Nigerian Code.  
2.3 Research theoretical Perspective 
Generally, boards’ fiduciary duties can be classified into control, resource provision and strategic 
advisory roles. These involve monitoring of the executives and provision of critical resources needed 
and strategic decisions for the firm (Goodstein et al., 1994). Studies on the effectiveness of boards 
to perform these duties are still not clear. Some studies argue that boards are symbolic, passive and 
serve as the mere ‘rubber-stamp’ of the executives (Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989), while 
others indicate that board members are no longer a ‘rubber stamp’ and that they perform their 
fiduciary duties effectively (Morgan, 1999). Corporate governance theories such as agency, 
stakeholders and resource dependency theories present the theoretical explanations of how boards 
perform their fiduciary duties and how that influence corporate financial or social performance. 
This research uses multiple theories to study the influence of board members on multiple tasks and 
firm-level effectiveness. Agency theory, resource dependency theory and stakeholder theory are the 
three theories that serve as the theoretical lens of this study. The three corporate governance 
theories mentioned above are employed and are complementing each other in order to fully capture 
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board effectiveness in Nigeria. An effective board should sufficiently monitor and control the 
opportunistic agents (agency theory), provide adequate guidance, strategic advice and critical 
resources to the firm (resource dependency theory) for the betterment of all those that can affect or 
be affected by the firm (stakeholder theory). These three theories are integrated into this research, 
as a single theory will not be able to sufficiently capture a complete picture of board effectiveness 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  
According to the SEC Code (2011), firms shall pay adequate attention to the interests of their various 
stakeholders, and the boards to “report annually on the nature and extent of its social, ethical, safety, 
health and environmental policies and practices” (p.34). Also, the code recommends that the board 
should set the firm’s strategy and provide strategic advice and guidance. Furthermore, the Nigerian 
code also requires the protection of shareholders’ interest (especially minority) through the board 
monitoring role. Agency problem needs to be addressed as it is common in any non-transparent 
country such as Nigeria (Yakasai, 2001).  
It is believed that giving the Nigerian Code requirements mentioned above, these three theories 
employed in this research, are the most appropriate to use in any corporate governance study in 
Nigeria (see Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011). Additionally, the research conceptual framework 
requires the use of multiple theories rather than a single theory to be able to fully capture board 
effectiveness. 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
The model of a man described by agency theory can be traced back in the work of Adams Smith 
which argues that it is difficult for a manager to behave as if he owns the firm’s assets (Fama, 1980). 
This typically indicates that there may likely be a divergent of interests between the manager and 
the owner of the assets. In fact,  Berle and Means (1932) emphasise a need to separate ownership 
and control. The executives should have the responsibility of decision management while 
shareholders (represented by a board) are responsible for decision control.  
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In a principal-agent relationship, owners (principals) contract the executives (agents) to manage the 
day-to-day activities of the firm on behalf of the former (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and this scenario 
leads principals to lose total control of their investment. The possibilities of engaging in opportunistic 
behaviour by the agents are very likely, because the managers are more knowledgeable, skillful and 
informed than the shareholders.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), describe agency theory as a relationship between the agents and 
principals whereby the latter delegate duties to the former and expect the agent to perform such 
duties in his (the owner’s) best interest. For Jensen and Meckling, managers may engage in 
opportunistic behaviour at the expense of the shareholders; therefore, certain internal and external 
control mechanisms need to be in place to checkmate any utility maximization of the agents. 
Typically, the interests of the shareholders differ from that of the managers. For the former, their aim 
is to maximise profit and ensure maximum return on their investment, while an agent’s interest is to 
maximise his utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In a situation whereby the two divergent interests 
are aligned, that is shareholders’ wealth maximisation and agent self-benefits maximisation are 
aligned, the agency problem will not arise. An agency problem occurs when the executives engage 
in self-serving behaviour at the expense of the shareholders’ wealth. In this situation, internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms are required to mitigate the agency problems that are 
likely to arise (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The board of directors is the main internal corporate governance mechanism (Bawhede, 2010), and 
according to agency theory, these corporate leaders are expected to provide effective monitoring of 
the executives and ensure their behaviours are consistent with the interest of shareholders. 
Executive incentives are another internal governance mechanism that motivates the executives to 
act in the best interest of the owners (Dalton et al., 2007). If these internal corporate governance 
mechanisms fail to address the agency problems, external mechanisms, such as merger, acquisition 
and divestitures, are imposed to mitigate agency costs (Walsh and Seward, 1990).  
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Agency theory considers the board and its attributes, such as board size, the proportion of non-
executive directors and the separation of duties between the CEO and chairperson, as the main 
internal CG mechanisms. The fiduciary duty of the board is to control, monitor, compensate and 
discipline the agents (Bawhede, 2010), so that the agents act in the best interest of the owner. This 
addresses the agency problems that may arise in the principal-agent relationship.  Additionally, 
another set of agency problems that may arise, which is common in Nigeria and other developing 
countries, is the abuse of minority shareholders’ rights by the majority stockholders. Nigerian 
corporate governance emphasises the responsibility of the board of directors to curtail both the two 
dimensions of agency problems that may arise. The SEC (2011) Code recommends boards to 
ensure sufficient monitoring of managers, so that their actions and inactions are in the best interest 
of the shareholders. At the same time, the Code wants boards to mitigate the abuses of minority 
shareholders’ rights by the large shareholders. 
The main focus of agency theory is shareholders’ wealth maximization. However, maximum return 
on investment, especially in the long-term, may be possible, if firms operate ethically and are socially 
responsible to the society. Failure of an organisation to address social responsibility issues may 
harm the shareholders’ wealth through actions, such as payments of penalties, product boycott, 
employee ineffectiveness and negative press (Lenssen et al., 2007). This may damage the firm’ 
reputation and may subsequently lead to its collapse. 
Raelin and Bondy (2013) argue that the agency theory does not only explain the principal-agent 
(shareholder-manager) relationship, but also the shareholder-society relationship. They termed the 
former as the first layer and the latter as the second layer of agency theory, advocating that the 
board should satisfy the interest of shareholders without compromising the interests of society. Both 
layers are important for an effective board and good corporate governance practice. Directors should 
design appropriate strategic plans, such as CSR initiatives and effectively monitor managers to 
ensure that the strategic plans are adhered to. 
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2.3.2 Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory is rooted in sociology and organisational disciplines and received more 
attention in the 1970s (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Rather than view the board as monitors of the 
executives, this theory considers the board of directors as a mechanism to acquire critical resources 
needed by the firm. A director is expected to provide human and relational capital to the firm (Hillman 
et al., 2000). Human capital refers to the director’s competencies, knowledge, skills and expertise, 
while relational capital is the network and connection a director possesses, such as ties with other 
boards (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) and the society in which the firm operates. 
For example, appointing a director who gets access to critical resources, such as lawyers, 
accountants and doctors, onto the board provides an opportunity for the firm to acquire knowledge 
and information relating to these resources for free or at a reduced cost. Similarly, politically-
connected directors are likely to receive favours from the government for their focal firms. Price 
(1963) concludes that appointments of this kind of director to the board benefits their focal firms by 
influencing their constituencies. 
Provision of these resources through social ties have a significant effect on board-level and firm-
level performance (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 2000). In view of the resource dependency theory, board 
effectiveness is determined by the ability of the directors to provide the critical resources needed for 
the firm. This can be achieved if the board has directors with a diverse background, experience, 
expertise and the right connections inside and outside of the industry in which the firm operates. This 
theory argues that the responsibility of board members is more aligned to providing useful 
information, expertise, skills, advice and counsel to the firm or contributing to the firm’s reputation 
rather than monitoring of the executives. The Nigerian Corporate Governance Code stresses to the 
boards of the listed firms the need to ensure that they serve as means of resource to their firms. The 
Code recommends boards to set the firm’s strategy, provide strategic advice and guidance, as well 
as making sure that human and financial resources are available and utilised effectively.  
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The ability of the board to provide resources to the firm reduces uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972), 
decreases dependency on external contingencies and lowers transaction costs (Salancik and 
Pfeffer, 1978). This provision of adequate resources by the boards may enhance a firms’ competitive 
advantage, at the same time guarantee adequate support from the various stakeholders. In this vein, 
stakeholders’ wants and needs are satisfied through corporate social responsibility activities which 
are possible through the availability of resources in the firm.  
Moreover, board members are expected to have a societal and professional background, so that 
resources and timely information from the external environment can easily be tapped and made 
available to the firm (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). They should also provide the firm with information 
about the wants of various stakeholders. In this capacity, the board serves as boundary spanner 
between the firm and the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Linking resource dependency theory with stakeholder theory, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that 
a board’s effectiveness is their ability to manage the demands of the various stakeholder groups that 
provide the support and resources needed by the firm. According to the resource dependency theory, 
the responsibility of a board is to serve the firm with the crucial resources needed through appropriate 
ties with the external environment and provision of useful advice and counsel to the managers when 
making strategic decisions. Serving the firm in this way is also a means of ensuring decisions are 
made in the best interest of the society who provides the resources.  
2.3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
The basic assumption of stakeholder theory is that the traditional emphasis on shareholders’ wealth 
maximization at all costs should be avoided and corporations should operate in the best interest of 
all stakeholders (shareholders’ inclusive). Freeman (1984) opines that boards should be accountable 
to “any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisations’ 
objectives” (p.46), such as shareholders, employees, customers, creditors, government and society 
at large.  
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For instance, if a firm collapses, employees may face difficulties in getting another job and so, 
workers will have an interest or ‘stake’ in the affairs of the company. Similarly, customers may be 
unable to obtain a replacement of the firm’s product, if it stops operations and creditors may lose 
their money, if the firm is unable to pay its debt (bankrupt). Likewise, the community may be 
adversely affected by unemployment and a lack of CSR activities, if the firm closes. Moreover, these 
groups of stakeholders affect the firm in a way that the company cannot operate effectively without 
their contributions. Therefore, stakeholder groups are important organs that firms need to consider 
in their decisions. The argument here is that firms have responsibilities beyond the fiduciary duties 
to shareholders (Carroll, 1979).  
However, some scholars such as Sternberg (1997) argue that for board members to be accountable 
for all stakeholders, they are actually accountable to no one.  As such, the author contends that 
managers are free to engage in self-serving behaviour at the expense of owners’ capital. 
Nevertheless, it is essential to note that the perspective of stakeholder theory does not mean that 
shareholders’ interests are to be compromised rather the aim is to achieve a win-win situation 
between shareholders and stakeholders. That is when satisfying the interests of the shareholders, 
the needs and wants of the stakeholders should be addressed as well (Kakabadse et al., 2005). In 
fact, the instrumental stakeholder approach maintains that satisfying the interests of stakeholders 
enhance maximization of shareholders’ funds, especially in the long-term. Generally, directors are 
encouraged to consider the interest of other stakeholders and environmental issues in their decisions 
(Freeman, 1984).  
For the board to be effective, stakeholder theory advocates that the board should be comprised of 
representatives from important stakeholders groups, such as those mentioned above. The argument 
being that it serves normative and instrumental purposes as firms feel morally obliged and at the 
same time it ‘gives a sense of belonging’ to these groups, which enhances the support base from 
the groups and facilitates the firms’ reputation and legitimacy. There is no doubt that shareholders’ 
wealth maximization is the main responsibility of Nigerian firms and should be taken seriously, but it 
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should not be performed illegally and unethically. The Nigerian governance system places the 
responsibility on boards to ensure firms operate ethically and abide by the laws of the land (SEC, 
2011) and also ensure justification for sharing the value created. Accordingly, the board should make 
certain the benefit generated is shared among the shareholders and employees, as well as maximum 
consideration is given to the interests of other stakeholders (SEC, 2011). 
There is an intertwining relationship between the concepts of stakeholder theory and corporate social 
responsibility, as literature from the two concepts is built on each other. The latter is about the social 
responsibility a firm needs to fulfill, while the former is about being responsible and accountable to 
various stakeholders (Kakabadse et al., 2005). Both stakeholder theory and CSR focus on the 
responsibilities of board members beyond satisfying the interest of shareholders alone, instead 
focusing on the interests of all stakeholders. Accordingly, boards of directors should be 
knowledgeable and inform the executives of the importance and expectations of various 
stakeholders, so that it can be articulated in the strategy decision-making (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; 
Mallin and Michelon, 2011) to ensure these expectations are met and this can be achieved through 
effective CSR strategic planning. 
The three corporate governance theories discussed above are employed as the theoretical 
framework of this study. The SEC (2011) Code emphasises firms to pay adequate attention to the 
interests of their various stakeholders, and the boards to “report annually on the nature and extent 
of its social, ethical, safety, health and environmental policies and practices” (p.34). Also, the code 
recommends that the board should set the firm’s strategy and provide strategic advice and guidance. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian code also requires the protection of shareholders’ interest (especially 
minority) through the board monitoring role. Agency problem needs to be addressed as it is common 
in any non-transparent country such as Nigeria (Yakasai, 2001).  
2.4 Board Characteristics 
Four board characteristics are considered in this study: board size, board composition, CEO duality 
and board gender diversity. These characteristics are often used in investigating board effectiveness 
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and are termed the ‘usual suspects’ in corporate governance literature (e.g. Gabrielson and Huse 
2004). However, findings on these ‘usual suspects’ are mixed.  Therefore, more empirical studies 
are needed in a different context and using different methods and approach, in order to ascertain 
the effectiveness of these variables. 
2.4.1 Board Size 
Board size refers to the total number of directors sitting on a particular board (Judge and Zeithaml, 
1992). A board can be small, medium or large, each with different advantages and implications 
supported by different organisational theories and a country’s system of governance. For instance, 
in the UK and other Anglo-Saxon countries boards are encouraged not be too large. In Nigeria, good 
corporate governance practice (SEC code, 2011) recommends that board size should not to be less 
than five, but more importantly, “of a sufficient size relative to the scale of complexity of the 
company’s operation” (p.9). Therefore, Nigerian companies are encouraged to have a board that is 
not too small, but of a size that suits their needs. 
According to agency theory, a small board is more coordinated and independent in controlling the 
agent (Jensen, 1993). Whereas a large board is ineffective, as it may result in sub-teams within the 
board which could lead to the board becoming inactive in monitoring the executives and easily 
dominated by the chief executive. However, the proponents of large boards argue that the greater 
number of directors available on the board, the more resources of human and relational capital can 
be acquired from the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This increases the chances 
of appointing experts and skilful women and minority groups on the board, which enhance diverse 
views in decision making (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). This is consistent with the resource dependency 
theory which argues that the main duty of the board is to provide critical resources, (such as 
knowledge, finance, reputation, strategy advice, and counsel), to the firm, rather than monitoring 
managers as postulated by agency theory.  
Pressure from stakeholders may force a firm to have a larger board size (Hillman et al., 2001). This 
is in line with the stakeholder theory which supports boards that consist of representations from each 
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stakeholder group. In this situation, the company sends a positive signal to the community that the 
firm is a moral citizen and subsequently, enhances corporate legitimacy.  
However, it is essential to understand that the relationship between board size and corporate 
performance is not as straightforward as expected, as it likely depends on the contextual and firm-
specific contingencies (Essen et al., 2013). For example, in a highly competitive and complicated 
industry a larger board size, which provides diverse knowledge and experience from many directors, 
is more beneficial than a small board because these benefits outweigh problems associated with the 
large board (Kaymak and Bektas, 2008). While a small board is more appropriate for small firms with 
less complicated activities and operations. 
2.4.2 Board Composition 
Board composition is mostly referred to as the mixture of executive and non-executive directors. A 
board member can be either an executive or non-executive director (NED). The former is an insider 
that manages the day-to-day activities of the firms, while NED is an outside director that is 
independent of the management and serves as a representative of the shareholders. Short et al., 
(1999), termed NEDs as “corporate watchdogs” (p.339), as they checkmate the activities of the 
executives to ensure corporations are directed according to the established procedures. A non-
executive, also referred to as outside director, may be affiliated or a completely independent director. 
An affiliated director has either personal or professional ties with the firm, while an independent NED 
has no link with the firms, either directly or indirectly.  
Like in the UK, firms in Nigeria operate unitary board system where all decisions and directions of 
the firms are taken. Such boards find it necessary to have mixture of inside and outside directors on 
the board which may facilitate board independence, integrity and diversity of knowledge and 
experience (Okike, 2007). Ejuvbekpokpo and Usuike (2013) explain that the Nigerian CG Code 
recommends that more than half of the board be made up of NEDs and should be able to provide 
independent judgment, plus the “necessary scrutiny to the proposals and actions of the management 
on issues of strategy, performance evaluation and key appointments” (p.55). This implies that an 
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adequate proportion of NEDs on the board is expected to improve board control task, which 
consequently enhances overall corporate performance.  Nevertheless, theories and empirical 
evidence continue to present contradicting remarks on the effectiveness of NEDs in performing their 
fiduciary duties.  
According to the agency theory, a board that is dominated by executive directors (ED) lacks the 
necessary independence to perform their monitoring role and therefore, emphasised the need for a 
reasonable proportion of NEDs on the board (Dahya and McConnell, 2007). However, it is argued 
that the proportion of outside directors does not guarantee board independence, as boards are found 
to be executives’ rubber stamp, answerable to CEOs, as well as play symbolic and passive roles 
(Mace, 1971). The NEDs that serve as a mechanism that provide independence to the board are 
ineffective monitors of the executive, as it was found that executive directors decide on their 
appointment and remuneration (Dahya and McConnell, 2007). Furthermore, it is argued that a higher 
proportion of NEDs on the board is likely to have an adverse effect on other board roles, such as 
resource co-optation and strategy advisory, as the board may concentrate on excessive monitoring 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Gomes and Novaes, 2006). 
Nevertheless, resource dependency and stakeholder theories argue that NEDs possess diverse 
experience, knowledge, networks and acquire critical resources and the reputation needed by the 
firm, through establishing an external relationship with various stakeholders (Certo et al., 2001). 
Outside directors have access to resources needed to manage stakeholders’ claims as they possess 
different backgrounds and experience from education, law and not-for profit organisations and are 
representative of the external environment (Zhang et al., 2013). Similarly, it is argued that a 
proportion of NEDs on the board increases the ability of the board to have different viewpoints on 
the issues that deal with the environment and stakeholders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).  
Zahra et al., (1993) argue that maintaining a proportion of outside directors represents a more 
diverse board with the possibility of appointing more gender, ethnic and racial diversity. This 
increases the social responsibility related to community, minorities and women (Johnson and 
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Greening, 1999). Additionally, outside directors serve as a mechanism to acquire resources through 
board interlock, as they serve in more than one board, have the privilege to co-opt resources from 
another firm quickly at less cost, and they are able to effectively manage environmental and 
community expectations (Oh et al., 2006).  
Therefore, this study concludes that an adequate proportion of non-executive directors improve 
board task, as the monitoring and resource provision capabilities of the board increase with the 
additional number of NEDs. Similarly, appropriate board composition enhances corporate social 
responsibility activities, which in turn leads to better firm-stakeholder relationships. 
2.4.3 CEO Duality 
Two board leadership structures are common in corporate literature and practice: CEO duality and 
non-duality. The latter leadership structure exists when the roles of CEO and chairman are not 
exercised by one individual, while CEO duality is a situation whereby the chief executive also serves 
as chairman of the board. The board leadership structure has been an on-going debate and empirical 
studies present contradicting results in regard to the effectiveness of CEO non-duality on firm 
performance. Moreover, just like the empirical findings, the theoretical explanations of CEO duality 
are nebulously presented. 
Proponents of agency theory argue that CEO duality presents excessive power to management and 
decreases board independence; therefore, separation of the duties between CEO and chairman is 
necessary in order to improve board independence and effectiveness (Tuggle et al., 2010). 
Separation of leadership positions is important so as to maintain a check and balance between the 
executives and the board. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that CEO duality represents “the absence 
of separation of decision management and decision control” (p.314). Thus, having a single individual 
serving as both chairman and CEO jeopardises board independence, which means that the board 
cannot perform their oversight functions effectively. 
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However, some organisational theories support firms in combining the role of chief executive and 
that of chairman to a single individual. Duality presents a strong unity of command which may 
promote effectiveness, faster decision-making (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and fewer costs in 
information transfer (Schooley et al., 2010). Barnea and Rubin (2010) linked stakeholder theory and 
CEO duality. They argue that a joint leadership structure improves CSR initiatives, as the chief 
executive may have intrinsic motivations (to portray a good legacy and enhance personal and 
organisational reputation), rather than utility maximization claimed by the agency theory. It also 
sends a positive signal to various stakeholders that ‘someone is in control’ and that there is a clear 
person to hold accountable for their needs. 
However, the duality leadership structure is likely to lead to excessive pressure on CEOs to pursue 
short-term economic performance, at the expense of long-term strategic plans, such as CSR. With 
less pressure CEOs with non-dual roles may have the opportunity to consider the interests of both 
stockholders and stakeholders (Zhang, 2012).  
Notwithstanding, it is important to highlight that no single board leadership structure fits all firms. 
CEO duality is appropriate for some firms while the separation of the roles is more beneficial for 
others (Singh and Gaur, 2009). It is also essential to mention that the benefits of either combining or 
separating the duties of CEO and chairman to the firm, depends on other factors such as firm size, 
complexity and economic stability. For example, a larger firm with complex activities can benefit from 
separation of the two important roles, while a small firm with less operational activities may find a 
strong unity of command is required (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  Moreover, the ‘real’ independence 
of the chairman also determines whether CEO non-duality is beneficial to the firm or not.  
2.4.4 Gender Diversity 
Women are driving the workforce of many governmental and non-governmental organisations 
around the globe. This may be due to higher educational qualifications they possessed or due to 
various pressures on gender equality from different governments and organisations. Board gender 
diversity refers to a mixture of both female and male directors on a particular board, rather than 
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having ‘all men.’ Various theories have different implications and explanations on the benefits or 
otherwise of gender diversity. 
According to agency theory, gender diverse boards are more independent than ‘all men’ boards and 
as such, are more effective in performing their control role. Hillman and Dalziel (2003), argue that 
board needs a composition of directors with appropriate skills, experience and capabilities to 
effectively monitor executives which will consequently improve corporate performance. This would 
be possible with women directors on the board as they possess different perspectives, skills and 
experience than their male counterpart. Thus, boards that have an adequate proportion of female 
directors are expected to be effective monitors, which in turn enhance firm performance. Erhardt et 
al. (2003), opine that diversity may lead to conflict and communication difficulties that are common 
in a diverse group, yet the diversity can also enhance the control role of the board and mitigate any 
agency problem that may arise due to poor monitoring, which in turn improves firm performance.   
Taking the perspectives of resource dependency and stakeholder theories, Bear et al., (2010) 
explain that women directors have a higher educational qualification, more experience in small 
enterprises and broader professional backgrounds than their male colleagues. The authors argue 
that including women directors on the boards will provide different perspectives for strategic decision-
making, such as CSR initiatives. Furthermore, it was argued that gender board diversity enhances 
its support base and legitimacy in the community, as it sends a positive signal to other stakeholders, 
especially women and minorities within and outside the board that the firm is ethically and morally 
responsible (Zhang et al., 2013). Additionally, Nielsen and Huse (2010), Mallin and Michelon (2011) 
and Setó‐Pamies (2015) argue that women’s psychological characteristics, such as assisting, 
soothing, kindness, sensitivity and concerns for others’ people problems, facilitates their readiness 
to engage in CSR activities. 
However, Forbes and Milliken (1999) explain that gender diversity may likely have an adverse effect 
on the board decision-making process because it creates a small group within the board and leads 
to less unity and cooperation among directors. Further, in-depth evaluation of strategies due to 
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diverse opinions may slow down the decision-making process and this may harm stakeholders’ 
claims that require a fast response (Ujunwa, 2012).   
It is essential to note that unlike in developed economies, the perception of having women as leaders 
in emerging nations, (like Nigeria), is unfavourable. Ideally, women are considered in those countries 
as weak and inactive leaders.  Abdullah et al., (2016) reported a biased evaluation by the market in 
Malaysia as a result of having female directors on the board which led to a negative effect on the 
market-based performance. Nevertheless, the Nigerian corporate governance system encourages 
board diversity and companies listed on the NSE have started appointing female directors on their 
board, but still more needs to be done in this respect. 
In conclusion, the board characteristics discussed above were heavily researched, but as mentioned 
earlier their impact on board effectiveness and firm performance are inconclusive. The approach and 
methodology employed to study these ‘usual suspects’ could be the genesis of contradicting results 
(Daily et al., 2003). Instead of investigating the direct effect of board characteristics on board 
effectiveness and firm performance, board scholars were called to open the ‘black box’ (Pettigrew, 
1992). This study answers the call and examines the influence of board processes variables on the 
relationships between board characteristics and board tasks effectiveness. The next section 
discusses board processes variables that were introduced in the theoretical paper of Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) (see figure 4.6).   
2.5 Board Processes 
Research on boards of directors and corporate performance has continued to receive 
condemnations due to the focus on ‘what’ instead of ‘how’ board structures affect performance. Daily 
et al., (2003) argue that using board characteristics to determine corporate performance may lead 
to biased outcomes because the board is faced with complex processes and group dynamics. On 
the same vein, Pettigrew (1992) calls for studies on boards to consider “the processes and 
mechanisms which presumably link the input to the output” (p.171).  
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Similarly, Forbes and Milliken (1999) described boards as “large, elite and episodic decision-making 
groups that face complex tasks petering to strategic-issue processing” (p.492). The authors argue 
that besides facing complex tasks, board members are busy individuals with tight schedules which 
make the board loosely connected and this leads to difficulties in their interactions with each other. 
As a result, certain social-psychological processes determine their effectiveness. Such processes 
include board effort norms, cognitive conflict, and use of knowledge and skills.  
2.5.1 Effort Norms 
Effort norm is considered one of the board processes variables that helps to explain board 
effectiveness. Directors’ effort norms refer to the level of involvement during meeting and preparation 
before meetings (Minichilli et al., 2009). Involvement represents the level of effort directors allocate 
during discussions and follow-up of the decisions made in the boardroom, while preparations refer 
to board members’ desire to make meaningful contributions in the meetings and the extent to which 
directors engage in research about the topic prior to the meeting (Minichilli et al., 2009).  
Board members are busy people (Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) especially those with 
board interlock and other tight schedules outside the firm. The maximum level of effort by a group 
member can be achieved with strong group levels of involvement and preparation (Wageman, 1995).  
Boards with a minimal levels of effort among directors that did not meet regularly, became less 
effective in meetings and only approved proposals of the management (Mace, 1971). However, a 
board with significant level of effort norms engaged in active, critical discussions, were always 
available when needed and utilised their knowledge and skills effectively in performing their duties 
(Lorsch and MacIver, 1989).  
The way and manner boards operate may likely effect directors’ involvement and participation, a 
board with a few individuals that dominate the affairs of the board demoralise other board members 
inhibiting their contribution and active participation in the decision making process. An inclusive 
board which allows all directors to contribute equally and freely is more likely to have directors that 
are active and committed in performing their fiduciary duties, which in turn improves firm 
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performance. Pugliese et al., (2015) explain that the better way to assess whether boards are 
capable of questioning and monitoring the executive is through inclusiveness and evenness of turn-
taking, rather than relying on the proportion of non-executive directors. Moreover, the structure of 
the board meeting (informality and formality of meetings), is likely to influence directors’ engagement 
and involvement. Formal meetings are normally characterised by a bureaucratic system and series 
of rules that must be followed which can lead to fewer contributions and reduced participation from 
the attendees. Conversely, informal meetings are conducted with fewer rules and instructions, which 
results in greater participation of directors in a free environment.    
2.5.2 Cognitive Conflict 
Another board process considered in this study is board cognitive conflict which refers to task-related 
disagreements or differences among group members. With task-related conflicts board members 
engaged in open debate, critical analysis and disagreement of management proposals. A board 
without a moderate level of conflict may be submissive to the management (e.g. Forbes and Milliken, 
1999).  
Board members face ambiguous tasks and for effective decision making on these tasks there is a 
need for board members to freely present different viewpoints and be able to critically analyse each 
other’s views (Watson and Michaelsen, 1988); this should result in quality decision making, 
especially in an uncertain environment (Milliken and Vollrath, 1991).  
Another factor that assists boards to perform their duties effectively is the level of cohesiveness 
among directors. However, it is imperative to mention that higher cohesion results in a negative 
influence on effective decision making. Task-related disagreements reduce or eliminate the negative 
effect of higher cohesiveness. Janis (1982) argues that effectiveness of a group on quality decision-
making is determined by a moderate level of cohesiveness, as a higher level of cohesiveness among 
group members is likely to lead to a decrease in or non-existence of independent critical thinking 
and engagement. The result being mostly consensus opinions among group members, a 
phenomenon termed as ‘groupthink’.  
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However, Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that ‘groupthink’ is only possible if a high level of 
cohesiveness is accompanied by a low level of cognitive conflict among group members. In general, 
board cognitive conflict is assumed to be a factor that assists board members in performing their 
expected responsibilities, such as monitoring and service roles, which in turn enhances corporate 
performance. 
2.5.3 Use of Knowledge and Skills 
According to Bettinelli (2011), use of knowledge and skills is “the extent to which a board taps into 
and applies the human capital members bring to the table” (p.156). The ability of a group to utilise 
the knowledge, experience and skills of each group member determines the group effectiveness 
(Wageman, 1995). The availability of knowledge and skills in a group does not necessarily guarantee 
the effectiveness of that group, what matters most is the sharing and utilisation of knowledge and 
skills among members of the group.  
Some board structures, such as the proportion of outside directors, female directors and board size, 
are likely to enhance the availability of diverse knowledge and experience, but that does not 
guarantee proper utilisation of such resources. It is the application of these resources that improves 
organisational performance, not its availability or abundance. Zhu et al., (2016) contend that the 
availability of information in the boardroom has no effect on strategic involvement. However, the 
authors report that utilisation of such information improves strategic involvement in for-profit 
organisations. Zona and Zattoni (2007) suggested that the effectiveness of the board in performing 
their duties may depend on the ability to actively use and integrate each board member’s knowledge, 
skills, experience and expertise. The availability of human capital is essential to the board, but 
utilising such human capital is more important as the benefits of that capital can only be achieved if 
it is put to use. Therefore, it is assumed that the use of knowledge has sufficient influence on board 
tasks which consequently improves firm performance. 
In summary, board effort norms, cognitive conflict and the use of knowledge are the three main board 
processes variables commonly used in studies that investigate the impact of board processes on 
 46 
 
board effectiveness, (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; 
Minichilli et al., 2009; Bettinelli, 2011), which consequently improves firm-level performance. In this 
study, board-level (board task) and firm-level (CSR) effectiveness serve as proxies for board 
effectiveness. Task effectiveness relates to the extent to which a board successfully performs their 
control, resource provision and strategic roles. The next section discusses board task. 
2.6 Board Control, Resource Provision and Strategic Tasks  
The board control role, also known as oversight or monitoring, refers to the protection of 
shareholders’ wealth from expropriations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The duties of the board, in this 
regard, is to provide an oversight function in which a firms’ operations and executives’ behaviours 
are conducted in the best interest of the owners (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Boards are expected 
to sufficiently investigate, evaluate, and scrutinise executives’ activities and proposals. Agency 
theory is the main theory that focuses on the board control role. The theory’s dominant aim, as 
discussed above, is to minimise or eliminate the agency costs problems that may arise in a principal-
agent or minority-majority relationship. Boards of directors, as the representatives of the 
shareholders, serve as the main internal corporate governance mechanism that ensures the interest 
of shareholders and managers are aligned, either through managerial incentives or effective 
monitoring.  
Whereas the resource provision role involves the provision of advice and counsel, forming links with 
important stakeholders and capital provision (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This board role is one of 
the main tasks directors are expected to perform and is closely linked to resource dependency 
theory. According to this theory, boards are required to provide human and relational capital, which 
includes directors’ expertise, knowledge, sources of finance, environmental linkage, reputation and 
other critical resources to the firm.  
Another equally important board task is the strategic role. In addition to board control and resource 
provision tasks, directors are required to perform a strategic role, which refers to the provision of 
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strategic advice and involvement in the strategic decision-making process, through strategic 
formulation and implementation (Westphal and Bednar, 2005). 
2.7 Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility  
Corporate governance was initially defined narrowly, but recent happenings required a broader 
definition of corporate governance. The broader definition of governance is more acceptable in the 
business world today, because corporations are expected to satisfy the interest of both shareholders 
and stakeholders and to operate in ethical and moral behaviours which enhance long-term benefits. 
Thus, good CG should improve CSR activities to give a ‘sense of belonging’ to the stakeholders, and 
lead to long-term benefits and survival.  
Businesses all over the world are encouraged to engage in corporate social activities. Recently, CSR 
gained considerable attention among academics and in the global business environment. Different 
terms are frequently used, such as corporate citizenship, sustainability, stakeholder management, 
business ethics and corporate responsibility (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). Yet underlining all terms 
is the motive to do good for society and the environment, and to eliminate or at least reduce the harm 
generated by firms’ activities. 
CSR is defined by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) as 
“continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development, 
while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families, as well as improving the life of 
the local community and society at large” (1999, p.65). However, this concept of CSR is heavily 
criticised as an unnecessary waste of a firm’s assets.  
The classical economic argument by late Milton Friedman insists that corporations’ responsibility is 
to generate more and more profit for the shareholders (Friedman, 1962). Similarly, critics of CSR 
argue that it is inappropriate for managers who are trained in finance and operations to engage in 
CSR activities, which makes the business’ main purpose weaker (Hayek, 1969; Davis, 1973). 
However, the perception of CSR as a detriment to shareholders’ assets has changed over time. 
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Recent evidence shows how CSR activities benefit both society and shareholders. Satisfaction of 
stakeholders’ interests through social responsibility enhances financial performance  (Brammer et 
al., 2006). Therefore, an effective CG practice should ensure the board of directors engage in 
corporate social responsibility activities which consequently enhances the overall firm performance. 
Jamali et al. (2008), suggest that a strong connection exists between corporate governance (CG) 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Similarly, Gill (2008) suggests that CG and the board of 
directors specifically, should serve as a vehicle that incorporates ethical, social, and environmental 
responsibilities into firms’ decision-making process.  
Consistent with predominant agency theory, the fiduciary role of the board members is to monitor 
and control corporation’s assets from opportunistic managers and ensure maximum returns to 
shareholders. Studies conducted on this view are mostly on the effectiveness of the board 
characteristics, for example board size, CEO duality, the proportion of outside directors and diversity 
of gender, in mitigating agency problems and improving the financial performance of the corporations 
(e.g. Grove et al., 2011; Elsayed, 2007; Zhu et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2010). However, in addition 
to shareholders’ wealth maximization, boards nowadays are expected to consider the interests of 
those who are directly or indirectly affected by the actions of the firm, for instance employees, 
customers, creditors, suppliers, the community and society at large (Freeman, 1984).  
Boards can achieve these ‘multiple responsibilities’ through appropriate design and involvement in 
long-term strategic plans, such as corporate social responsibility which accounts for the interest of 
stakeholders, as well as enhances the long-term survival of a firm which benefits shareholders.  
Recent events of corporate failures, as a result of the unethical and immoral behaviour of some 
directors, indicate that the traditional view of corporate governance needs to be reviewed. Scholars 
have started to realise that a disproportionate emphasis on shareholders’ wealth maximization, at 
the expense of ethical, social and environmental concerns does not yield the desired result.  
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Therefore, some researchers argue that the measurement of firms’ performance should not be 
restricted to financial performance, rather benefits, such as corporate reputation, employee 
commitment, customer loyalty, legitimacy and access to critical resources, should also be considered  
(Michelon et al., 2013; Setó‐Pamies, 2015). These benefits improved corporate performance, 
especially in the long-term. Thus in addition to short-term financial performance, the board of 
directors should ensure the interest of various stakeholders are considered in decision-making, 
which includes social and environmental issues (Sánchez et al., 2011; Ferrero‐Ferrero et al., 2015).  
In developed countries, there are pressures from the governments and various non-profit 
organisations for companies to engage in corporate social responsibility activities. In such countries, 
there are fewer cases of unethical and irresponsible attitudes of companies compared to developing 
nations. These issues of corporate irresponsibility are more common in countries where corruption 
is endemic and weak legislation is in practice, like Nigeria. There are cases where some multinational 
companies in Nigeria were accused by their host community for doing nothing to mitigate the 
negative impact and hazardous environment they intentionally created (see Eweje, 2007). These 
acts lead to social unrest, riots, kidnappings and vandalism which also threaten the economic 
stability of the country and corporate existence of these firms. 
Despite the importance of CSR activities on a firms’ survival, little is known of the impact of the board 
of directors on corporate social responsibility performance (Villiers et al., 2011); rather numerous 
efforts have been made by previous scholars to examine the relationship between the board and 
financial performance (e.g. Dalton et al., 1999; Dahya and McConnell, 2005; O’Sullivan et al., 2016; 
Ehikioya, 2009 and Ujunwa, 2012). Moreover, the limited studies that investigate the link between 
board and CSR, employed the traditional input-output approach where the direct relationship 
between board characteristics (input) and CSR (output) is examined. It is essential to investigate the 
influence of board processes on the relationship between this input and the output (Pettigrew, 1992). 
The current study argues that the effectiveness of board characteristics depend on its impact on 
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board processes, which leads to better board task and CSR activities that provide long-term 
corporate performance and survival. 
2.8 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter starts by giving a brief history of the Nigerian corporate environment. The 
developmental process of the Nigerian corporate governance is also discussed in this chapter. To 
some extent, the Nigerian CG system can be traced back to 1968 few years after the country’s 
attained independence, in which the Companies Act was introduced. Thereafter, the CAMA 1990 
replaced the Companies Act, and later, the SEC established codes of CG in 2003 and revised in 
2011. Moreover, a summary of the SEC code (2011) code provisions that are relevant to this study 
are discussed in this chapter. 
This chapter discusses the three main corporate governance theories that seem appropriate to 
employ as theoretical lenses for this research. Considering the fact that no single theory covers all 
the roles boards are expected to perform, multiple theories are used in this study. The theories that 
are applied as the research theoretical framework are: agency theory, resource dependency theory 
and stakeholder theory.  
Furthermore, this chapter defines and discusses the study variables and concepts. This includes 
board characteristics, board processes, board task and corporate social responsibility. The board 
characteristics (board size, composition, CEO duality and gender diversity), that are termed the 
‘usual suspects’ by other scholars, are considered as the main explanatory variables for this study. 
Board processes variables (cognitive conflict, effort norms and use of knowledge), introduced in the 
theoretical model of Forbes and Milliken are considered in this research. Board control task, service 
task and strategic task are the major board roles recognised in the literature and are the board task 
examined in this study. The concepts of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
are discussed in this chapter. In the subsequent chapter, a discussion on the systematic (narrative) 
literature review of previous empirical studies conducted is presented. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviewed relevant literature on board effectiveness. Three common perspectives on 
board effectiveness were identified which are board of directors influence on (1) financial 
performance, (2) CSR performance and (3) board task effectiveness. Therefore, due to the abundant 
and diverse literature on boards of directors, the review of literature is restricted to these three 
common board effectiveness perspectives. A systematic (narrative) literature review on these three 
main perspectives of board effectiveness is presented in this chapter.  
The subsequent section (3.1) introduces the three perspectives of board effectiveness. Section 3.2 
highlights process of the systematic (narrative) review conducted. Sections 3.3 discusses relevant 
previous empirical findings on the relationships between board characteristics and financial 
performance. Studies on the effect of the board on corporate social responsibility performance are 
discussed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents empirical studies on the influence of board functioning 
on the board task effectiveness. Section 3.6 presents the literature gaps, and the research 
hypotheses as well as the final conceptual framework which accommodates findings from the 
qualitative interviews are presented in section 3.7. A summary of the chapter is presented in section 
3.8.  
3.1 Perspectives on Board Effectiveness 
The importance of board of directors is highly recognised globally, especially after the collapsed of 
some big firms. Boards are the main internal corporate governance mechanism and they play a vital 
role in a firm’s value maximization, through safeguarding corporation’ assets, resource provision, 
and giving ethical directions for firms. The board of directors’ effectiveness is crucial in the business 
environment and economic growth of any nation.  
 52 
 
A number of corporate scandals, such as those discussed earlier, were attributed to the 
ineffectiveness of the board of directors. Thus, the board, as the apex decision-making body, has 
been the subject of both blame and series of reforms (Roberts et al., 2005). Therefore, it is essential 
to understand what board effectiveness is and what makes a board effective.  The literature on board 
effectiveness is increasingly fragmented, as such, there is no unanimity on what board effectiveness 
is and the main factors responsible for board effectiveness are ill-defined. Nevertheless, three major 
groups of board scholars are common in the board effectiveness literature (see Figure 3.1). 
One group of board scholars argue that board effectiveness is the ability of directors to improve firm-
level performance, notably the financial outcome (Dalton et al., 1999; Dahya and McConnell, 2005; 
Kajola, 2008). These scholars usually rely on board structure and archival data to investigate the 
direct relationship between the board and financial performance. Common board structures used 
are the boards’ size, the proportion of non-executive directors, board gender diversity and CEO 
duality. These characteristics are frequently used in board literature to examine board effectiveness. 
However, findings on these ‘common suspects’ are mixed.  This study reviews those articles that 
investigate the impacts of these heavily researched board characteristics on corporate performance. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Perspectives on board effectiveness 
Source: Author 
Board 
effectiveness
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Similar to the above approach, another group of scholars emerged and argue that short-term 
financial performance does not guarantee the long-term survival of a firm. Firms are expected to 
operate ethically, legally and for the best interest of all stakeholders rather than stockholders alone 
(Freeman, 1984). Therefore, benefits associated with customer loyalty, firm reputation and employee 
motivations should be considered in assessing firm performance (Setó‐Pamies, 2015). These 
scholars refer to board effectiveness as the ability of the board structure to influence corporate social 
responsibility activities (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995; Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Shaukat et al., 2016). 
Recently, many scholars have criticised this traditional approach of board effectiveness literature 
that investigates a direct link between the input (board structure) and the output (firm performance). 
Researchers were called to dismantle the fortresses (Daily et al., 2003) and open the ‘black box’ to 
examine the intervening processes between board characteristics and corporate performance 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Huse et al., 2011). This group of researchers argue that boards are effective, if 
they positively influence board task, such as monitoring, advice and counsel, strategy formulation 
and provision of resource, which consequently improves firm performance. Scholars on this 
streamline of research rely on board’s internal working processes as the key determinants of board 
effectiveness (e.g Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; and Minichilli 
et al., 2012). The next section discusses previous empirical studies from a systematic (narrative) 
literature review conducted in regard to these three perspectives of board effectiveness. 
3.2 Introduction to the Systematic Narrative Review  
This section reviews previous studies on the board of directors’ effectiveness, in relation to board 
influence on financial, corporate social responsibility and board task, so as to fully understand what 
is discussed and what is missing in the literature. The review clearly shows what has been written 
about the research topic and the areas that require further investigation. Next, the process of 
narrative review of the literature and the methodology employed in the review is discussed.  
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The study uses an appropriate systematic approach to identify relevant literature. Research 
questions used in this study are specific, well defined and focused. The literature review starts with 
sensitivity searching, then shifts to a specificity searching approach. At the former stage, the motive 
is to find as many relevant articles as possible, in the latter stage, one needs to make sure articles 
used are indeed relevant. Overall, the quality of studies included in the review is judged based on 
appropriateness of the studies’ design for answering the research questions.  
3.2.1 Methodology for Paper Selection 
Quantitative and qualitative methodologies have increasingly been applied jointly in recent social 
science studies. Such an approach is also required in a review of the literature. Meta-analysis is a 
quantitative analysis of previous studies that are relevant to a review topic, while the narrative 
method is an approach that involves both quantitative and qualitative studies. To avoid missing out 
any important study in the review, a narrative method of synthesis is used in this study.  
Unlike quantitative meta-analysis review, that used only quantitative articles, narrative reviews 
involve summaries and interpretations of evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies 
relevant to the review topic, without any attempt to transform them into a common metric for the 
analytical purpose (Mays et al., 2005). This approach has been appropriately used where it seems 
the experimental and quasi-experimental studies included in a systematic review are unlikely to be 
similar for a quantitative meta-analysis review to be suitable (Nijmeijer et al., 2014). Moreover, the 
research questions a researcher intends to address serve as the key determinants of the review 
approach to be applied. Experimental or quasi-experimental studies are appropriate if the target of 
the questions is to address ‘what’, rather than ‘why’ or how’; if the intention of the question is to 
address the latter then qualitative and survey are more suitable (Petticrew and Roberts, 2008). In 
this review, both studies that answered ‘what is the effect of the board on performance’ and ‘how 
boards work’ are considered. Thus, some studies are likely to have used a quantitative and positivist 
approach, while others are likely to have employed an interpretivist and qualitative methodology. In 
this circumstance, a narrative method is more appropriate than meta-analysis approach. 
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The narrative review method is more comprehensive, inclusive, and less labor-intensive techniques 
are required (Mays et al., 2005). In addition, the approach is more likely to allow for wide coverage 
of the topic under investigation (Collins and Fauser, 2005) than quantitative meta-analysis. However, 
this approach received greater criticism for being subjective and selection biased (Dixon-Woods et 
al., 2005). To reduce the bias, an advice given by Hopkinson and Blois (2014) is followed and a 
systematic method in the narrative review is employed. This is necessary to ensure selection bias is 
minimised and the study is replicable (Collins and Fauser, 2005). 
A structured search process for the relevant articles was conducted using Journal Storage (JSTOR), 
Scopus, Google Scholar, PsycINFO and Business Source Premier Databases. Search terms were 
supported by certain terms in order to ensure all related published articles are included in the review, 
such terms include: wildcards, Boolean operators (AND, OR, and NOT) and truncations (*).Three 
broad search terms (corporate governance, the board of directors and effectiveness) were used in 
order to ensure all relevant articles are included at the initial stage of the search process.  
Studies considered for this review are from the top and highly reputable journals from the Association 
of Business School (ABS) journals ranking, which includes the Journal of Business Ethics, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, British Journal of Management, Strategic Management 
Journal, Journal of Corporate Finance and Journal of Management Studies.  
Additionally, the search was limited to only articles published from 2003 to 2016, in the English 
language and peer-reviewed. The kick-off year (2003) is chosen because at that period a major 
reform is taking place in the US where by a federal law (known as Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002) is 
introduced and the Act issued new requirements for all boards of public firms in the US. In a similar 
vein, the Nigerian government through the Security and Exchange Commission issued their first 
corporate governance code in 2003 which was made applicable to all listed companies. Moreover, 
the majority of the major corporate scandals occurred within that period (such as Enron in 2001, 
Parmalat in 2003 and Royal Ahold in 2003). The researcher intends to start analysis in early 2017 
and therefore, consider 2016 as the ending period. 
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The initial search resulted in 524 papers ready for further screening from databases: JSTOR (no = 
43), Scopus (no = 110), Google Scholar (no = 224), PsycINFO (no = 37) and Business Source 
Premier (no = 118). However, papers with no direct reference to the research area, book chapters 
and letters from the editors were removed from the review. Similarly, also removed from the review 
were papers that used other performance as outcomes, such as merger and acquisition, earning 
management, CEO compensation and capital structure. This process led to the exclusion of 256 
articles and 276 papers being retained for further analysis.  
The next step is reading the titles and abstracts of all potential articles (276) to be considered for the 
review. An inclusion and exclusion criterion was used to identify papers that qualify for this review. 
The following inclusion criterion is used and any paper that answers ‘no’ to any of the questions is 
excluded; 
1. Does the paper discuss board of directors? 
2. Is the paper empirical? 
3. Is the paper written in the English language?  
4. (a) Does the paper include board processes, financial performance or corporate social 
responsibility performance? 
(b) The paper that uses financial or corporate social responsibility performance as the 
outcome variable, does the paper include board structure variables (Board size, the 
proportion of outside directors, female directors and CEO duality)? 
186 articles answered ‘no’ to at least one of the above questions, so were excluded from further 
analysis. The final sample is 90 papers that were saved and reviewed. Figure 3.2 below describes 
the selection process of papers that were included in the review.  
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Figure 3. 2: Selection Process 
Source: Author 
 
3.3. Board Characteristics and Corporate Financial Performance 
The direct relationship between the board and firm performance has been investigated for over a 
decade. The tradition of scholars on this streamline is to narrowly examine the impact of board 
characteristics on firm-level performance. Common board characteristics used in the previous 
studies are: board size, the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs), gender diversity and CEO 
duality leadership structure, while financial performance is mostly considered as the dependent 
variable. However, similar to the lack of consensus from theoretical arguments, the empirical findings 
on the relationship between these board characteristics and corporate performance are never 
conclusive. In the subsequent sub-sections, articles that investigate the direct relationship between 
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board characteristics and corporate financial performance are presented and the articles are 
summarised in appendix I (i). 
3.3.1 Non-executive directors and financial performance 
A China-based study of 2,057 firms shows that independent outside directors decrease tunneling 
(self-dealing) and enhance efficiency, which in turn lead to better operating performance (Liu et al., 
2015). This indicates that outside dominated boards are more vigilant, than the inside dominated 
board in China. Similarly, it was found that the higher the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board, the higher the financial performance of 259 Taiwanese electronic firms (Luan and Tang, 
2007). However, a study of US commercial banks by Grove et al., (2011) contradicts agency theory, 
as it found that firms with a higher proportion of inside directors were not worse than those with NED 
dominated boards. Specifically, the negative impact of executive-dominated boards, speculated in 
the literature on the dependent variables, was not supported.  
Investigating whether or not board characteristic variables are implicated in the mutual funds trading 
scandals of 2003-2004, Ferris and Yan (2007) used a sample of 448 US fund families and find that 
funds with adequate proportion of outside directors and independent chairman do not reduce the 
likelihood of a fund scandal. Moreover, funds that have greater numbers of independent NEDs that 
receive large compensation and serve on multiple boards are more likely to be implicated in a 
scandal.  
A study of 27 Turkish banks finds support for stewardship theory, it argues that inside directors are 
good stewards of corporation’s assets and are positively related to bank performance, but outside 
directors negatively and significantly affect performance (Kaymak and Bektas, 2008). The study 
highlights the importance of firm and industry-specific knowledge to the overall corporate 
performance, (of which executive directors possess and non-executive directors have a deficiency).  
However, it is essential to understand that the relationship between board characteristics and 
performance is not as straightforward as expected.  The impacts of corporate governance 
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mechanisms depend on the contextual and firm-specific contingencies (Essen et al., 2013). The lack 
of a significant impact by NEDs on firm performance is likely to be due to inferior feelings of the 
outside directors in the boardroom. Zhu et al., (2016) argue that independent NEDs that are ranked 
higher, are more likely to improve firm value (measured with Tobin’s Q) than those ranked lower 
(less empowered).  
Moreover, outside directors are appointed to the board to mitigate opportunity behaviour of the agent, 
but their impact on corporate control is largely contingent on other environmental factors where the 
firm operates. Using firm’s growth as an environmental factor, Hutchinson and Gul (2004) predict a 
negative relationship between growth opportunity and firm performance. They find that proportion of 
outside directors on the board reduces the negative relationship predicted. However, it was found 
that firms with a higher proportion of NEDs, perform worse than firms with less NEDs on their board 
and the finding was the same in both of the two developing countries (India and China) in which the 
sample of 813 firms were drawn (Singh and Gaur, 2009). Therefore, the country’s context is 
irrelevant to the negative effect of NEDs on firm performance.  
Combs et al., (2007) argue that the importance of board independence is more salient when a firm 
has a powerful CEO, where the monitoring role of the board is highly required. However, if a firm 
has a weak CEO, an executive dominated board is sufficient to serve as a control mechanism. The 
researchers used 73 US firms alongside event data (unexpected CEO deaths) and found that CEO 
power moderates the board-performance relationship. They further explained that shareholders are 
glad about the passing away of the powerful chief executive when the board is dominated by inside 
directors, and are relieved when the CEO is less powerful and the board is heavily dominated by 
independent outside directors. In other words, the stock price falls, when a powerful CEO death is 
announced for a firm that has a high proportion of independent directors or a less powerful CEO’s 
death is announced for a firm that has executive monitoring. 
It is essential to know that different governance mechanisms substitute each other. The presence of 
one mechanism may cancel the benefits of the other and therefore, it is unnecessary to have both 
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mechanisms at the same time. For instance, due to the greater percentage of large shareholders of 
Korean firms, outside directors are found to have a weak (positive) impact on participation rate and 
overall profitability of the sampled firms (Cho and Kim, 2007). Large shareholders with large stock 
ownership are likely to serve as effective monitors of the corporate assets. Consequently, a greater 
proportion of NEDs is not required. The relationship between board independence, measured by the 
proportion of outside directors, and firm value is greatly moderated by concentrated ownership and 
dividend policies (Setia-Atmaja, 2009).  
The corporate governance mechanisms that monitor the executives are required to minimise or 
eradicate the agency problems that may arise as a result of the separation of ownership and control. 
Setia-Atmaja (2009) showed that closely-held companies that have low dividend payouts and greater 
proportion of NEDs, outperformed those firms with a lower percentage of NEDs. The author 
concluded that the presence of independent outside directors mitigates the controlling-minority 
shareholder's agency problem that is likely to arise in concentration ownership structure. However, 
Klein et al., (2005) found a negative relationship between the proportion of NEDs on the board and 
Tobin’s Q of 263 Canadian family firms. They argue that the duties of outside directors are not 
required for family firms where the majority of the managers are also the owners. 
Similarly, a recent study by Yeh et al., (2011) shows that during the crisis period independent outside 
directors were more likely to reduce the agency problems that might arise between manager-
shareholders and controlling-minority shareholders in civil law countries, where weak shareholders 
and concentration ownership structure is common. Specifically, the study finds that firms with 
reasonable number of NEDs on audit and risk committees were more likely to improve the 
performance of twenty of the largest financial institutions from G8 countries during 2007-8 financial 
crisis and that the relationship was stronger for firms that operate in civil law countries with excessive 
risk-taking behaviour. However, in an effort to examine the impact of outside directors on firms’ 
financial performance before and after political instability, it is concluded that the proportion of the 
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NEDs on the board is significantly negative, irrespective of the post or pre-presidential election in 
Zimbabwe political instability (Mangena et al., 2012).  
3.3.2 Board size and firm performance 
Grove et al., (2011) investigate the relationship between board structure and firm performance of 
236 public US commercial banks and used future excess return (alpha), loan quality and return on 
assets as dependent variables. They found that board size initially has a positive effect on ROA, but 
when the board got too large, the effect changed to negative. On the relationship between board 
size and alpha, Grove et al., (2011) reported significant linear and insignificant quadratic coefficients. 
This implies that larger boards are more effective than the smaller board in regard to stock market 
performance, during the crisis period. However, the authors find that firms with small boards are 
more likely to improve loan quality due to the effective monitoring of lending activities of the banks. 
Large boards bring diverse knowledge and experience which lead to an abundance of opinions and 
enhance quality decision-making. Nevertheless, boards with many directors face difficulties in 
making decisions due to diverse opinions, poorer coordination and communication. The benefits are 
likely to be outweighed by the challenges of the board size which lead to a negative effect on a firm 
financial performance (De Andres et al., 2005). 
In contrast to this, Kaymak and Bektas (2008) argue that larger boards are more beneficial, than the 
smaller board in an industry that is heavily regulated and difficult to understand, like banks. In a 
complex environment, the diverse knowledge, experience and skills offered by having many directors 
on the board outweighs the negative issues related to a large board size. In a similar vein, Essen et 
al., (2013) conducted research using a large sample of over 1,197 firms drawn from 26 European 
countries. It was reported that the ‘best governance practices’ such as small board size and 
proportion of outside directors, were found to have a negative and significant influence on firm 
performance during the European financial crisis.  
Similarly, Rose (2005) finds that boards that are large in size are not better than those of a small 
size. However, contrary to Essen et al., (2013), Rose (2005) argues that the impact of these ‘good 
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governance practice’  is difficult to find under normal circumstance, but might more likely be seen 
when firms are facing a financial crisis, challenges and threats. 
Investigating the impacts of board size and outside directors on firms’ financial performance before 
and after political instability, Mangena et al., (2012) used a sample of 53 firms listed on the Zimbabwe 
Stock Exchange for the period 2000 to 2005. The findings show that firms with a large board size 
have better economic performance after, not before, the Zimbabwean presidential election.  
3.3.3 CEO duality and firm performance 
On the impact of CEO duality leadership structure, Kaymak and Bektas (2008) find that having the 
CEO as the Chair or empowered CEO is a detriment to the firm’s performance. A recent study of 
1,384 Chinese listed firms, for a period from 2001 to 2010, show that CEO duality reduces short-
term performance persistence (Haß et al., 2016). In a related development, CEO duality leadership 
structure is found to be negatively and significantly related with ROA and alpha, but not on loan 
quality (Grove et al., 2011). Having a powerful CEO on the board destroys firm performance pre-
crisis period, but after the crisis, the negative association disappears (Grove et al., 2011). 
Notwithstanding, Jackling and Johl (2009) in their study, failed to find support for the negative impact 
of CEO duality on firm performance, as speculated by various previous studies. 
CEO duality-performance relationship depends on the complexity, challenges and company size. 
Larger firms are characterised with operational complexity and numerous challenges. In such 
organisations separation of the two leadership positions is more appropriate, but in small firms that 
are less complex, CEO duality may likely benefit the company (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  
Singh and Gaur (2009) argue that CEO duality is appropriate for some firms, while separation will 
be more beneficial for others. Furthermore, the authors assert that CEO duality-performance 
relationship is determined by industry type and firm characteristics: “the relationship is not 
monotonic” (Singh and Gaur 2009, p.1210) as speculated by other authors.  In relation to this, 
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Elsayed (2007) explains that the choice of leadership structure largely depends on firm size, firm 
age and ownership structure. 
The effect of CEO duality is different across industries. Notably, Elsayed (2007) finds a negative 
impact on the performance of firms from the cement industry, as well as  positive and neutral 
influence on firm performance from 18 other industries in the sample. Therefore, the insignificant 
effects of CEO duality on performance, found by other studies that have different types of industries 
in their samples, have been challenged because the positive effect from some industries may likely 
be set-off by the negative impact from other industries. Moreover, any study that uses a single 
industry should not be generalised. No single leadership structure fits all; rather, both leadership 
types may likely be appropriate under certain conditions (Elsayed, 2007). Evidence emerged which 
evinces that CEO duality is chosen by the sample firms, not purposely to improve financial 
performance, rather certain antecedents of duality, such as internal complexity, institution, social 
reciprocity, reward and powerful CEO, influence firms to choose leadership structure style (Iyengar 
and Zampelli, 2009). 
Another factor that needs to be considered in board-performance studies is the level of past firm 
performance, itself. Ideally, low performing firms require unity of command, technical knowledge and 
problem-solving techniques, therefore, CEO duality may likely be more beneficial. However, higher-
performing firms need a vigilant board to mitigate managerial entrenchment and moral hazard, which 
separations of duties between CEO and Chairman may likely provide (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 
2010)  Yet in contrast to this, a recent study demonstrates that a vigilant board is only beneficial to 
those firms with poor past performance (Haß et al., 2016). 
It is argued that the best leadership structure for firms operating in an unstable environment is to 
have a CEO who also serves as the chairman of the board (Essen et al., 2013). Overall, Essen and 
colleagues concluded that those good governance provisions are not the best for firms operating in 
an environment facing a financial crisis, rather technical know-how and executive discretion are 
required to deal with the challenges and improve corporate performance. 
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Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) measured firm performance with the cash flow return on total assets 
(CF ROTA) and sales turnover (sales) to investigate the relationship between board composition, 
practices and corporate performance of some listed firms in the UK. that the total number of directors 
on the board has no significant impact on firm performance and surprisingly, CEO duality or non-
duality does not matter in regards to both performance measures (CF ROTA and Sales growth). 
They concluded that for any benefits to be derived from the separation of the roles, the chairman 
should be an independent non-executive, in order to ensure the power is fully diffused (Dulewicz and 
Herbert, 2004).  
As traditional accounting and market value measures continue leading to inconclusive findings, 
researchers should consider using other alternative measurements of financial performance. 
Adjaoud et al., (2007) failed to find any significant relationship between the board’s quality, such as 
CEO non-duality, and traditional financial performance, such as return on investment (ROI), return 
on equity (ROE), earning per share (EPS) and market-to-book value. However, when EVA and 
value-added performance measures were used as dependent variables, the board’s quality variables 
have a positive and significant impact on performance. 
3.3.4 Board gender diversity and firm performance 
Another board structure that is receiving greater attention in the literature currently is board gender 
diversity. However, like other board structure variables, findings on the effect of women on corporate 
performance are inconclusive. A study on the influence of gender diversity from a developing nation, 
Mauritius, demonstrates a positive and significant effect on firm value, which clearly shows in 
addition to ethical and symbolic perspectives,  having women on the board has a strong business 
case (Mahadeo et al., 2012).  
However, female directors on the board are found to have conflicting effects in another recent study 
in Malaysia. From a sample of 841 listed firms on the main board in Bursa, Malaysia, the proportion 
of women directors on the board was positively and significantly related with return on assets (ROA), 
but negatively and significantly associated to Tobin’s Q (Abdullah et al., 2016). Nevertheless, it is 
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essential to note that unlike in developed economies, the perception of having women as leaders in 
emerging nations is unfavourable. Thus, the negative relationship with the market-based 
performance is due to biased evaluation by the market, as a result of having female directors on the 
board (Abdullah et al., 2016). 
Similarly, in an attempt to shed more light on the ‘business case’ of having female directors on the 
board, Carter et al. (2010)  investigated the relationship of women directors on two measures of firm 
value (Tobin’s Q and ROA) using a sample of 641 unique US firms. The authors find that the 
proportion of women directors has no significant effect on firm performance and they argue that the 
influence of gender diversity on the firm’s value may not be the same under different circumstances, 
at different times. 
Conversely, Erhardt et al., (2003) investigated the effect of diversity on financial performance at 112 
large US firms and found that diversity significantly improved the return on investment and return on 
assets of the sampled firms. The authors evince that diversity may lead to conflict and 
communication difficulties that are common in a diverse group, but enhance the control role of the 
board and mitigate any agency problem that may arise due to poor monitoring, which in turn improves 
a firm’s financial performance. In contrast, a recent study by Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2015) 
demonstrates that the presence of women on the board of NHS Foundation Trusts (NHS FTs) in 
England has an insignificant effect on ROA and also does not substantially influence service quality 
of NHS FTs. However, a position held by a female director, whether CEO or chairman, reduces or 
eliminates poor service quality (clinical negligence costs).  
Veltrop et al., (2015) reported a negative impact of boards-factional demographic faultlines at board-
level and on the financial performance of 318 firms in the Netherlands. This, Veltrop and colleagues 
asserted, was due to social categorization within groups, that is where group members prefer to work 
and cooperate with persons with similar, rather than dissimilar attributes, Similarly, Rose (2007) finds 
that the relationship between the proportion of women directors on the board and Tobin’s Q is 
negative, but not significantly different from zero of Danish firms. Chapple and Humphrey (2014) 
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employed a portfolio approach, rather than a firm-level approach, in measuring the impact of female 
directors on firms’ financial performance. They reported no evidence to support that firms with 
women on the board are better off than those without. Chapple and Humphrey (2014) argue that 
larger and older firms are more likely to have women on their boards, than smaller and new firms 
with the aim to improve legitimacy, not economic performance.  
Sufficient female representation in managerial positions is required for any contribution to be derived 
for having women on the board. Firms that operate in a complex and highly competitive environment 
(measured by high betas, market-to-book-ratio or analyst forecast standard deviation) have a 
significant influence on the abnormal return when the firms possess a high proportion of women in 
managerial positions (Francoeur et al., 2008). Women on the board, itself, does not improve financial 
performance, but having female at both the managerial level and on the board improves stock-
market returns (Francoeur et al., 2008). 
Ideally, the proportion of female directors on the board is expected to provide organisational benefits, 
but the insignificant effect found by other empirical studies may be attributed to the performance 
measure and type of role the female directors are offered in the boardroom. Provision of abundant 
human and relational resources due to the proportion of women directors on the board improves the 
operating revenue, which in turn leads to high employee productivity. However, the benefits women 
bring to the firm is likely to take time before it can have any significant effect on ROA (Ali et al., 2014). 
Moreover, Ali et al., (2014) argue that in most cases women are offered operational, rather than 
strategic roles; as such, women may not have sufficient influence on the efficient use of assets 
(ROA). Moreover, evidence has emerged that women are more likely than their male counterpart to 
be appointed as directors of firms that are facing numerous challenges or had experienced poor firm 
performance (Ryan and Haslam, 2005). As a result, the negative effect may be due to other factors 
as opposed to the ratio of women on the board. 
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3.3.5 Multiple theories 
Scholars should be aware that no single theory gives a complete picture of the governance-
performance relationship, rather each theory may seem more appropriate in different circumstance 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Jackling and Johl (2009) examined the effect of board characteristics on 
the firm performance of the top Indian non-financial firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange from 
2005 to 2006. They find support for both agency and resource dependency theory. It is purported 
that an adequate number of outside directors enhances board vigilance and monitoring capabilities, 
which in turn improves corporate performance. Similarly, a large board provides companies with 
greater exposure to the external environment and easy access to the critical resources needed, 
which leads to better operating performance.  
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) employed multiple theories (agency, resource dependency and 
stewardship) to examine the relationship between board characteristics and corporate financial 
performance of 348 of Australia’s largest listed firms. The authors find that the percentage of outside 
directors and board size effect performance measure differently. Larger boards and proportion of 
inside directors positively and significantly affect market-based performance measure (Tobin’s Q), 
but such impact is not found when accounting measure (ROA) is used (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
The former and latter findings indicate support for both stewardship and agency theory, respectively. 
Trusting and giving managers discretion to perform their duties improve Tobin’s Q, but certain 
agency problems may arise due to the absence of effective monitoring, which leads to a poor return 
on assets.  
3.4 Existing work on the Relationship between Board Structure and CSR  
Recently, companies are expected to consider the interest of other stakeholders rather than 
shareholders alone and this assist in ensuring long-term corporate survival. Basically, firms 
nowadays are advised to engage in corporate social responsibility programmes which take into 
account the wants and yearnings of other stakeholders such as employees, customers, government 
and society at large. Thus, a good corporate governance should be able to influence social 
 68 
 
performance. In other word, an effective board should have a positive effect on corporate social 
responsibility. Various authors that are on this argument, examined the link between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. This section discusses the empirical studies on this 
stream line of research and appendix I (ii) summarises these studies. 
3.4.1 Link between Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
Boards are the apex decision-making bodies in public corporations; they are expected to formulate 
all important decisions for either current (operational) or future (strategic) benefits. Although 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation still serves as the main goal of any serious for-profit organisation, 
the negative effect of the unethical and irresponsible attitude of firms have indeed made social 
performance a consideration along with financial performance (Jamali et al., 2008). Engagements of 
firms to corporate social responsibility activities improve corporate legitimacy and reputations (Bear 
et al., 2010) and overall long-term performance.  Therefore, the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms depends on how well the mechanisms influence CSR performance.   
In fact, some scholars argued that there is a strong connection between corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility. Jamali et al., (2008) explained that corporate governance (CG) serves 
as the foundation of CSR, CSR can be seen as a dimension of CG, and the two concepts can be 
termed as two sides of the same coin. CG and CSR are complementary and mutually reinforcing, as 
an effective CG system prevents unlawful behaviours of managers, which in turn improves 
shareholders’ wealth, while CSR activities minimise actions which may be legal, but unethical in 
relation to their implications to other stakeholders (Jamali et al., 2008). 
Some corporate governance scholars argue that firms that engage in CSR activities have better 
corporate governance mechanisms, while others argue that it is CSR performance that leads to good 
governance practices. Jo and Harjoto (2012) offered some explanations about the causation 
between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. Findings from a large sample of 
2,952 US firms show that CSR variables do not cause governance variables, rather the latter 
positively influences the former (Jo and Harjoto, 2012). Furthermore, the authors argue that firms 
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that engage in CSR activities are more likely to resolve any conflict that may arise between the firm 
(shareholders) and various stakeholder groups, which in turn strategically improves a firm’s financial 
performance.   
Similarly, a positive, but weak relationship is found between financial performance and CSR 
however, corporate governance has strengthened the relationship, as it possesses a significant 
moderating effect on the link between the two concepts (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Ntim and 
colleague concluded that firms with effective CG system are more likely to engage in CSR activities, 
which in turn influences corporate financial performance.   
Some companies that have good corporate governance practices are proactive with regard to CSR 
activities, as some mechanisms are used to ensure directors and other managerial officers are 
encouraged to engage in social and environmental programmes. The proactive measures of these 
firms lead to better CSR performance.  Hong et al., (2016) find that firms that have better corporate 
governance are more likely to provide compensation contracts linked to corporate social 
responsibility and compensation contracts tied to CSR are positively and significantly related to CSR 
activities in the following year, this, in turn, leads to better financial performance. 
It is important to highlight that expenditures related to CSR activities are either viewed as agency 
costs or instruments that can be used to maximize shareholders’ wealth. A recent study from the US 
shows that companies nowadays view CSR as a strategy that improves a firm’s financial 
performance and shareholders’ funds (Hong et al., 2016). An effective corporate governance (CG) 
practice ensures executives run the firms in an ethical and responsible manner, and the board of 
directors are the main actors to ensure firms operate in the most ethical and acceptable ways 
required by the law. Therefore, investigating the impact of board structure on CSR is paramount.  
3.4.2 Non-executive directors and CSR performance 
Ibrahim et al., (2003) investigate whether there is a difference between outside and inside directors, 
of 307 US board members, in regard to responsiveness to stakeholders’ claims. They argue that the 
benefit of outside directors is more skewed toward philanthropic responsibilities than economic social 
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dimension, while executive directors are more inclined to improve economic performance. Both 
inside and outside directors have similar attitudes towards ethical and legal corporate social 
responsibility dimensions (Ibrahim et al., 2003). 
A longitudinal study of 1,060 US  firms evinces that availability of an uncommitted resource (cash) 
leads firms to engage in higher community-based performance, such as CSR discretionary activities, 
but the proportion of NEDs on the board decreases the impact of available slack on community-
based performance (Harrison and Coombs, 2012). Thus, boards dominated by outside directors may 
likely have an adverse effect on CSR activities. However, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) examined 
the relationship between corporate governance and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
disclosure of 75 non-financial and utilities listed South African firms from 2003 to 2009. The authors 
find that the proportion of NEDs on the board influences firms to voluntarily disclose BEE information. 
This positive link can be expected because outside directors have their reputations to protect and 
are good monitors of executives’ unethical activities that may lead to payments of penalties. 
Appointment of NEDs on the board decreases agency problems that may arise between managers 
and owners. In advancing the interest of shareholders, it is also likely to reduce the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and stakeholders, as they mitigate managers’ unethical activities (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). In a similar vein, after controlling the effects of firm size, age, leverage and 
return on assets, it is found that having a proportion of NEDs and the presence of an audit committee 
have a positive and significant impact on the CSR disclosure of 116 Bangladesh firms  (Khan et al., 
2013).  
It is common practices in emerging economies to appoint NEDs, not based on merit, rather based 
on their ties with the firm which jeopardizes their independence.  Khan et al., (2013) argue that 
although NEDs in Bangladesh are appointed on the boards of family firms, mainly based on family 
and friendship ties, a large proportion of NEDs on the board offsets the family and friendship 
influence on CSR disclosure.  
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Another study from the same geographical context (Bangladesh) shows that an adequate proportion 
of NEDs provides sufficient board capital (experience, skills, expertise and knowledge) to the board 
and this improves the monitoring role of the board, ensuring transparency, whilst leading to a high 
level of CSR disclosure in Bangladesh (Muttakin et al., 2016). Notwithstanding, for outside directors 
to influence CSR, they require a sufficient level of independence and knowledge about CSR 
programmes. It is argued that effectiveness of outside directors in regard to CSR performance largely 
depends on their experience, independence and the environmental context in which the firm 
operates (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).    
Further evidence emerged on the relationship between board characteristics and CSR performance. 
Outsider dominated boards were significantly related to the corporate reputations of 324 
manufacturing and service US corporations (Musteen et al., 2010). Communities viewed boards that 
had sufficient numbers of NEDs as better corporate leaders to consider wider stakeholders’ interests 
because outside directors are more concerned with the company’s  and their own reputation, than 
inside directors (Musteen et al., 2010). 
In order to improve corporate legitimation, boards are expected to possess adequate knowledge 
about claims of firm’s stakeholders and acquire necessary resources needed to satisfy their claims. 
In this regard, a board has two major roles to play, identifying salient stakeholder claims and 
augmenting firm resources (Zhang et al., 2013). Proportions of NEDs is found to have significant 
effect in this regard. Outside directors are representatives of the wider community, have diverse 
knowledge in law, finance, engineering, for-profit and non-profit organisations, they may likely have 
knowledge about stakeholders’ interests and provide adequate resources to engage in CSR 
activities which satisfy the interest of the wider community, rather than shareholders alone (Zhang 
et al., 2013). Appointing well-connected individuals as outside directors, such as politicians, 
government officials and university presidents, serve as a strategy to acquire expertise and other 
resources (Zhang et al., 2013).  
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However, it is argued that proportion of sufficient outside directors curtail charitable giving, but firms 
with greater proportions of outside directors curtail such expenditure (Brown et al., 2006). This 
implies that boards dominated by outside directors are likely to give little or no cash contributions to 
charity. In a related development, an evidence emerged that outside directors have an insignificant 
effect on the accuracy of greenhouse gases sustainability information disclosed, especially for firms 
operating in industries with the higher risk of litigation (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). 
Similarly, Walls et al., (2012) investigated the corporate governance influence on the environmental 
performance of 313 firms cutting across 29 industries from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500. They 
find that lower proportion of NEDs effectively improves environmental performance. Thus, the 
independence of the board (in regard to the percentage of NEDs) is more beneficial to the financial 
performance, rather than the environment and social performance. 
Shaukat et al., (2016) developed and tested a model that predicted endogenous relationships 
between board CSR orientation, CSR strategy and the environmental and social performance of 
2,028 firm-year observations of UK listed firms. Boards that have an appropriate proportion of NEDs 
are referred to as the CSR orientation board, and such boards may likely engage in CSR strategy, 
which in turn leads to better environmental and social performance (Shaukat et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, Shaukat and colleagues argue that the relationship between CSR strategy and CSR 
performance is endogenously determined and self-reinforcing, as a firm with favourable 
environmental and social performance are more likely to encourage board-level CSR strategy. 
3.4.3 Board size and CSR performance 
While some boards’ target is to influence the financial performance of their firms, others’ main aim 
is to serve as a bridge between the firm and their host community and ensure the organisations 
operate for the best interest of all stakeholder groups. Bai (2013) reports that board size has a 
negative influence on the social performance of 137 for-profit Californian hospitals, but it has a 
positive effect on 226 non-profit hospitals. The author explains that much emphasis is given to the 
short-term financial performance in for-profit hospitals and incentives are offered to align the interest 
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of the managers with that of the shareholders. In contrast, non-profit hospitals are more concerned 
with social responsibility activities and ensure conflicts that might arise, between the firms and its 
host community, are minimised or eradicated (Bai, 2013).  
However, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) argue that a larger board improves the corporate social 
responsibility activities of South African listed firms, because a board with many directors from 
diverse stakeholder groups enhances corporate reputation and a sizeable board is unlikely to be 
dominated by the CEO. As such, any proposal from executives (including CSR) will be thoroughly 
scrutinised with a larger board. Moreover, the authors explain that larger boards are expected to 
effectively monitor managers, serve as an inclusion board with wider representations from various 
stakeholder groups and provide adequate diversity in terms of expertise, knowledge and experience. 
This demonstrates support for agency, stakeholder and resource dependency theories, respectively. 
Similarly, based on resource dependency theory, the larger board is more likely to have sufficient 
knowledge about various stakeholders’ claims and provide adequate resources to satisfy those 
claims.  However, it is argued that the positive effect of large boards on CSR is triggered by agency 
costs, as larger boards are ineffective monitors due to communication difficulties and free-rider 
issues. Such boards are positively and significantly related to making cash contributions to charity 
(Brown et al., 2006).  
There is a growing emphasis to ensure corporations’ maximise shareholders’ value in the long-term, 
rather than short-term. This can lead to board characteristics designed to protect the firm’s value 
and consideration of the benefits of all other stakeholders, if the aim is to enhance shareholders 
wealth in the long-term. Boards of directors are expected to satisfy the interests of stockholders and 
stakeholders.  Jizi et al., (2014) find that board size is one of the main internal corporate governance 
mechanism that influence both shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests of US commercial banks. 
Big sizeable boards represent diverse interests of stakeholders and are more likely to ensure the 
quality of CSR reporting and get CSR assurance (Liao et al., 2016). 
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3.4.4 CEO duality and CSR performance 
CEO duality is reported to have a positive and significant effect on CSR disclosure and this is mainly 
due to chief executive desires to reduce negative media coverage, protect their reputation and 
mitigate extreme supervision by the board and the financial market (Jizi et al., 2014). In a similar 
direction, a positive and significant relationship is found between CEO duality and corporate 
reputation (Musteen et al., 2010). Comparably, a study by Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez 
(2010) investigates the effectiveness of boards on disclosure of greenhouse emissions of 283 
companies listed on the FTSE Global Equity Index and reports that CEO duality benefits 
dissemination of greenhouse information, but the firm’s environmental behaviour and the sensitivity 
of the industry mitigate the positive impact.  
However, a powerful CEO has a negative influence on CSR disclosure in Bangladesh and it mitigates 
the positive link found between board capital and CSR disclosure (Muttakin et al., 2016). Although 
board capital improves CSR disclosure, a powerful CEO renders the capability of resources useless 
in regard to disclosure of CSR information. Similarly, Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) discover a 
negative and significant relationship between CEO duality and disclosure of BEE information by 
South African companies. 
Recently, Liao et al., (2016) examined the relationship between corporate boards and CSR 
assurance of Chinese listed firms. They found that firms that separate the roles of chairmen and 
CEOs, are more likely to improve CSR assurance. Surprisingly, the authors find that supervisory 
directors and CEOs with a foreign background in China are not too involved and considered as a 
token, therefore, have an insignificant effect on CSR assurance.  
It is not the separation or combining the roles of chairman and CEO that matters, rather, the real 
independence of the directors. Khan et al., (2013) argue that CEO duality has an insignificant effect 
on CSR disclosure, however, the lack of proper separation between CEO and chairman, as both 
leaders are from the same family in Bangladesh, makes board leadership structure meaningless.   
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3.4.5 Board gender diversity and CSR performance 
The majority of previous studies find a positive relationship between the proportion of women 
directors and CSR performance. Women directors have the interest to ensure the quality of non-
financial disclosure and reliability of information in China (Liao et al., 2016). Boards with a sufficient 
number of female directors are more likely to influence corporate social responsibility performance 
in both institutional and technical strength CSR measures, which in turn improves firm reputation 
(Bear et al., 2010).  
Diversity leads to communication difficulties, but having a substantial number of women minimises 
such difficulties. Moreover, the influence of proportion of female directors is more salient when their 
number increases and have a more assertive, rather than minority voice (Bear et al., 2010). Similarly, 
female directors are found to have a positive and significant effect on CSR performance because 
they are kind, sympathetic, maturing, helpful and are more lenient toward others, than their male 
counterpart (Zhang et al., 2013). However, differences in regard to directors’ age, experience, 
education, ethnicity, nationality and occupation have a positive effect on the extent of CSR disclosure 
of South African companies, but surprisingly, board gender diversity is not significantly linked to BEE 
disclosure (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
In an effort to examine influence of boardroom diversity on social responsibility performance,  Hafsi 
and Turgut (2013) distinguished between ‘ diversity of boards’ and ‘diversity in boards’. The latter 
refers to differences in boards attributes, such as size, leadership structure, the proportion of outside 
directors and foreign directors. ‘Diversity in board’ refers to the dissimilarities among directors within 
a particular board, such as age, gender and ethnic diversity. The authors argue that dissimilarities 
among board members are the key determinants of corporate social responsibility performance 
(CSRP) of 95 manufacturing and service firms listed in the S&P 500. They concluded that the 
‘diversity of boards’ has no direct effect on corporate social responsibility performance, rather a 
moderating role on the relationship between ‘diversity in boards’ and CSRP. 
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In a study of 516 of the largest companies listed on the US stock Exchange, across 64 industries, 
Zhang et al., (2013) found that the proportion of NEDs and women directors are positively and 
significantly linked with CSR performance, measured by Fortunes America’s Most Admiral (FAMA-
reputational-based) within an industry, but when CSR measures are based on firms’ actions, only 
women directors have influence on CSR performance.  Moreover, women directors improve the 
disclosure of greenhouse emission information, even in polluting companies that operate in high 
chances of a lawsuit (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). 
Additionally, it is argued that women directors are more likely to have a greater influence on CSR 
performance than firm value. Isidro and Sobral (2015) investigated the impact of female directors on 
firm value, corporate financial performance and the ethical and social performance of boards of 
larger European firms. No direct relationship was found between female directors on the board and 
firm value (measured with Tobin’s Q), however an indirect impact was discovered through a greater 
influences on financial performance (ROA and RO Sales) and ethical and social compliance (Isidro 
and Sobral, 2015). The authors concluded that the proportion of women directors have both financial 
and non-financial benefits for corporations. In a similar vein, using a large sample of 1,489 US firms 
and stakeholder theory lenses, evidence emerged that board gender diversity improves a firm’s 
ability to acquire the resource needed and satisfy the yearning of various stakeholder groups, which 
in turn influences corporate social responsibility performance (Harjoto et al., 2015).  
However, it is essential to highlight that the impact of gender diversity on corporate reputation varies 
with the environment in which the firm operates. The effect of board gender is more salient on those 
firms that operate in industries that require a greater need for effective stakeholder management, 
such as firms in highly competitive markets and consumer product markets (Harjoto et al., 2015). 
Similarly, Brown et al., (2006) find differences of making contributions to charity across industries; 
firms that operate in transportation, retail, mining, and construction industries give meager 
contributions to charity compared to those in the manufacturing industry. 
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Brammer et al., (2009) find that female directors have a negative and positive effect on the corporate 
reputation of firms in producer services and consumer services (such as hotels, restaurants, and 
retailers) respectively. The authors concluded that the positive effect of women directors on the 
corporate reputation is more pronounced in firms that operate close to final consumers and have 
sufficient gender composition in their workforce. However, a recent study by Shaukat et al., (2016) 
find no evidence that shows women have different effects on CSR performance across industries. 
This means there are no variations across industries, against the speculations of many authors. 
In a further argument on the effect of the critical mass of women directors on firm social performance, 
Jia and Zhang (2013) investigate whether multiple identities of women directors influence the 
relationship between the critical mass of women directors and the corporate philanthropic disaster 
response (CPDR) of 492 Chinese listed firms. The authors report that age diversity among female 
directors moderated the relationship between critical mass and response to the Wenchuan and 
Yushu earthquakes. The authors explained that diversity within a minority group is likely to lead to 
in-group categorization, but it may also create similarities with the majority, which minimises out-
group bias, and this enhances the minority impact on firm decision making. Therefore, multiple 
women, rather than a single woman, are more beneficial to quality decision making, which in turn 
improves decisions on CSR activities. 
3.4.6 Contingency and Multiple theories 
The relationship between governance mechanisms and CSR is not as straightforward as assumed. 
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) explained that effective corporate governance mechanisms negatively 
influences positive CSR (proactive stakeholder relationship management) and negative CSR 
(violation of regulations and standards). In addition, the relationships are contingent on the 
satisfaction of firm performance indicated by the levels of slack (availability of resources) and the 
differences between actual and expected performance (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Specifically, 
non-executive directors reduce the expenditure of positive CSR and curtail violation of environmental 
regulations and standards in order to avoid paying penalties and fines. In summary, effective 
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governance mitigates negative CSR in high-performing companies with slack and reduces positive 
CSR in low-performing firms with negative slack.  
These findings are consistent with agency theory views which require the board to be vigilant and 
mitigate any expenditure that may not serve the interest of shareholders. The theory emphasises 
the control governance mechanism which ideally protects the owners’ wealth against unjustifiable 
spending. Such mechanisms would likely improve short-term financial performance, but not long-
term social performance. It was found that board structure design, based on conventional agency 
theory, such as the proportion of NEDs and female directors, has insignificant relations with the 
corporate social responsibility performance of 471 Chinese firms (Lau et al., 2016).  
Evidence emerged that certain factors, other than board characteristics, determine firm CSR 
engagement: Non-manufacturing firms have greater CSR performance scores than manufacturing 
firms, past-performance is positively related to CSR performance scores and larger firms engage 
more in CSR activities, than smaller firms (Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Lau et al., 2016). Therefore, these 
factors need to be controlled for any study that investigates the direct influence of board 
characteristics on CSR performance.  
Taking a different approach and breaking down corporate sustainability into the triple bottom line 
performance, which comprises of economic, environmental and social sustainability performance, 
Hussain et al., (2016) find that board characteristics affected each dimension of performance 
differently. The proportion of outside directors, women directors, CEO duality and board meetings 
have an insignificant effect on the economic bottom of sustainability performance, but the proportion 
of outside directors has a significant influence on environmental and social sustainability 
performance (Hussain et al., 2016). Furthermore, the authors find that board diversity significantly 
influences social dimension, but not environmental sustainability performance. Similarly, 
environmental performance is not influenced by board size, women directors and board meetings. 
Additional evidence emerged that outside directors, women directors and board meetings are all 
positively related to social sustainability performance. However, board size and CEO duality have 
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no significant effect on social performance, and duality is a detriment to environmental sustainability 
performance (Hussain et al., 2016). 
Corporate governance theories have different implications on the influence of board structure on 
performance. Scholars should avoid using a single theory, as using multiple theories give a clearer 
picture of the effectiveness of these board characteristics. A single theory only gives a limited 
explanation of the board effectiveness. Integration of stakeholder-agency theories indicates that 
board duties are to control and monitor executive activities and ensure firms are run ethically, legally 
and morally for the benefit of the wider community, rather than shareholders alone (Prado-Lorenzo 
and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). Meanwhile, agency and stewardship theories are among the main 
corporate governance theories used in the board literature and the theories represent two main 
contradicting roles that boards are expected to perform.  
Galbreath (2016) advises that these two main roles to be viewed as complementary and 
interdependent, rather than mutually exclusive. In a study of 295 Australian listed firms, the author 
finds that proportions of NEDs and female directors jointly have a strong effect on corporate social 
responsibility performance, than each individual effect. Galbreath further explains that outside 
directors provide sufficient monitoring, questioning and scrutinizing of managerial CSR proposals, 
but that does not bring new ideas or effective strategies related to CSR. Sufficient support on CSR 
strategies and various CSR activities may likely be available with an adequate proportion of female 
directors on the board due to certain psychological attributes they possess (Galbreath, 2016).  
3.5 Previous Studies on Board Processes 
Other scholars have argued that boards are effective, if they positively influence board task, such as 
monitoring, advice and counsel, strategy formulation and provision of resource, which consequently 
improves firm performance. Scholars on this streamline of research rely on board’s internal working 
processes as the key determinants of board effectiveness. These sub-sections below discuss 
previous empirical studies on board processes and a summary of these studies is presented in 
appendix I (iii). 
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3.5.1 Boards’ expected roles 
Studies that investigate board functioning consider board effectiveness as the abilities of directors 
to perform certain board tasks. Boards are expected to sufficiently monitor the activities of 
executives, provide resources and effectively guide, advice, and formulate strategies. In summary, 
boards are required to provide control and service tasks. Although scholars use different types of 
board tasks in their studies, a large number of these studies have reached consensus on the two 
common board tasks: service and control. Control and service tasks are the main board roles, but 
there are other duties that overlap within these roles (Kula, 2005). For example, Melkumov et al. 
(2015) explain that the resource provision role involves being internally focused on the provision of 
advice and counsel to managers, and external provision of networking and legitimacy.  Based on 
this, the resource provision role can be merged into a service task. 
Service task involve resource provision, initiating and formulating strategies, advising and guiding 
the CEO and other executive directors on administrative and other managerial issues. The control 
role refers to the monitoring and controlling of executives, to mitigate their likely opportunity 
behaviours; it involves  hiring and firing of CEOs and other executive directors and setting  
reasonable compensation for managers (Kula, 2005). These two roles are supported by different 
contradicting theories such as agency and resource dependency. Notwithstanding, it is essential to 
understand that one single theory is not adequate to sufficiently account for board roles as well as 
reflect the directors’ behaviours and experience, therefore, board scholars have been encouraged 
to use multiple theories in their studies (Roberts et al., 2005).  
In order to have a complete understanding of the roles of directors, both agency (control) and 
stewardship (collaboration) theories are required; that is to support managers in their managerial 
activities and monitor their activities to ensure non-divergence of interest. To achieve this, Roberts 
et al., (2005) highlighted certain conducts, such as ‘engage, but non-executive’, ‘challenge, but 
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supporting’, and ‘independent, but involved,’ which help directors to ensure both control and 
collaboration roles are performed effectively. 
It is essential to note that the role directors actively perform depends on the actors they want to 
serve. Melkumov et al., (2015) argue that directors that have a greater desire to satisfy the interest 
of the shareholders are more likely to engage in roles that improve short-term performance (such as 
monitoring of managers and financial outcome) in order to quickly satisfy the interest of their 
principals. However, such directors may have an adverse effect on strategic participation. 
Furthermore, the authors explain that directors’ identification with the focal organisations improves 
external legitimacy, networking, advice and counsel, and strategic participation roles. Such directors 
influence monitoring of the management role only to a certain level, then the positive impact changes 
to a negative effect (Melkumov et al., 2015). 
Boards that perform activities that benefit the overall focal organisation or move away from extreme 
shareholder wealth maximisation are more likely to engage in strategies that guarantee the long-
term survival of a firm and satisfy the interest of both shareholders and stakeholders. Directors that 
limit their activities to managerial control are likely to have a narrow focus on the short-term financial 
outcome. Strategic control is long-term and qualitative in nature and refers to boards’ ex-ante control 
of strategy proposals submitted by the managers. Whereas an operational control role is short-term 
and quantitative-oriented, these are the activities relating to the supervision of executives routine 
operations regarding investments decisions and the financial status of the firm (Nielsen and Huse, 
2010). 
Recently, directors have started to realise the importance of other roles, such as service task, rather 
than the control role emphasised by the agency theory. A survey from New Zealand by Ingley and 
Van Der Walt (2005) evinces that respondents indicate that the fundamental strategic directions 
(38.7%) of the firms are the key corporate activities that directors influenced. Moreover, the data 
from the survey shows that the board’s main role is defining the strategy framework (34.6%) and 
these strategies are formulated and developed jointly by the managers and the board (65.8%), rather 
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than by managers alone-who developed the strategies  and then sought approval from the board 
(Ingley and Van Der Walt, 2005).  
In fact, some directors nowadays are more concerned with providing advice and guidance on 
strategies to the firm, rather than providing external resources.  Using the top-100 listed firms in the 
Netherlands between 1997 and 2005, Bezemer et al., (2007) show that non-executive directors’ 
service role in the Netherlands is more focused on internal service activities, such as the provision 
of advice and counsel to the CEOs, than external service roles, such as serving as boundary spanner 
between the firm and the environment.  
In a related development, a qualitative longitudinal complete member researcher participant-
observer methodology, employed by Parker (2008), identifies three main controls that the boards 
pay more attention to: control reporting, control orientation and budgetary control. The author finds 
that strategic orientation of directors is driving the focus on operational and financial controls. Parker 
(2008) observed that both boards show greater attention to the financial implication of strategic 
proposals because board strategic involvement is found to have a positive and significant influence 
on the organisational performance of both for-profit and non-profit firms (Zhu et al., 2016). 
3.5.2 Board structure, board processes and board tasks 
As there is no unanimity on the direct effect of board structure on firm performance from previous 
studies, board researchers have recently shifted their focus on opening the ‘black box’ to investigate 
the influence of board processes on board tasks effectiveness. Andrés‐Alonso et al. (2010) found 
the  traditional board structure (board size and proportion of NEDs) had a dubious impact on the 
organisational efficiency of 119 Spanish foundations, but  the availability of diverse knowledge, 
experience in the boardroom and the active engagement attitudes of directors to utilise the 
knowledge improved the foundations’ efficiency (effective resource allocations).   
It is essential to ensure knowledge and skills available in the boardroom are fully utilised for any 
benefit to be derived.  Availability of information has no effect on strategic involvement, but utilisation 
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of such Information improves strategic involvement in for-profit organisations (Zhu et al., 2016). Both 
proportions of independent directors and board size may likely bring diverse and abundant 
knowledge to the board, but it is the active involvement of directors that guarantee effective utilisation 
of the knowledge, which consequently improves corporate performance. Non-executive directors are 
unpaid directors, they are likely to be less committed than inside directors who receive wages and 
totally depend on the survival of the organisations for their daily expenditure (Andrés‐Alonso et al., 
2010). Furthermore, it is argued that large boards are characterised by communication difficulties, 
less cohesive, sub-divisions within the board and social loafing, which is likely to have an adverse 
effect on the directors’ active engagement (Andrés‐Alonso et al., 2010). 
Having a mere proportion of NEDs on the board does not guarantee board effectiveness, what is 
important is the level of their engagement in firm’ activities. With a large sample of 12,131 Chinese 
firm-year observations, Liu et al., (2016) find that firms that have independent directors that attend 
board meetings are more likely to protect minority shareholders interest by reducing the problem of 
tunneling, especially in non-state-owned companies and when external supervision is weak. The 
authors argue that the effectiveness of independent directors in protecting shareholders’ wealth is 
only possible if they are attending board meetings.  
Taking a different approach, Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007) argue that the trade-off between 
independence/control and collaboration/access to information benefits is not as straightforward as 
expected.  In a study of 149 usable responses from a questionnaire sent to chairpersons of US public 
firms in Chemicals, Printing and Publishing, and Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Rutherford 
and Buchholtz (2007) find some support for agency theory asserting a vigilant board is more likely 
to reduce information asymmetry between managers and the board. The authors argue that boards 
with a sufficient proportion of outside directors are more likely to engage in proactive information 
seeking, collect new information and obtain a greater quality of information than inside director 
dominated boards. Outside directors engage in behaviours that assist to receive specific information, 
in addition to the generic information they possess (Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007).  
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However, inside directors are more likely to have firm-specific information than outside directors; the 
latter improves board independence, but at the expense of firm specific information which is valuable 
in enhancing firm performance. Payne et al., (2009) testify that a higher proportion of internal 
directors increases firm-specific information, but it decreases board independence. This may likely 
have an adverse effect on board level of commitment, cognitive conflict and use of knowledge 
available in the boardroom. 
In an attempt to shift from easily measurable demographics for investigating the impact of diversity 
on board effectiveness, Huse et al., (2009) consider backgrounds, experience and esteem of women 
directors in examining the contribution of female directors in the boardroom. They find that creative 
discussions improve board control task, but while the proportion of women directors, per se, has an 
insignificant effect on creative discussions, the combined effect of different backgrounds and esteem 
of women directors have a strong influence on creative discussions. 
It is argued that women directors may provide diverse knowledge and opinions in the boardroom, 
which leads to in-depth analysis and debate, and they are likely to raise questions if not clear about 
anything. Therefore, women directors on the board may likely improve open discussions. However, 
a study from Norway indicates that the proportion of women has no significant effect on open 
discussions in the boardroom, but open debate enhances boards’ strategic and operational controls 
(Nielsen and Huse, 2010).  
Furthermore, Nielsen and Huse (2010) indicate that the proportion of female directors on boards 
positively relate to strategic controls and board processes variables (board development and 
decrease conflict) mediate the relationship between the female ratio and strategic controls. The 
authors posit that boards with an adequate proportion of women directors are likely to have lower 
levels of conflict. It is also noted that board conflict is negatively related with strategic control tasks, 
but has no significant impact on operational control. Similarly, it is found that boards with a sufficient 
number of female directors are more likely to contribute on strategic and CSR controls than budget 
and behavioural controls, thus have less influence on board roles that are qualitative, rather than 
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quantitative in nature (Huse et al., 2009). This may likely be due to psychological attributes of women 
such as helping, leniency and caring about others.  
Both ‘all men’ boards and boards with adequate representation of female directors have merits and 
demerits. On one hand, homogenous (all men) boards are expected to have unified direction, an 
effective interpersonal relationship among directors, greater trust and a level of consensus. However, 
this type of board may continue with the current unfavourable strategies and unlikely to be open to 
new information and ideas. Such boards harm innovative ideas and discussions on entrepreneurial 
issues (Tuggle et al., 2010). On the other hand, heterogeneous boards may provide different 
perspectives, knowledge, skills and experience that can be used to make quality decisions for the 
benefit of the firm. However, such boards may lack good communication between directors, face 
negative interpersonal relationships and difficulties in working together as a team. Such challenges 
may lead to poorer decision-making and discussion of entrepreneurial issues (Tuggle et al., 2010). 
Tuggle and colleagues argue that only boards with moderate or weak, not strong, diversity will be 
able to discuss entrepreneurial issues. This is due to the fact that weak faultlines may not result in 
sub-groups within the board, which can damage the communication and directors’ ability to discuss 
entrepreneurial issues (Tuggle et al., 2010). Nonetheless, extreme separation patterns among 
directors negatively influence discussions on entrepreneurial issues in the boardroom (Tuggle et al., 
2010). Thus, a board with moderate gender diversity are more likely to be effective in performing 
board tasks. 
It was argued that the proportion of women directors per se does not matter, if all the female directors 
have the same experience and skills as their male counterpart. Women with different backgrounds 
and experience are more likely to improve creative discussions in the boardroom, than women 
directors that have similar backgrounds with their male counterparts (Huse et al., 2009). However, 
Minichilli et al. (2009) argue that directors with different backgrounds may lack the capability to give 
constructive and technical advice on executives issues. The authors find that background diversity 
is negatively related to output and behavioural controls. Thus, in regard to advice and control roles, 
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the homogenous board are more effective than heterogeneous board. Furthermore, Minichilli et al., 
(2009) find that critical debate has no influence on output control and strategic control. 
3.5.3 The importance of board processes 
Kula (2005) investigates the impact of board roles, structure and processes on the firm performance 
of 386 small and non-listed Turkish firms. The author finds that board processes variables (board 
effectiveness and access to information) have greater influences on board effectiveness. Moreover, 
Wan and Ong (2005) argue that the ability of directors to perform their duties effectively depends on 
certain social-psychological processes variables, such as board level of commitment, cognitive 
conflict and use of knowledge and skills.  
Directors’ commitment refers to the level of involvement during meetings and preparation before 
meetings (Minichilli et al., 2009). Involvement represents the level of effort directors allocate during 
discussions and follow-up of the decisions made in the boardroom; while preparations refer to board 
members’ desires to make meaningful contributions in the meetings and the extent to which directors 
conduct further research into the topic prior to the meeting (Minichilli et al., 2009). Using a sample of 
301 responses received from CEOs of the largest Italian industrial firms, Minichilli et al. (2009) find 
that critical debate and directors’ commitments are prerequisites for board advice and networking 
roles. Similarly, the authors find that commitment has a positive and significant effect on output 
control, strategic control and strategic participation roles. 
While an insignificant relationship is found between women (board structure) and open debate 
(board process), the latter has a positive and significant influence on board effectiveness. This 
implies that the process variable has greater explanatory power independent of the board structure 
(Nielsen and Huse, 2010). Therefore, it is essential for board scholars to pay more attention to the 
processes variables, rather than board structure alone. Wan and Ong (2005) argue that board 
processes are more important than board structure variables. Specifically, the authors find that board 
structure variables have an insignificant relationship with board processes and board effectiveness, 
but effort norms, as well as the presence and use of knowledge and skills, are positively and 
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significantly related to board monitoring, service and strategic roles in Singapore. However, the 
authors find that cognitive conflict has a significant effect on the strategic role, but not service and 
monitoring roles of the board. Extending the model of Wan and Ong (2005), Kula (2005) finds that 
board roles have different effects on firm-level performance. Specifically, among the control, service 
and resource acquisition roles, only the latter has a positive and significant effect on firm 
performance. 
In a related research, Zona and Zattoni (2007) argue that although in their study, positive 
relationships are found between board size, outside directors and monitoring and networking roles 
respectively, board processes variables impacts are stronger than that of board demographic 
variables. The authors find that effort norms and the use of knowledge and skills improves the 
monitoring capability of the board, whereas cognitive conflict does not. Cognitive conflict and the use 
of knowledge and skills have a positive and significant impact on the board networking role, but effort 
norms have a weak effect on the networking role (Zona and Zattoni, 2007). The authors called for 
more studies that fully investigate how board structure and processes variables jointly affect the 
board task performance.  
In their efforts to examine the influence of CEO duality on board task through board processes, 
Machold et al., (2011) find that board members’ knowledge utilisation, board development 
programmes and chairperson leadership efficacy improves boards’ strategic involvement and this is 
possible if the CEO also serves as the chairperson of the firm (Machold et al., 2011).  
Another study that investigates the influence of board processes on board effectiveness by Payne 
et al., (2009) find that sufficient levels of knowledge in the boardroom, availability of external 
information, power, the commitment of directors and maximum time spent on activities have a 
positive and significant effect on the board control and service tasks. However, the authors report 
that incentives, attributes and internal information failed to have a significant influence on board 
effectiveness. Thus, inside director dominated boards significantly harm board functioning. 
Furthermore, boards that are effective in performing their duties are more likely to improve the 
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financial performance of their firms (Payne et al., 2009). In other words, abilities of directors to 
perform their roles effectively improve corporate financial performance. 
An observational approach is employed to discover how boards function by Brundin and Nordqvist 
(2008). The study shows that directors with high emotional energy tend to become order givers, 
controller of board affairs, have feelings of superiority, feel included and are active in performing their 
duties; such boards are expected to be effective in performing their duties. On the other hand, 
directors with low emotional energy are normally order takers, have inferior feelings, are isolated, 
less involved and less committed on the board activities; such behaviours may impair the board 
effectiveness (Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008). The authors found that a CEO could start a meeting 
with high emotional energy, but due to the excessive control role of the board, the CEO’s emotional 
energy would become low and he would then start to receive orders from the board. The CEO would 
eventually become demotivated and a passive, rather than an active, board member. This, Brundin 
and Nordqvist (2008) argue may have an adverse consequence on the firm considering the sensitive 
position the chief executive holds in that organisation. However, if the CEO continues with the same 
high emotional energy as he started with, then he is likely to become a dictator and make the board 
ineffective in challenging any unfavourable strategy. 
Some of the explanation given for directors’ inability to challenge the CEOs opinions about the 
viability of the existing strategy is a lack of independence, as directors rely on executives for their 
appointments (Westphal and Bednar, 2005). It is general believed that independent outside directors 
are expected to be more objective and able to challenge unfavourable strategies than employee 
directors. However, it is  possible for outside directors to be ineffective in challenging current strategy 
due to pluralistic ignorance, which is a psychological bias whereby each director is reluctant to raise 
concerns due to fear that the points raised may not be accepted by other members (Westphal and 
Bednar, 2005). 
Different types of boards exist; some boards passively rubber-stamp strategies proposals submitted 
by CEOs, while other boards are actively involved in strategy formulation. A study of 140 US non-
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profit organisations (NPOs) shows that boards that are more strategic, active and cohesive are more 
likely to manage their resources effectively through innovation, risk-taking and proactive behaviours 
than operational, passive and fractional boards (Coombes et al., 2011). These behaviours have a 
positive and significant impact on social, but not the financial performance of these NPOs (Coombes 
et al., 2011). 
Zhang (2010) investigates the effects of board information on strategic task performance of 
Norwegian companies. The author finds that using diverse information had more influence on 
current, but not future, strategic task performance, than possessing diverse information. However, 
possessing that information enhanced current and future strategic task performance.  Specifically, 
three behaviours of using diverse information (open discussions, effective leadership and active 
search) have positive and significant impacts on current strategic task performance. Using diverse 
information creates a competitive advantage for a short period, while possessing diverse information 
gives a sustainable competitive advantage in the long-term (Zhang, 2010). 
Taking a different approach to fully understand the actual board working style, Pugliese et al. (2015) 
employed a direct observation methodology to study the impact of board dynamics and directors’ 
participation on perceived board effectiveness. The authors attended three meetings of two boards 
in Australia and noticed that there were differences between the two boards in regard to board 
climate. Pugliese et al., (2015) explained that in the first meeting, the members were fully controlled 
by the chairperson, few individuals dominated the meetings and directors were less active and made 
limited contributions. In the other board’s meeting, participants made contributions freely without 
seeking approval from the chair, there was sufficient opportunities for all participants to make 
contributions, and discussions in the meetings were more open and inclusive (Pugliese et al., 2015). 
The authors concluded that the better way to assess whether boards are capable of questioning and 
monitoring the executive is through inclusiveness and evenness of turn-taking, rather than relying 
on the proportion of non-executive directors. The researchers’ observations exemplify informal and 
formal board meeting structures. In the former, meetings are conducted with fewer rules and 
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instructions, while the formal meeting is usually characterised by a bureaucratic system, a series of 
rules and instructions as well as controlled and codified with fewer contributions from the attendees. 
Informal meetings generates open discussions and innovative dialogue due to trust and freedom in 
the boardroom with fewer rules and instructions, which eliminates or reduces the relational conflict 
that may arise among dissimilar individuals (Tuggle et al., 2010). Informal meetings decrease the 
negative effect of strong dissimilarities among directors on discussions of entrepreneurial issues 
(Tuggle et al., 2010). An informal meeting reduces the confrontations, stress and mistrust among 
board members. It can lead to the transparency of exchanges and maintain cohesion in the 
boardroom, even when there are intense disagreements (Parker, 2007). In a similar vein, Tuggle et 
al., (2010) argue that frequency of board meetings, venue and structure of the meeting, which can 
be used to neutralised the demerits of formal meetings, influence the amount of time used to discuss 
entrepreneurial issues. Moreover, the frequency of general board and strategic meetings influence 
strategic involvement in for-profit organisations (Zhu et al., 2016).  
3.6 Findings and Literature Gap 
Recently, research on board effectiveness received greater attention from scholars around the world. 
Ninety empirical articles about the board of directors’ effectiveness were reviewed above. Based on 
this review, board effectiveness is referred to as (1) the influence of directors on corporate financial 
performance (2) impacts of boards on corporate social responsibility performance and (3) effects of 
board internal processes on board-level performance. Using a narrative and systematic search 
approach, ninety relevant articles were reviewed in order to find ‘what is written’ and ‘what is not’ 
about board effectiveness.  
The review has shown that the findings from the studies that investigate the relationship between 
common board characteristics, known as the ‘usual suspects’, and corporate financial and social 
performance are of the majority and clearly contradictory. Out of the 90 articles reviewed, the 
predominant approach in the board literature examines the impact of boards on financial 
performance (no = 37), followed by the board-CSR relationship (no = 29) and then board processes 
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(no = 24). 65 per cent of studies that investigated the board-financial performance employed 
accounting measures as a proxy for financial performance, either alone or in conjunction with the 
market measures. The largest contributions from these studies are from the USA (no = 6) and 
Australia (no = 5). Few articles (no = 4) from this streamline considered using multi-countries as the 
research contexts.  The highest numbers of articles that used corporate social responsibility 
performance as the outcome variable are from USA (no = 16) and KLD is used to measure the 
dependent variable in ten articles.  
The literature on what makes boards effective is increasingly getting attention. The figures 3.3 and 
3.4 below indicate the evolution of board of directors’ studies over the years. The maximum papers 
published in each year are 11 and the minimum is one. 2006 and 2016 are the years that the majority 
of the contributions are published. The publications in recent years show a paradigm shift from much 
attention on financial performance to an increased focus on CSR performance. However, the area 
that requires more research is the examination of the influence of board processes variables.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Number of Articles Published Each Year From 2003-2016 
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Figure 3.4: Number of Articles Published Each Year From 2003-2016 
 
Various authors make contributions on ‘what is’ and ‘what makes’ boards effective, however, this 
paper finds that the literature is skewed towards developed markets, a similar pattern of approach 
and specific methodology. The review shows clearly that studies on board effectiveness are more 
salient in the developed countries than in emerging market. The majority of the contributions are 
from USA and Australia with 27 and nine respectively. The data evinces that the USA has five papers 
on board processes, six on board-financial performance and 16 on board-CSR relationships.  
Similarly, six papers reviewed are from the UK. The majority of articles reviewed above are from 
developed countries. Notwithstanding, few studies are from developing countries with the majority 
from China (no = 7) cutting across the three perspectives of board effectiveness. None of the studies 
is from Nigeria. Generally, empirical studies published in higher ranking journals about corporate 
governance and specifically on boards of directors are scares in developing countries.  
The input-output approach, where scholars seek to investigate the direct relationship between board 
and performance, dominated the board effectiveness literature in both developed and developing 
economies. This direct approach has been applied in studies that examine board-financial (no = 37) 
and board-CSR (no = 29) performance relationships. Overall, out of the 90 articles reviewed, 73 per 
cent are relying on board structure to directly influence firm-level performance.  
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This is similar to what Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) reported, that 99 out of 102 articles reviewed 
examined the impact of some subset of board characteristics on performance. Figure 3.5 below 
shows that only 24 papers in the review try to understand the influence of conduct and behaviours 
of directors. For these scholars, board effectiveness refers to the influence of boards on task 
performance, which in turn improves firm-level performance.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Approaches to Board Effectiveness Literature 
 
This input-output approach led researchers to rely on archival data and employ quantitative 
methodology with the similar analytical tool. Figure 3.6 below shows that a quantitative approach is 
the common methodology employed for board-financial performance (no = 37), board-CSR (no = 
28) and board processes (no = 19) studies. However, the quantitative approach is more common for 
studies that directly investigate the board-firm level performance, than board processes studies. Five 
papers that seek to understand board functioning used qualitative methodology out of which Pugliese 
et al., (2015), Brundin and Nordqvist (2008), Parker (2007), and Parker (2008) employed direct 
observation methodology. 
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Archival data is collected and analysed by the majority of those studies (no = 84) that used a 
positivist, deductive and quantitative methodology. However, 16 out of the 19 board processes 
papers use the questionnaire as the main instrument for data collection. This is necessary as the 
aim is to understand the exact working styles of directors, which are mostly latent variables.  
 
Figure 3.6: Methodological Approach of the Previous Studies 
 
Based on the above review, literature gaps were identified as follows: Firstly, the majority of previous 
studies on board effectiveness treat boards as a ‘black box’ employing the input-output approach 
(Figure 3.5). Many scholars are calling for a new perspective on board literature and ask researchers 
to open the ‘black box’ and include the intervening processes that link the input with the output 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Daily et al., 2003; Huse et al., 2009). Secondly, although 
some studies make contributions on the board processes literature, findings are not unequivocal. 
Therefore, more studies are needed to understand the actual board functioning (Zona and Zattoni, 
2007). Thirdly, most board processes studies used models that investigate the relationships between 
board characteristics, processes and tasks effectiveness (Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 
2007). However, none of these consider the influence of board task on the firm-level effectiveness 
especially CSR performance. Similarly, the mediating effect of board processes and board task are 
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relevant to developed economies. A literature gap exists for developing markets and particularly for 
Nigeria.  
Following the above literature gap identified, this study adopted a theoretical model developed by 
Forbes and Milliken in 1999 (see Figure 3.7 below) and has been tested in a small number of 
developed nations. The framework is modified, extended and empirically tested in Nigeria. The board 
characteristics (board size, board composition, CEO duality and gender diversity), board processes 
(effort norms, cognitive conflict, and use of knowledge) and board tasks discussed in the previous 
chapter are all included in the model. Forbes and colleague argue that instead of the direct input-
output approach, researchers should consider investigating the relationships between board 
characteristics and board task effectiveness through board processes, which in turn improves firms’ 
financial performance.  
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Sources: Forbes and Milliken, (1999) 
3.7 Hypotheses Development 
This section introduces the hypotheses that will be tested in order to answer the research questions 
and achieve the research aim. The hypotheses were developed using previous literature on board 
characteristics, board processes, board task and corporate social responsibility. Board 
characteristics considered are: board size, board composition, CEO duality and proportion of women 
directors. Effort norms (commitment), cognitive conflict (challenge) and knowledge utilisation serve 
as board process variables in this research. Two major board tasks (control and service) are 
considered for board task, while corporate social responsibility legal and ethical activities are 
considered as the overall firm-level effectiveness.  
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Figure 3.7: Theoretical Model Adopted From Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
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3.7.1 Board Size and Board Processes 
According to resource dependency theory, a larger board is more beneficial than small board, as it 
provides multiple sources to the firm which enhances the availability of both human capital and 
relational capital in the boardroom (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). This availability of resources equip 
boards with different perspectives, ideas and experience which may trigger critical discussions, open 
debate and job-related disagreements and this consequently,  improves quality decision-making 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
However, too many members on the board may lead to difficulties in building interpersonal 
relationships within the board and this results in lower levels of commitment among directors, as 
some directors are likely to contribute less effort than their capabilities, thinking that ‘they are not 
alone’. This is consistent with the social loafing found in the large group literature (Latane et al., 
1979) and it supports the general belief of agency theory that a large board creates dysfunction and 
sub-groups within the board. A study in Nigeria shows that large boards are ineffective monitors of 
managers and such, boards failed to minimise firms’ negative environmental impact on the society 
due to social loafing (Uwuigbe and Uadiale, 2011). 
Furthermore, it is argued that large boards enhance abundant human capital, but it creates 
coordination difficulties because of the various perspectives, ideas and knowledge possessed by 
many directors. This may hinder the utilisation of knowledge and skills available in the boardroom 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). However, abundant knowledge, ideas, opinions and perspectives in the 
boardroom lead to higher levels of disagreement and challenge among board members, as directors 
are likely to challenge any single opinion, idea or decision presented at the meetings. Thus, the 
following hypotheses are developed: 
 H1a - Large board size is positively related to the board level of challenge 
 H1b - Large board size is negatively related to the board commitment 
 H1c - Large board size is negatively related to the board knowledge utilisation  
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3.7.2 Board Composition and Board Processes 
Board composition refers to the inclusion of non-executive directors on the board. The presence of 
outsiders on the board would be perceived by inside directors as a challenge. Therefore, the latter 
will ensure that things are done correctly and demonstrate that they are ‘equal to the task’, while 
outside directors want to protect their reputations by performing their duties as expected and show 
their positive impact on the board (Bettinelli, 2011). Each group of directors is avoiding interpersonal 
embarrassment (Feldman, 1984). This attitude from both NEDs and executive directors, due to 
heterogeneity, as a result of the inclusion of NEDs on the board, enhances the directors’ commitment 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). In fact, it is argued that boards composed of adequate proportions of 
NEDs are more likely to improve a board’s level of involvement and effort norms (Judge and 
Zeithaml, 1992; Bettinelli, 2011). 
Ideally, outside directors that are independent of the executives are expected to provide an oversight 
function that ensures agency problems are minimised and the corporation operates transparently. It 
is claimed that non-executive directors are good monitors of the activities of management and as 
such, intellectual capital is properly disclosed (Li et al., 2012). However, only committed outside 
directors perform this oversight function effectively. A study in China shows that only those NEDs 
that attend board meetings regularly are able to decrease tunneling and protect the interest of 
minority shareholders (Liu et al., 2016).  
Agency theory postulates for a heterogeneity board because such corporate leaders might have a 
higher level of disagreements on job-related issues and opinions than a homogeneous board. More 
importantly, the presence of NEDs on the board would trigger open debate as they possess different 
experience from their counterparts (managers), as well as scrutinize available alternatives more 
freely than managers (Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  NEDs are expected to be capable of asking more 
proven questions and engage in critical discussion during meetings. Outside director dominated 
boards are likely to collect new information and engage in proactive firm-specific information seeking 
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(Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007), this may require asking probing questions and making in-depth 
inquiries which may lead to open debate and disagreements. Thus, the following hypotheses are 
developed: 
 H2a - Board composition is positively related to board level of commitment 
 H2b - Board composition is positively linked to challenge in the boardroom 
 H2c - Board composition is positively related to board knowledge utilisation  
3.7.3 CEO Duality and Board Processes 
According to agency theory, combining the roles of chairman and CEO to a single individual is a 
detriment to board independence and results in a powerful CEO who controls all activities of the firm. 
For the board to perform its oversight function effectively, the roles of the top positions should be 
separated between the chairman who leads the board and the CEO who leads the day-to-day 
activities of the firm (Wan and Ong, 2005). The concentration of powers to an individual could impair 
the monitoring capability of board members (Li et al., 2008). 
Although, it is argued that CEO duality enhances unity of command and direction (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998), but is likely to decrease the level of open debate and critical discussion. 
Nevertheless, chief executive officer role duality may improve the use of knowledge and skills in the 
boardroom, as there is less monitoring of the management activities. In such situations, managers 
are willing to cooperate sincerely with directors. Moreover, duality leadership motivates the 
management to share firm-specific knowledge with the board members. 
Adegbite (2015) contends that in the Nigerian context, separation of the two roles does not guarantee 
board independence and effectiveness, as most of the chairmen are former CEOs of the same firm. 
In this case, the chairmen may have strong ties with the management and act more as chief 
executives, rather than independent chairmen. The succession of former CEOs to chairmen 
positions show how powerful CEOs are in the Nigerian corporate environment. In Nigeria, chief 
executives make the final approval on the appointments of both chairmen, inside directors and 
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outside directors. Therefore, this study suggests that board leadership structure (either to separate 
or dual leadership) does not matter in influencing board processes variables in Nigeria. Overall, the 
following hypotheses are developed: 
 H3a - CEO duality has no significant effect on board level of commitment 
 H3b - CEO duality has no significant influence on level of challenge in the boardroom 
 H3c - CEO duality has an insignificant effect on board knowledge utilisation 
3.7.4 Board Gender Diversity and Board Processes 
Expectations of the directors’ task performance are higher on women directors than their male 
colleagues (Fondas, 2000). This indicates that the level of commitment to perform board duties 
would be higher with women directors on the board. Broadbridge et al., (2006) suggest that because 
of their inexperience in the board work, women directors prepare more for board meetings, seek 
knowledge about the nature of the board work and identify areas of improvements. These efforts by 
women directors enhance their level of commitment in the boardroom. 
It is purported that the inclusion of women directors on the board improves open-debate, critical 
discussion and fruitful disagreements. This is because female directors present different opinions 
and perspectives from male directors (Nielsen and Huse, 2010). and because of their nature of 
asking questions and disagreeing on anything they are not clear with (Broadbridge et al., 2006). 
However, the abundance of different perspectives, experience and knowledge can lead to a 
coordination problem and failure to effectively utilise the human capital available in the boardroom. 
Similarly, gender diversity reduces the board’s levels of interpersonal relations and effective 
communication, which may lead to difficulties in knowledge utilisation as individuals tend to work 
with those they perceive share similarities and reject those with dissimilarities (Wegge et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H4a - A proportion of women directors on the board is positively related to the board      level 
of commitment 
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H4b - A proportion of women directors on the board is positively related to challenging among 
directors 
H4c - A proportion of women directors on the board is negatively related to board 
 knowledge utilisation 
3.7.5 Board processes and Board Task 
Board internal processes, such as board levels of commitment, challenge and knowledge utilisation 
are expected to help the board to perform their main roles, such as monitoring of the management 
and provision of services that will benefit an organisation. Board members are busy individuals 
(Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989), especially those with board interlocks and other 
commitments outside the firm. The maximum level of effort by a group member can be achieved with 
strong group levels of commitment (Wageman, 1995).  
Boards with a minimal level of commitment among directors did not meet regularly, became less 
effective in meetings and only approved proposals of management (Mace, 1971). Agency theory 
evinces that this sort of board is not effective in monitoring the activities of self-serving executives. 
Previous studies, such as Lorsch and MacIver (1989) show that board members with a higher level 
of commitment toward their responsibilities are more able to improve board-level and firm-level 
effectiveness during stability and crisis periods. Similarly, regular board meetings, due to a higher 
level of commitment by directors, improve board strategic involvement in for-profit organisations (Zhu 
et al., 2016).   
Board members face ambiguous tasks,  so there is a need for directors to freely present different 
viewpoints and be able to critically analyse each other’s views for an effective decision to be made 
regarding these tasks (Watson and Michaelsen, 1988). This is likely to result in a higher number of 
disagreements among directors which can enhance quality decision making, especially in an 
uncertain environment (Milliken and Vollrath, 1991) and subsequently improve board monitoring and 
service roles.  
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The ability of a group to the utilize knowledge, experience and skills of each group member 
determines the group effectiveness (Wageman, 1995). Zona and Zattoni (2007) suggested that 
effectiveness of the board in performing their duties may depend on the ability to actively use and 
integrate each board member’s knowledge, skills, experience and expertise. The availability of 
human capital is important to the board, but utilising such human capital is more crucial as benefits 
of that capital can only be achieved if it is put to use. According to Bettinelli (2011), use of knowledge 
and skills is referred to as “the extent to which the board taps into and applies the human capital 
members bring to the table” (p.156). Knowledge utilisation was found to be positively related to board 
strategic involvement (Zhu et al., 2016); thus the following hypotheses are developed: 
 H5a - Board level of commitment is positively related to board control role  
 H5b - Board commitment is positively linked to board service role 
 H5c - Challenge has a positive influence on board control role 
 H5d - Challenge is positively related to board service role 
 H5e - Knowledge utilisation in the boardroom is positively associated to board control role  
 H5f - Knowledge utilisation has a positive effect on board service role 
 
3.7.6 Board Task and Corporate Social Responsibility  
According to agency theory, the fiduciary duty of the board is to monitor, compensate and discipline 
the executives (Bawhede, 2010). Raelin and Bondy (2013) explained that agency theory does not 
only explain the principal-agent (shareholder-manager) relationship, rather it also explains the 
shareholder-society relationship. They termed the former as the first layer and the latter as the 
second layer of agency theory. The authors emphasised that the board should satisfy the interests 
of shareholders without compromising the interests of society.  
Directors are encouraged to consider the interests of other stakeholders and environmental issues 
in their decisions and this improves corporate social responsibility performance (Carroll, 1979; 
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Freeman, 1984). The satisfaction of stakeholders means maximisation of shareholders’ wealth, 
especially in the long term (Brammer et al., 2006). Integrating agency and stakeholder theories, the 
role of board members is to provide effective monitoring of managers which ensure adherence to 
strategic decisions that enhance corporate social responsibility activities. Stakeholder theory’s 
emphasis is on the firm to operate in the best interest of various stakeholder groups, here the role of 
the board is to make sure managers are fully controlled to ensure firms operate according to the 
laws of the land and are ethically responsible. Therefore, it is expected that:  
H6a - Board control role influences corporate social responsibility (legal) activities 
H6b - Board control role is positively related to corporate social responsibility (ethical) activities  
 
According to resource dependency theory, the main duty of any board is to provide resources to the 
firm. The ability of the board to provide resources to the firm reduces uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972) and 
dependency on the external contingencies, while lowering transaction costs (Salancik and Pfeffer, 
1978). These provisions of adequate resources by the board enhance firms’ competitive advantage 
and at the same time guarantees adequate support from the various stakeholders, as their wants 
and yearnings are satisfied through CSR activities. This can be possible with the availability of 
resources in the firm.  
Similarly, board members are expected to have societal and professional backgrounds, so that 
resource and timely information from the external environment can easily be received and made 
available to the firm (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Furthermore, consistent with stakeholder theory, 
boards should provide the firm with information about the wants of various stakeholders. In this 
capacity, the board serves as boundary spanner between the firm and external environment (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). This improves social performance, as the wants and needs of various 
stakeholder groups are considered because of knowledge about stakeholders’ claims and the 
availability of resources in the firm. In view of this, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H7a - Board service role has a positive effect on corporate social responsibility (legal) activities 
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H7b - Board service role is positively connected to corporate social responsibility (ethical) activities. 
3.7.7 The mediating effect of board processes  
The direct relationship between board characteristics and performance has been investigated for 
over a decade. However, the empirical findings are inconclusive and this has led some board 
scholars (e.g. Daily et al., 2003; Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999) to conclude that for any 
meaningful result researchers should consider the influence of board processes on the relationship 
between board characteristics and performance. Roberts et al., (2005) argue that it is not board 
structure per se that guarantees board performance, rather the internal workings among directors. 
Some of the board characteristics, such as proportion of non-executive directors and board size may 
provide diverse knowledge and experience in the boardroom, and that gives their firm a competitive 
advantage, as argued by resource dependency theory. However, only those directors that are 
committed will be able to utilise such resources, which consequently improves monitoring and 
provides external and internal resources to the board. 
The availability of knowledge, skills and experience in the boardroom serves as the foundation for 
an effective board, but this does not guarantee that the board will have sufficient influence on its 
monitoring and service tasks. Rather, it is the ability of directors to utilise the human capital available 
in the boardroom that assist the board in performing their expected roles of monitoring the executives 
and servicing the board with strategies, finances and other resources. Zhu et al., (2016) found that 
availability of information in the boardroom has no serious effect on strategic involvement, but 
utilisation of such information does. 
According to agency theory, boards with adequate proportions of non-executive (outside) directors 
are expected to protect shareholder funds from opportunistic agents. However, it is argued that this 
is only possible if the NEDs are committed to doing their job. A board dominated by outside directors 
that are not attending board meetings will not be able to reduce problems of tunnelling through the 
monitoring role (Liu et al., 2016). Notwithstanding, efforts to attend board meetings without desire to 
 105 
 
critically access, challenge, scrutinize the proposals of the executive will not yield to any meaningful 
influence on board control and service tasks.  
Evidence has emerged that while open discussions, where opinions and ideas are frequently 
challenged, improve a board’s strategic and operational controls, the proportion of women directors 
has no significant influence on open discussions (Huse et al., 2009). The ratio of women to men has 
no significant effects on board controls, but board processes variables mediate the relationship 
between board gender diversity and strategic controls (Nielson and Huse, 2010). 
Although, CEO duality may not have a significant influence on the boards’ roles, Machold et al., 
(2011) find CEO duality, through board processes variables, such as knowledge utilisation and board 
development programmes, improves a boards’ strategic involvement. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is developed: 
H8 - Board processes mediate the relationship between board characteristics and board tasks 
3.7.8 The mediating effect of board tasks  
Boards of directors that are committed, in that they utilise knowledge that is available in the 
boardroom and critically analyse information provided by the executives, are more likely to improve 
board control and service tasks, which consequently influence the corporate social responsibility 
activities of their firm. Evidence has emerged that strategic boards that are active and cohesive are 
more likely to manage their resources effectively through innovation, risk-taking and proactive 
behaviours than operational, passive and fractional boards, and this improves CSR activities 
(Coombes et al., 2011).  
Directors that are more concerned with satisfying the interests of their shareholders are more likely 
to be committed to activities such as questioning, challenging and scrutinising the activities of 
management, which can lead to effective monitoring. Moreover, knowledge available in the 
boardroom will be used in order to effectively control the opportunistic agents.  Melkumov et al., 
(2015) argue that such boards improve the financial performance of their firms, which is short-term 
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in nature, but neglect strategies such as corporate social responsibility programmes which ensure 
long-term performance for the benefits of all stakeholders, including the shareholders. 
Taking the traditional agency theory perspective, an effective board control role may have an 
adverse effect on CSR activities. However, linking the stakeholder and agency theories, the board’s 
main task   is to monitor the activities of the opportunistic executive in order to ensure the firms 
operate ethically and legally for the benefits of those that can affect or can be affected by the firms’ 
activities (Freeman, 1984). Consistent with Raelin and Bondy (2013), this study argues that the 
agency theory does not only explain the principal-agent (shareholder-manager) relationship, but also 
the shareholder-society relationship. Therefore, a board control task is expected to have a 
substantial effect on CSR activities and also mediate the relationship between board processes and 
social responsibility (ethical and legal) activities. 
Those boards that are committed and challenge opinions of other directors in order to satisfy the 
interest of all stakeholders rather than shareholders alone, are more likely to improve strategic 
participation roles, such as CSR initiatives which improve external legitimacy and reputation 
(Melkumov et al., 2015). Similarly, directors that intend to satisfy shareholders’ interests, especially 
in the long-term, are more committed in the provision of strategic advice and other external resources 
that can be used to satisfy the stakeholders’ claims.  They also challenge any strategy proposal that 
did not consider the interest of other stakeholders and effectively utilise the knowledge available in 
the boardroom for the best interest of all stakeholders. 
Challenging and questioning the proposals of the management may not have a direct effect on CSR 
(Galbreath, 2016). As mentioned earlier, board commitment, use of knowledge and board challenge 
may not have a significant and direct effect on social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities, 
especially if the intention is to maximise shareholders’ wealth in the short-term. Conversely, the 
board monitoring role can improve CSR strategies, if scrutinising and challenging the management 
proposal is to ensure firms operate ethically and legally for the overall benefits of all stakeholders, 
including stockholders in the long-term. Unethical and illegal attitudes of firms may harm 
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shareholders’ wealth, especially over time, for example through negative press attention, paying 
penalties, product boycotts and reputational loss (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are developed: 
H9a - The board control role mediates the relationship between board processes and CSR (legal 
and ethical) activities. 
H9b - Board service task has an indirect influence on the relationship between board processes 
and CSR (legal and ethical) activities. 
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Figure 3.8: New Research Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
 109 
 
 
3.8 Summary of the Chapter 
The three common perspectives available in the literature were highlighted in this chapter. The 
systematic (narrative) literature review presented in this chapter shows what is written and what 
needs to be written in the literature about board effectiveness. The review evinces that the majority 
of the previous studies investigate the influence of board characteristics on firms’ financial 
performance, followed by those that examine the relationships between board structure and 
corporate social responsibility performance. Minimal studies investigate the importance of board 
functioning. Moreover, this chapter highlights that the majority of these studies are from developed 
countries and employed the same methodological approach. Overall, the chapter identifies and 
presents the literature gaps. In the end, the research hypotheses with the new conceptual framework 
that accommodates the few necessary amendments are presented (Figure 3.8). The next chapter 
discusses the research methodology employed which involves the research paradigm and overall 
research design.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The systematic (narrative) literature in chapter four identifies the literature gaps that the current study 
intends to fill. This chapter presents the research methodology employed to collect and analyse data, 
so that the research questions raised in chapter one are addressed and the main aim of the research 
is achieved. 
In the subsequent section (4.1) the various methodologies adopted by previous and relevant studies 
were discussed. Section 4.2 presents the research design which comprises the study’s philosophical 
assumptions, methodological approach, population and sample, and process and development of 
survey design. Moreover, variables and operationalisation used in this study are discussed in section 
4.3, followed by a discussion of common method bias in section 4.4. Research ethical considerations 
are briefly presented in section 4.5. 
The approach employed for data analysis was discussed in section 4.6. This section highlights the 
process and results of data screening techniques used in this study. Furthermore, section 4.7 
discusses partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) in detail which is the 
research analysis tool. Approaches in assessing and reporting PLS results were presented in section 
4.8. Lastly, section 4.9 summarises the chapter. 
4.1 Methodologies Adopted From Previous Studies 
Generally, access to the board of directors is difficult and this leads many scholars to rely on archival 
data in their board research (Daily et al., 2003; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). Notwithstanding, few 
researchers have employed various methods, such as direct participation or observation, qualitative 
interviews and survey questionnaires in order to study these corporate leaders. 
Brannen (1987) followed board members on their daily activities both within and outside the 
boardroom to understand their functioning. Hammer et al., (1997) participated in the board activities 
as a union elected director and collected board processes data for five years. Huse (1998) applied 
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‘one of the lads’ approach serving as board chairperson of three small firms for 18 months, in order 
to study the dynamics of board-stakeholder relations. Similarly, Huse et al., (2005) employed the ‘fly 
on the wall’ approach as a direct observation methodology to study the board of a major 
Scandinavian firm (TINE Group). The authors attended board meetings for a year, but with an 
agreement to provide board evaluation reports to the firm. In addition, they also conducted interviews 
with all the board members and the management team.  
Pugliese et al., (2015) applied direct observation facilitated by videotaping three board meetings of 
two Australian organisations. In the same vein, Parker (2007) employed a longitudinal Complete 
Member Researcher (CMR) participant observation methodology to study two Australian boards of 
non-profit associations. Parker participated and conducted observations in almost eighty per cent of 
all the board and sub-committee meetings of these organisations for two years (one year for each 
organisation). In addition, the author collected documents, such as meeting minutes, supplementary 
presentations and agenda papers. 
Boardroom direct participation and observation are the most appropriate methods to gather primary 
data in order to study boards of directors (Huse, 2008). However, Samra-Fredericks (2000) 
describes this approach as an ‘impossible method’ because of a lack of accessibility, legality and 
confidentiality issues.  
Other authors successfully conducted qualitative interviews focussing on the direct experience of 
board members. Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) conducted 32 structured interviews with members 
of corporate boards in their study of board structure and processes. McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) 
interviewed 108 directors to explore how part-time board members influence strategy in UK 
corporations. Roberts et al., (2005) used 40 in-depth interviews with directors in the UK, in order to 
make contributions on the real factors that make outside directors effective, rather than relying on 
their mere presence on the board. 
Survey questionnaires were also used in previous board processes literature. Huse (1994) in a 
cross-cultural study, sent mail questionnaires to a sample of CEOs and chairmen of small firms in 
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Sweden and Norway, in order to examine the impact of board-management relations on board task 
performance. Many board processes’ scholars fall under this category (see for example, Wan and 
Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Bettinelli, 2011; Minichilli et al., 2012; Zona, 2015).  
The current study employs this approach because it is the most appropriate considering the time 
frame, accessibility and resources available. Samra-Fredericks (2000) asserts that negotiating 
access to conduct direct boardroom observations can take many years and in the end access still 
might not be allowed. Furthermore, the above studies based on qualitative methods do not cover a 
large sample because of the nature of the studies or difficulty in getting access to other boards. 
These limitations could be addressed through a quantitative questionnaire approach by covering a 
large sample within the limited time frame. This study employs positivist philosophical assumptions 
and a quantitative approach. However, qualitative interviews are conducted in order to fully 
understand board processes and tasks variables that are appropriate to use for the context under 
study. Moreover, themes discovered from the qualitative interviews have been used in the 
development of the quantitative questionnaire. The current study uses survey questionnaires as the 
main instrument for data collection, the next sections discuss, in detail, the research design adopted. 
4.2 Research Design 
Saunders et al., (2012) describe research design as “the general plan of how you will go about 
answering your research question(s)” and is the crucial part of every research project. It involves 
approaches to methodology, methods, analysis and ethical considerations used in conducting a 
research (p.159). The methods used in collecting data and type of analysis employed depend largely 
upon the methodological approach employed. Furthermore, the methodology applied in a study 
depends on the research paradigm, which is the philosophical assumption of the study. Therefore, 
it is essential for the researcher to select appropriate research paradigm and ensure coherence with 
the philosophical beliefs, methodology and methods of that paradigm.  
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4.2.1 Philosophy (paradigm) 
At the initial stage of any study, it is essential for a scholar to identify the research paradigm on which 
to build the study on and ensure coherence with the chosen paradigm. This is essential as different 
paradigms require different ways to conduct a research. Collis and Hussey (2014) define paradigm 
as “a philosophical framework that guides how scientific research should be conducted” (p.43). It is 
a way of thinking about the world and can be used in different stages of a research.  
Morgan (1979) classified three stages where paradigm can be used: firstly, from the philosophical 
perspective; secondly, at the social level and lastly, at the technical level. In other words, research 
paradigm involves ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. These 
assumptions are based on the philosophical beliefs of a researcher. Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
developed a sociological paradigms framework with four categories that are commonly accepted 
and debated by scholars. These four paradigms are constructivism (interpretive), functionalist 
(positivism), radical structuralist (post-positivism) and radical humanist (critical theory). 
4.2.1.1 Interpretive (Constructivism) and Functionalist (Positivism) 
Constructivism scholars focus on exploring ambiguous meanings of social phenomena with the aim 
of achieving interpretive understanding. Conversely, positivism researchers rely on theories to 
explain or predict relationships between variables and make “logical reasoning, so that precision, 
objectivity and rigour underpin their approach, rather than subjectivity and intuitive interpretation” 
(Collis and Hussey 2014, p.44). Positivism and constructivism are the most common paradigms used 
in natural and social science, each with different ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions. 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of the world or reality. Here a researcher makes an 
assumption about beliefs on how the world operates and makes a commitment on a particular view 
on the nature of reality (Saunders et al., 2012). In this regard, two schools of thought are common 
which are objectivism (realism) and subjectivism (relativism, idealism). The former holds the 
ontological assumption based on the positivism position which believes that objective reality exists 
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and is independent of the researcher. On the other hand, relativism believes that there are multiple 
realities and are constructed through social interactions.  
Epistemology refers to what should be considered as acceptable knowledge in a discipline.  
Interpretivism believes that knowledge comes from subjective evidence through interactions with 
participants, while positivism considers knowledge to come from objective evidence that is 
measurable, observable and where the researcher does not relate with the phenomena under study 
(Bryman, 2012).  
Positivism believes that the phenomena can be observed or measured therefore quantitative 
methodological approaches are the most appropriate. Here, the approach used in such a paradigm 
is deductive in nature, where specific data is deduced from the theories in order to identify cause 
and effect (Gray, 2013). However, using an inductive approach is more appropriate in interpretivist 
studies (Corbin and Strauss, 2014), since the aim is not to investigate cause and effect using a static 
design or general law, rather understand multiple and subjective realities from the participants. 
Positivism and interpretivism are the two extremities on the research continuum of paradigm (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980), nevertheless, other paradigms exist between them, such as post-positivism 
(radical structuralist) and critical theory (radical humanist).  
4.2.1.2 Radical Humanist and Radical Structuralist 
The radical humanist paradigm has an ontological belief of historical realism; what is considered as 
truth is shaped by political, social, economic, ethnic and gender values (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
Researchers on this paradigm aim to emancipate society from unequal power and overthrow the 
flaws of existing social arrangements, to release society from the dominant way of thinking which is 
influenced by a few powerful players (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Radical humanists are more 
aligned to subjectivist epistemology, where knowledge is achieved through interaction between the 
investigator and the investigated object (Crotty, 1998). This paradigm uses both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques and the approach is abductive in nature. 
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Similar to radical humanists, radical structuralist believes that the status quo needs to be changed 
to free society from thinking that is influenced by dominant and powerful players. However, the latter 
differs with radical humanist as it assumes that the unequal arrangement is due to flaws from the 
objective reality and that it can be solved by having a proper objective structure, such as changing 
the laws, political, economic and social institutions policies (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Scholars on 
post-positivism (radical structuralist) believe that reality exists, but cannot be perfectly detected due 
to the nature of phenomena under study and the researchers’ inadequacy of finding the reality 
(Saunders et al., 2012). The epistemology paradigm is ‘objectivity,’ but which does not believe the 
researcher should be distant from the researched. Critical methodologies, such as discourse 
analysis and ethnography, are commonly used in this paradigm.  
Based on the above philosophical literature, positivism assumption and quantitative approach will 
be more appropriate to conduct this study because the hypotheses will be relied upon to establish 
systematic relationships between board characteristics, processes, board task and corporate social 
responsibility activities in the Nigerian corporate environment. Data is collected from directors of 
listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange and deduced the data from the hypotheses, in 
order to confirm or refute the hypothesised relationships. Thus, the positivist, deductive approach 
and quantitative methodology are more appropriate for this study. This study believes that 
relationships between variables of interest exist and are independent of the researcher. Therefore, 
the study intends to find, explain or predict those relationships. Thus, the research ontological and 
epistemological beliefs are consistent with the positivist ideologies and the main methodological 
approach is a quantitative approach. However, as mentioned earlier, qualitative interviews were 
conducted in order to understand the perspectives of the Nigerian boards of directors with regards 
to the phenomenon under study. The findings from the interviews are used to develop the final 
versions of the research conceptual framework and quantitative questionnaire.  
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4.2.2 Quantitative Approach 
Research methodology is a way of obtaining or discovering evidence in a systematic manner. 
Quantitative methodology is used mostly by positivist scholars and is an approach where 
theories/hypotheses are tested in order to investigate the relationship between two or more variables 
(Creswell, 2013). The quantitative methodology involves the collection of numerical data and has 
ontological and epistemological beliefs that there is one single social reality which is context-free 
and objective. This approach is theory-driven where specific data is collected and deduced from the 
general theories in order to confirm or refute it. 
Selecting research methodology depends on the problem the researcher intends to address. For 
example, if the aim is to identify the relationship between variables of interest, then a quantitative 
approach is more appropriate; while the qualitative approach is to explore certain phenomenon 
because little or no research has been conducted (Creswell, 2013).  
In order to determine board effectiveness, the current study intends to find the dynamic relationships 
between board characteristics, board processes, board task and corporate social responsibility 
activities. Hypotheses have been developed and tested empirically to establish the relationships. 
Data is collected from directors of all listed firms on the NSE and the data is deduced from the 
hypotheses in order to confirm or refute it. Thus, the quantitative approach will be more suitable. 
This approach is common in board literature (Bhagat and Black, 2001; Bettinelli, 2011; Akpan and 
Amran, 2014).  
Positivism assumptions and quantitative approach are more appropriate for this study as it relies on 
the hypothesis to predict relationships between board characteristics, board processes, board task 
and CSR. However, quantitative methodology is criticised for having ‘static views’ of a social world 
without considering the meanings of individuals (Bryman, 2012). Nevertheless, findings from this 
approach can be generalised to the entire population, as it allows the use of a large sample size. 
Using a quantitative approach would allow this study to cover the entire population frame (directors 
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of companies listed on the NSE), which means, findings from the research are not by chance and 
can be generalised to the Nigerian corporate environment. 
As mentioned above, the most appropriate way to study board processes would be to sit in the 
board’s meetings as an observer. However, this method may not be feasible because of the fact that 
in Nigeria board meetings are highly confidential and firms rarely allowing outsiders to sit in their 
boardroom meetings. Moreover, access to boardroom’ meetings requires a lot of negotiation and 
time. The duration allowed for this study is not suitable for this approach. Similarly, qualitative 
methods, such as interviews and observations, have serious problems with transparency, validity 
(reactive affects), reliability (intra-observer consistency over-time), generalization, difficulty to 
replicate and tendency to generate lots of fragment data (especially in observation) which will be 
difficult to assemble together to have an overall picture (Bryman, 2012). 
Due to the short-comings of the qualitative methods mentioned above and difficulties in accessing 
boardroom qualitative data, this research follows the existing literature (e.g. Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Bettinelli, 2011; Minichilli et al., 2012; Zattoni et 
al., 2015; Zona, 2015) and uses a quantitative approach. Survey questionnaires are used as an 
instrument to collect data and the Partial Least Squares Structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) 
technique is used to analyse the data.  
However, prior to employing the quantitative approach to answer the research questions, qualitative 
interviews are conducted in order fully understand the board processes and tasks variables that are 
more suitable to use in the research context. The findings from the interviews were used in 
developing the final versions of the research conceptual framework and quantitative questionnaire. 
Thus the study involves two stages of data collection. 
4.2.3 Process of data collection 
Two stages of data collection are followed in this study in order to achieve the research aim and 
answer the research questions sufficiently. Although the quantitative approach is the main 
methodology for this study, qualitative interviews are initially conducted for the purpose of 
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understanding the board processes and tasks that are applicable in the context (Nigeria) under 
study. Thus, the final version of the research conceptual framework will be developed after the 
interviews. Additionally, the interview is expected to help in designing the final version of the 
quantitative questionnaire. The second stage of data collection, which is quantitative, begins after 
confirming the board processes and tasks variables that are appropriate to use in this study and for 
the finalisation of the quantitative questionnaire.  
4.2.3.1 Qualitative Interviews 
A semi-structured interview was conducted in February to March 2016 with four non-executive 
directors, one independent non-executive director and two executive directors that serve as 
representatives from different industries listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The researcher 
believes that these participants have adequate knowledge and experience needed to take part in 
this study.  
The interview questions were drawn from the research questions, themes from the adopted research 
conceptual framework and relevant literature. These interviews were conducted with the aim of 
understanding the board processes and board task relevant in the Nigerian context. The qualitative 
interview used in this study is based on an objective approach, rather than subjective, as the purpose 
is to receive responses to questions that are assumed to be factual (Saunders et al., 2016). The aim 
here is to understand perspectives of the Nigerian corporate directors on the phenomenon under 
study. Findings from these interviews have been used to developed final versions of the research 
conceptual framework and quantitative questionnaire. Data received was tape-recorded, transcribed 
and analysed using a thematic analysis approach. 
The current study employs a theoretical (deductive, top-down) thematic analysis approach and 
coding is done based on the findings of previous literature. The interview data was approached with 
certain themes in mind to see if they appeared in the context under study. The questions asked were 
driven based on the researcher theoretical interest in the topic. Similarly, a semantic approach 
(phenomenology) was followed in identifying theme level. Here, themes are identified within the 
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surface meanings of the data, rather than beyond what the participants have said, as required by 
latent themes approach (Braun and Clarke, 2006). After transcription, with the help of computer-
assisted software (Nvivo), interview data were coded and recorded to be able to bring out initial, 
developed and final thematic map (see Appendix J). This help in developing the final versions of the 
research conceptual framework (see Figure 3.8).  
 
Data from the interview shows that (see Appendix J), firstly, directors of the Nigerian companies 
misunderstood the concept of ‘cognitive conflict’ and ‘effort norms’. Instead, what appears to be 
easily understood by the participants is ‘challenge’ among directors in the boardroom and 
‘commitment’ of board members which are the same as cognitive conflict and effort norms 
respectively. Secondly, according to the interview findings, control and service tasks are the two 
common board roles that Nigerian boards are expected to perform. The data shows no identical 
differences between board strategic task and resource provision roles.  Lastly, various activities 
cutting across the four dimensions of corporate social responsibility, developed by Carroll (1991), 
were found.  
4.2.3.2 Quantitative Survey Design 
Unlike natural scientists that use the experimental method as a research instrument, non-
experimental instruments, such as surveys are the common research method employed in social 
science studies (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The survey is the main data collection method employed 
in this study. Surveys are commonly used in similar studies that investigate board effectiveness 
beyond the demographic variables (see for example, Zattoni et al., 2015; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; 
and Wan and Ong, 2005).  
With an appropriate sample size, a survey presents a numeric description of opinions or attitudes of 
a given population under study. Balnaves and Caputi (2001) explain that the survey instrument gives 
an account of peoples’ identity, thinking and behaviour, and is appropriate to use when a researcher 
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cannot or finds it difficult to directly observe the phenomena under investigation, such as board 
processes and board tasks. 
A survey can be in a form of a questionnaire, structured observation, face-to-face interview or 
telephone interview. Several methods can be employed to collect data using survey questionnaires, 
such as ‘delivery and collect’, postal and email (electronic) questionnaires. This study uses online 
and ‘delivery and collect’ questionnaires to collect data from the participants. Cross-sectional and 
close-ended questions are used in this study. Respondents were provided with alternative answers 
to choose at a point in time. This generates a rapid response on a large scale as it is easier to answer 
(Saunders et al., 2012).  
Though the survey questionnaire is more popular in Social Science, it is widely criticised as having 
limited, wide-ranging alternatives (Saunders et al., 2012). Researchers have to limit their inquiries 
because too many questions make the questionnaire unattractive and may lead to low response 
rates. Similarly, a survey is not suitable for recording complex information from the sample (Balnaves 
and Caputi, 2001). Notwithstanding, this study decides to use the survey because of difficulties in 
accessing boardroom primary data and is more appropriate to generate large data size, at a low 
cost, within a limited time frame compared to direct observations and other qualitative methods. 
Similarly, the majority of previous board studies relied mainly on archival data and the research 
lacked empirical evidence from primary data sources, especially surveys  (Huse et al., 2011).  
4.2.3.3 Population and Sampling Frame 
The population of this study are all directors of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
The aim is to have a large-scale sample of respondents in order to generalise any findings from the 
research. This eliminates sample error and minimises response bias. Furthermore, the population 
size is not too large and it is appropriate to use the entire population. As at the time of data collection, 
there are 170 firms listed on the NSE, cutting across 11 industries (see Table 4.1) and the total 
numbers of directors sitting on the boards of these firms are 1,430. 
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Due to difficulties in getting access to all board members (Daily et al., 2003), board studies using 
surveys rely mostly on a single respondent, such as CEOs (Zahra et al., 2000; Minichilli et al., 2012). 
However, this approach is criticised for an inability to address common method bias (Zona, 2015). 
Similarly, Wan and Ong (2005) argue that not all CEOs attend board meetings. To reduce common 
method bias in this study, multiple respondents will be contacted (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) and 
this provides large and reliable data to work with. Moreover, relying on responses from each CEO of 
the companies listed will result in a research population of 170 and to have 100 per cent response 
rate is very unlikely.  
The questionnaire was sent to all directors (1,430) of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (170 firms). This also seems to be a small population frame and likely to lead to small 
sample size. This is due to a limited number of listed firms on the NSE. A large sample is always 
desirable in a quantitative approach, however, a small sample size is acceptable in group processes 
research (Zona, 2015). Bettinelli (2011) examined board processes in family firms with a sample of 
90 firms, Eddleston et al., (2008) investigated group processes in a sample of 37 firms and Zona 
(2015) examined the influence of board ownership on board processes with 108 responses. 
Table 4.1: Industries and Number of Firms Listed on the NSE 
Industry Number of firms 
Oil and Gas 12 
Industrial Goods 14 
Consumer Goods 21 
Conglomerates 6 
Financial Services 57 
Healthcare 10 
 122 
 
Natural Resources 4 
Services 25 
Construction/Real Estate 9 
ICT 7 
Agriculture 5 
Total 170 
Source: Author extracted from the NSE website 
The study should have collected data from directors of both public and private companies operating 
in Nigeria, in order to improve external validity and enhance robust findings. However, getting data 
from private firms will be difficult or even impossible, as such companies are not obliged to disclose 
their information to the public. Similarly, private firms may not comply with the corporate governance 
guidelines and as a result, may have different board structures. Listed companies are expected to 
comply with CG codes and disclose information to the general public. To some extent, these firms 
have met national and international standards before they are listed on the NSE.  
4.2.3.4 Administration of the Questionnaire 
Through Qualtrics software, a survey questionnaire was designed and a collector (web link) was 
created. Additionally, the software allows the designed questionnaire to be printed and distributed to 
the participants in a hard copy form. Qualtrics survey software provides a ‘collect responses section’ 
where a survey collector can be open and/or closed to participants. Data collection starts in March 
2016 (pilot study) and a cut-off date and time were set for this study which is 24 April 2018 and 
11.59pm respectively. After this date, new participants cannot have access to the survey link. The 
duration of the data collection is approximately two years (pilot study plus the main study) and 
average completion period of the questionnaire is approximately seven minutes. However, the actual 
data collection for the main study starts in June 2017. A long data collection period is allowed in this 
study due to difficulties in getting access to the research respondents, but the completion time of the 
questionnaire is made shorter.  
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Prior to distribution, the questionnaire was shown to a director of the Nigeria Stock Exchange who 
is responsible for corporate governance issues in the organisation. Similarly, some directors of three 
different companies listed on the NSE also perused the questions. This served as a guide to remove 
any ambiguous questions, correct poor wording and add any relevant question that may arise (Wan 
and Ong, 2005). The feedback received from these directors was encouraging and the necessary 
amendments have been made. Overall, there was no serious error found. 
Getting access to directors of companies in Nigeria is extremely difficult, as they are not too open to 
individuals with whom they are not familiar. This may be due to rampant cases of kidnapping and 
other security challenges that the country is currently facing. Moreover, Nigerian boards of directors 
are skeptical about sharing their companies’ information with third parties due to mistrust and fear of 
the unknown. Additionally, at the period the researcher starts data collection, NSE in conjunction 
with the Convention on Business Integrity in Nigeria (CBI) is undertaking another study that rates all 
listed companies on their corporate governance and integrity practices through a system called the 
Nigerian Corporate Governance Rating System (CGRS). This contributes to resistance and 
reluctance from some directors to take part in the current study. 
Nevertheless, the researcher used different strategies in order to ensure difficulties of getting access 
to these corporate leaders are minimised. Based on the meeting held with the officials of the NSE, 
the researcher was advised to liaise with secretaries of the listed firms so that the difficulties of 
getting access to board members might be reduced. Similarly, the researcher has the opportunity to 
be registered (see appendix K) as a member of a reputable corporate governance organisation, 
known as the Society for Corporate Governance Nigeria (SCGN), in which membership is mostly 
drawn from directors of Nigerian companies. The organisation prepares a series of workshops for 
their members (directors) to attend.  As such, the researcher planned to familiarise himself with some 
key directors and the management of the SCGN which helps to reduce the anticipated low response 
rate. Moreover, some of the interview participants help the researcher to get access to other directors 
and companies’ secretaries. 
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It is essential to mention that multiple methods were used to deliver the questionnaire to the target 
respondents. Firstly, a survey link   (Appendix E) that contains a self-completion questionnaire had 
been sent through the emails accounts of each listed company secretary and solicits their help to 
send the questionnaire to their respective board members. Email questionnaires are commonly used 
in board processes’ research (Pearce, 1991; Wan and Ong, 2005). Sudman and Bradburn (1983) 
assert that professionals and white-collar workers are generally willing to respond to emails 
questionnaires.  
All the companies’ secretaries have valid email accounts and were accessed through the Nigerian 
regulatory agencies. In addition to their email addresses, phone (mobile) numbers of all the 
secretaries were received and were used to contact them for reminders. The researcher also 
contacted the majority of the secretaries face-to-face and sought their support.  
Secondly, the survey link and hard copy of the questionnaire has also been sent directly (either 
through email or ‘delivery and collection’) to the majority of the target participants, either by the 
researcher or via officials of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC) or Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). Similarly, some members of the Society for 
Corporate Governance of Nigeria (SCGN) and Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) 
voluntarily and personally volunteered to assist and delivered the research instrument to the target 
respondents.  
Sufficient literature has suggested that internet, internet-mediated and ‘delivery and collection’ 
questionnaires have more control to ensure the questionnaires are filled by the target respondents 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Evidence also suggests that online surveys have a higher response rate 
than mail questionnaire (Michaelidou and Dibb, 2006). In Nigeria, online and ‘delivery and collection’ 
approaches are much better than postal questionnaire because of the nature of the country’s postal 
service. However, in the Nigerian context, where the level of computer education is low, online 
questionnaires may lead to low response rates, especially in board studies. Moreover, ‘delivery and 
collection’ questionnaires will be difficult, as the respondents are geographically dispersed 
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(Saunders et al., 2012), with companies listed on the NSE situated in the North, South, West and 
Eastern part of the country. Nevertheless, the method can be applied by attending a series of 
seminars and conferences where the target respondents (directors of listed firms) are the audience. 
To address the shortcomings of the two approaches highlighted above, ‘delivery and collection’ and 
online questionnaire methods have been employed jointly. There is no known literature to support 
this approach, but it is more appropriate if the target participants lack computer literacy and are 
difficult to reach. In such situations, the mixed approach to survey delivery is necessary in order to 
maximize the response rate.  
4.2.3.5 Response Rate 
Various approaches to increase the research response rate were applied. A letter has been sent to 
the targeted respondents two weeks before sending the main questionnaires, which serves as a 
consent letter and introduces the research topic, aims and objectives (see Appendix B). Through 
that letter, directors were aware of the research and some were convinced and encouraged to take 
part in the study. Previous studies indicate that a covering letter improves response rates (Dillman 
et al., 2014). A brief covering letter which explains the reason for the study accompanies the 
questionnaire. Additionally, two weeks after questionnaires were sent, several reminders followed 
through emails, phone calls and personal contacts. Moreover, to facilitate higher response rates, 
participants were informed that they will receive an executive summary of the findings, if they so 
wish.  
Questions were prepared using simple and clear English, mindful of avoiding ambiguity. Similarly, 
as mentioned earlier, the interview initially orchestrated suggests that too many questions may 
discourage target respondents from taking part in the research. Therefore, minimal items were used 
to measure each construct. These are all measures taken by the researcher to ensure a high 
response rate is attained. 
Thereafter, a survey questionnaire generated through Qualtrics software was sent using multiple 
methods to all directors (1,430) of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. At the initial stage, 
 126 
 
not many responses were received (21 responses), first and second reminders attracted responses 
of 36 and 42 respectively, which are little higher than the first attempt. After wide consultations with 
relevant organisations and individuals, family, friends and relatives, recommendable responses of 
115 are achieved. Therefore, it is essential for any study of such kind in Nigeria to have personal 
contacts that can assist the researcher to reach the target respondents. 
As mentioned earlier, multiple methods of sending the survey to the target respondents have been 
applied, this includes an online survey and ‘delivery and collection’ approaches. Similarly, instead of 
one or two reminders, many reminders have been sent. There is no known literature to support these 
approaches, however, because of the characteristics of the respondents and the study context the 
researcher was compelled to employ these techniques.  
Overall, a response rate of 214, representing fifteen per cent of the total sample was received. 
However, some of the participants were eliminated from the study due to the straight line pattern of 
their responses, but 189 responses are valid and used for the analysis. This relatively seems small 
sample size. A large sample is always desirable in a quantitative approach, however, a small sample 
size is acceptable in group processes research (Zona, 2015). Eddleston et al., (2008) investigated 
group processes in a sample of 37 firms. Moreover, board scholars using surveys face low response 
rates because directors are busy individuals with difficult schedules on daily basis (Pettigrew, 1992). 
Minichilli et al., (2009) in their study of Italian corporate boards, received a response rate of 15 per 
cent, Brav et al., (2005) sent a survey to 384 financial executives of 256 public firms and received a 
response rate of 8 per cent. However, a study of Swiss boards and their involvement in strategic 
decision collected a response rate of 25 per cent (Ruigrok et al., 2006). 
4.2.3.7 Level of Measurement, Reliability, and Validity of the Questionnaire 
Stevens (1951) classified four levels of measurement: nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. Nominal 
data is a categorical and non-rank ordered level of measurement; ordinal is rank-ordered categorical 
data; interval data can be measured on an interval scale and the differences between scales are the 
same; ratio has properties of both interval and ordinal, in addition to the zero point that exists on the 
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scale (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001). Following the tradition of other board researchers, such as Wan 
and Ong (2005), Zona (2015) and Huse et al., (2009), this thesis assesses most data on Likert scales 
(summative scale) and treats it as interval scale levels of measurement.  
The research questionnaire contains eleven constructs and has thirty-eight items used to measure 
the variables in the model (see Appendix E). The researcher minimised the number of items per 
variable and this is based on the advice given by other directors, during the interview and pre-testing 
of the instrument. With the exception of CSR legal activities, all other latent variables are measured 
with five items. Boards are made up of busy individuals and it is difficult to get their attention; too 
many questions will make the questionnaire unattractive and lead to fewer responses. The indicators 
were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ with 
‘neither agree nor disagree’ as a mid-point. The validity and reliability of items were assessed. 
Balnaves and Caputi (2001) explain that reliability is concerned with the ability of the study to be 
replicable, while validity “is the extent to which your measures do, in fact, measure the constructs of 
interest to the research” (p.89). It is essential to ensure the questionnaire possesses a maximum 
level of reliability and validity. Reliability for the questionnaire is concerned about the consistency of 
the measures (Bryman, 2012; Saunders et al., 2012). The validity of the questionnaire refers to the 
ability of the measurement concept to actually measure the construct it intends to measure 
(Saunders et al., 2012). Researchers should redouble efforts to improve validity at each level of their 
studies. However, such efforts should not be at the expense of reliability, as Bryman (2012) suggests 
that it is impossible for a research that lacks reliability to be valid. 
This thesis addresses the issues of reliability and validity with caution in order to ensure robustness 
of the research findings. An intensive relevant literature was conducted and questions were adapted 
from reputable scholars of corporate governance, board characteristics, board processes, board task 
performance and corporate social responsibility. However, some minor modifications have been 
made and some new items were developed, in order to ensure questions suit the Nigerian context 
and effectively serve the purpose of the study. A qualitative, semi-structured interview with seven 
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board members from different companies listed on the NSE had been conducted and through this 
interview, the final conceptual framework (see Figure 3.8) and quantitative questionnaire was 
designed. Thereafter, a quantitative pilot test was conducted with directors of 20 companies from 
the targeted sampling frame in order to test the instrument and check validity and reliability of the 
variables under study.  
4.3 Variables and Operationalisation  
The current study intends to find the factors responsible for board effectiveness beyond the 
traditional input-output approach. Specifically, the relationships between board characteristics 
(independent), board processes, board task and corporate social responsibility (dependent 
variables) are investigated. A framework is developed and it consists of eleven variables with thirty-
eight indicators.  
Board processes, board task and CSR (legal and ethical) activities are treated as latent variables 
and data for these latent constructs are received through survey questionnaires using 5-point Likert-
type scales, ranging from 1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree with ‘neither agree nor disagree’ 
as a midpoint. The 5-point Likert scale is employed, rather than other point scales because of the 
assumptions that it may lead to a higher response rate, as it is less complex and easier for 
participants to complete. Besides, there is no significant difference in terms of mean scores of 5 point 
scale and 7 point scale (Dawes, 2008). 
The entire indicators used in this study are reflective and were mostly adapted from relevant 
literature. However, as a result of the qualitative interview conducted, the questions were modified 
in order to suit the context under study, similarly, some new (3) items were developed.  
4.3.1 Board Characteristics Variables and Measurements 
Board characteristics that serve as predictor variables include: board size, the, CEO duality and 
gender diversity. Data for these variables are collected from the survey questionnaires. Table 4.2 
below shows the measurements of board size, board composition with proportion of NEDs as proxy, 
CEO duality and gender diversity with proportion of female directors as proxy. 
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Board size is measured as the total number of directors on the board (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). 
The proportion of NEDs is operationalized as the number of outside directors divided by the total 
number of board members (Johnson and Greening, 1999). CEO duality is measured as a dummy 
variable, with 1 if the roles of CEO and Chairman are combined and 0 otherwise (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Zhang, 2012). Gender diversity is assessed as the number of women directors divided 
by the total number of directors on the board (Bear et al., 2010; Nielsen and Huse, 2010). 
Table 4. 2: Variables and Operationalisation for Board Characteristics 
 
4.3.2 Board Processes Variables and Measurements 
The current study considers board members’ commitment, ability to challenge and knowledge 
utilisation as processes that mediate the relationship between board characteristics and task 
performance (control and service roles). Full measurements of these processes variables can be 
found in table 4.3 below. This research considers board commitment as the level of directors’ 
involvement during board meetings and preparation before meeting (Minichilli et al., 2009). This 
latent variable was measured using five indicators measuring the level of engagement and 
seriousness of board members. The items were adapted from the examples given by Wageman 
Independent Variables 
(Board Characteristics) 
 
Operationalization/Measurement References  
Board size 
 
Total number of directors on the board 
 
Judge and Zeithaml (1992) 
Proportion of NEDs Number of directors that have no ties 
with the firm divided by the total  number 
of board members 
 
 
Johnson and Greening (1999) 
CEO Duality 
 
Dummy variable, with 1 if the roles of CEO 
and Chairman are combined and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
Donaldson and Davis (1991); 
Zhang (2012) 
 
 
 
Board diversity (Gender 
as a proxy of board 
diversity) 
 
The number of women directors divided 
by the total number of directors on the 
board. 
 
 
Nielsen and Huse (2010); 
Bear et al., (2010) 
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(1995) on effort norms and developed in a theoretical paper by Forbes and Milliken (1999). Examples 
of the questions used to measure board commitment, includes (a) board members acquire 
knowledge on issues that are relevant to the firm before attending board meetings (b) board 
members take notes during meetings.  
Challenge refers to asking proven questions, debates, disagreement or differences among board 
members on task-related decisions (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Board challenge is operationalized 
with five items based on some questions used in the work of Jehn (1995) for group task conflict and 
empirical studies on board cognitive conflict by Wan and Ong (2005), and Zona and Zattoni (2007). 
However, as mentioned earlier, the interview results suggest that these questions need to be 
modified. For examples of items used to measure challenge, participants were asked to gauge the 
extent to which: (a) there are frequent debates before the board agrees on a particular decision and 
(b) there are different views in the boardroom on how to pursue the firm’s objectives.  
Knowledge utilisation is the ability of a group to utilize the knowledge, experience and skills of each 
group member (Wageman, 1995). This was measured using five indicators, adapted from the advice 
given by Forbes and Milliken (1999) and tested empirically by Zona (2015), and Bettinelli (2011). For 
example, respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they agree or otherwise that (a) board 
members are aware of each other’s knowledge and area of expertise, and (b) there is quick 
information flow among board members. 
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Table 4.3: Variables and Operationalisation of Board Processes Variables 
Variables and 
Definition 
Indicators 
code 
Operationalization 
 
Sources 
 
Commitment 
 
The level of 
involvement 
during board 
meetings and 
preparation 
before meeting. 
 
 
  
 Comt 1 Board members critically analyse any 
information provided by the managers 
prior to board meetings 
 
Wageman (1995); Zona 
(2015) 
 Comt 2  Board members take notes during 
meetings 
 
Wan and Ong (2005)  
 Comt 3 Board members participate actively in 
discussion during meetings 
 
Forbes and Milliken 
(1999)  
 Comt 4 Board members are available when 
needed for emergency meetings at both 
committee and board levels 
 
Zona and Zattoni 
(2007) 
 Comt 5 Board members acquire knowledge on 
issues that are relevant to the firm 
before attending board meetings 
 
Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) 
Challenge  
 
Asking proven 
questions, 
debates, 
disagreement or 
differences 
among board 
members on 
task-related 
decisions. 
   
 Chlg 1 There are frequent disagreements about 
ideas and opinions in the boardroom 
 
Jehn (1995) 
 Chlg 2 There are frequent debates before the 
board agrees on a particular decision 
 
Minichilli et al., (2009)  
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 Chlg 3 There are different views in the 
boardroom on how to pursue the firm’s 
objectives 
 
Zona and Zattoni 
(2007) 
 Chlg 4 The best alternatives for the firm are 
critically discussed 
 
Minichilli et al., (2012)  
 Chlg 5 There are frequent debates on the 
interests of shareholders and 
stakeholders 
 
Minichilli et al., (2012) 
    
Knowledge 
Utilisation 
 
The ability of a 
group to utilize 
the knowledge, 
experience and 
skills of each 
group member. 
   
 Knowld 1 Board members are aware of each 
other’s knowledge and area of expertise 
 
McGrath et al. (1995); 
Minichilli et al., (2012) 
 Knowlg 2 There is quick information flow among 
board members 
 
 
Forbes and Milliken 
(1999); Zona and 
Zattoni (2007) 
 Knowlg 3 There is a clear division of labour among 
board members 
 
 
 
Forbes and Milliken 
(1999); Zona (2015); 
Bettinelli (2011) 
 Knowlg 4 Knowledge and skills available in the 
boardroom are coordinated to achieve 
more constructive discussions 
 
Bettinelli (2011) 
 Knowlg 5 When discussing issues in the 
boardroom, the most knowledgeable 
directors have the most influence 
 
Minichilli et al., (2012) 
 
4.3.3 Board Task Variables and Measurements 
Using the views of Fama and Jensen (1983) and the results from the interview conducted in this 
study, suggests that control and service roles are the main tasks expected of the board of directors 
to perform in Nigeria. In this study, each task is assessed with five indicators (see Table 4.4). For 
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control task, items were adapted from the previous study of Zona and Zattoni (2007) and Zattoni et 
al., (2015). One question to measure control task was developed by the researcher. Participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which the board (a) sufficiently monitors the activities of CEO/MD 
and other managers (b) your board ensures substantial expenditures are justifiable (newly developed 
item). Service task is operationalized using five questions drawn from Gabrielsson and Winlund 
(2000) and Zattoni et al., (2015). Example of items used include: (a) your board provides useful 
advice on management and (b) this board positively links the firm with society (newly developed 
item). 
Table 4.4: Variables and Operationalisation for Board Task Variables 
Variables and 
Definition 
Indicators 
Code 
Operationalization 
 
Sources 
Control Task 
 
The protection 
of shareholders’ 
wealth from 
expropriations. 
   
 Cntrl 1 Your board decides remuneration of CEO 
and other internal directors 
 
Zattoni et al., (2015)  
 Cntrl 2 Your board is fully informed about the 
financial position of the firm 
 
Zona and Zattoni 
(2007)  
 
 Cntrl 3 Your board ensures substantial 
expenditures are justifiable 
 
Newly developed item. 
 Cntrl 4 Your board establishes plans and budget 
for the firm’s operations 
 
 
Minichilli et al., (2012); 
Zattoni et al. (2015) 
 Cntrl 5 The board sufficiently monitors the 
activities of CEO/MD and other 
managers 
 
Wan and Ong (2005); 
Zona and Zattoni 
(2007) 
Service Task 
 
The provision of 
advice and 
counsel, 
forming links 
with important 
stakeholders 
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and capital 
provision. 
 Srvc 1 Your board provides useful advice on 
management 
 
Zattoni et al., (2015); 
Minichilli et al., (2009)  
 Srvc 2 This board positively links the firm with 
society 
 
Newly developed item. 
 Srvc 3 This board provides useful advice on 
financial issues 
 
Zattoni et al., (2015) 
 Srvc 4 Your board makes initiatives on strategy 
proposal 
 
 
Forbes and Milliken 
(1999); Zona and 
Zattoni (2007) 
 Srvc 5 This board makes long-term strategy 
plans 
 
Zahra and Pearce 
(1989); Zona and 
Zattoni (2007) 
 
4.3.4 Corporate Social Responsibility and Measurements 
In this study, corporate social responsibility activities serve as dependent variables and attention is 
given to ethical and legal CSR dimensions. Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) classified CSR into 
positive and negative CSR. The former refers to effective decision-making for proactive sustainability 
practice such as philanthropic CSR dimension, while negative CSR is poor corporate social 
responsibility decisions that are associated with costs, such as payments of penalties and fines. This 
can be classified under ethical and legal CSR activities. The current study considered the two 
dimensions of negative CSR (legal and ethical) activities.  
Data about CSR activities was collected from the survey questionnaires and questions are adapted 
from Maignan and Ferrell (2001), however, a question that measure CSR ethical has emerged from 
the interview conducted by the researcher. Nine items on a 5-point Likert scales were used to 
measure CSR legal and ethical activities (Table 4.5). For legal CSR activities, four questions were 
used and respondents were asked to answer questions on the extent to which they agree or disagree 
on items, such as: (a) Our firm seeks to comply with all laws regarding hiring and benefits of 
employees (b) Our firm pays taxes and other tax-related as and when due. Five items were used to 
measure CSR ethical activities. Examples of indicators used to measure CSR ethical activities 
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include: (a) Managers monitor the potential negative impact of our activities on society, and (b) We 
do not give donations to political and other unethical activities (newly developed item). 
Table 4. 5: Variables and Operationalisation for CSR Legal and Ethical Dimensions 
Variables  
 
Items code Operationalization  sources 
CSR (legal)    
 CsrLg 1 Directors of this firm try to comply 
with the environmental laws 
 
Maignan and Ferrell 
(2001) 
 
 CsrLg 2 Our firm seeks to comply with all laws 
regarding hiring and benefits of 
employees 
 
Maignan and Ferrell 
(2001) 
 
 CsrLg 3 We always comply with the norms 
defined in the law when carrying out 
our activities 
 
Turker (2009) 
 CsrLg 4 Our firm pays taxes and other tax-
related as and when due 
 
Turker (2009) 
CSR (ethical)    
 CsrEth 1 Managers monitor the potential 
negative impact of our activities on 
society 
 
Maignan and Ferrell 
(2001) 
 
 
 CsrEth 2 We follow professional and ethical 
standards 
 
Maignan and Ferrell 
(2001) 
 
 
 CsrEth 3 Our firm has a confidentiality 
procedure in place for employees to 
report any misconduct at work 
 
Maignan and Ferrell 
(2001) 
 
 CsrEth 4 Our company has an effective code of 
conduct in place 
 
Maignan and Ferrell 
(2001) 
 
 CsrEth 5 We don’t give donations to political 
parties and other unethical activities 
 
Newly developed item 
 
4.4 Common Method Bias (CMB) 
Common method bias (CMB) occurs when the research instrument used for data collection causes 
the variations, rather than the true scores received from the participants that the instrument intends 
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to find (Saiyidi, 2014). CMB leads to spurious effects as the variation occurs due to the instrument, 
rather than the variable being measured (Schaller et al., 2015). Specifically, common method bias, 
if not properly controlled, can lead to bias estimates of the measurement model with fake reliability 
and validity scores (Bagozzi, 1984) and bias parameter estimates of the relationship between 
exogenous and endogenous variables (Cote and Buckley, 1988). 
Data collected through multiple sources, as opposed to a single method at one point in time, is likely 
to have minimised the common method bias that may manifest as a result of variables are measured 
from different sources (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Additionally, measuring all variables with a single 
instrument means that the items measuring constructs are put together, which can influence 
respondents to give similar responses to these questions. To address this bias, Podsakoff et al., 
(2012) advised researchers to introduce a temporal, proximal or psychological separation between 
the measures of independent and dependent variables. The authors noted that these separations 
reduce the ability of participants to use previous responses to answer the subsequent question. The 
current study uses randomisation to reduce the motivation/ability of respondents to recall and use 
previous answers to fill in the next questions.  
Moreover, as this study collects data of all variables from a survey questionnaire, method bias is 
likely to occur. Certain procedural remedies offered by Podsakoff et al., (2012) are used to minimise 
the effect of common method bias. The researcher ensures unambiguous items are used because 
ambiguous questions are difficult to understand and as such, respondents create their own meanings 
of the item and give answers based on their understanding. In addition, the wordings of the items 
are improved and potential bad words that may prompt social desirability are identified through the 
pilot study and are corrected. Bad wordings may likely lead to bias findings,  Harris and Bladen 
(1994) reported an increase of 238% in the average correlation among variables when item word 
bias was not controlled. 
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4.5 Ethical Issues 
Ethical considerations are crucial in conducting research, particularly that which deals with the 
human subject. Respondents of this study were fully informed that participation is voluntary and that 
their identities and that of their companies are secured. For the qualitative interview conducted, a 
Participants Information Sheet (PIS) and a consent form were sent to respondents before qualitative 
data collection began (Appendices C and D). 
To mitigate unethical research conduct, the University of Bedfordshire, established the Research 
Ethics Committees (REC). The committees review research methodology of each researcher and 
issue approval if satisfied that the researcher adhered to good ethical practices. Prior to starting the 
qualitative interview and sending the questionnaire to participants for data collection, an appropriate 
research ethical committee screening form has been submitted to the Director of Business 
Management Research Institute (BMRI) for consideration by the Research Institute Ethics 
Committee. The form outlines the research outline, methodology, the strategy taken to store the data 
received and proposals for confidentiality and anonymity. Satisfied with the ethical practices of this 
study, approval was granted by the Faculty Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix A).  
4.6. Data Screening 
At the first instance, it is essential to ensure the data collected is the true representation of the 
responses received. The researcher should ensure that the data entered for analysis is the actual 
data received and patterns of the missing values are identified, so that suitable missing data 
technique can be applied. Similarly, suspicious response patterns and outliers need to be considered 
and the statistical assumptions appropriate for the methodology adopted are met (Hair Jr et al., 
2016). 
Data received from the Qualtrics questionnaire software (from both online and hard copy) are directly 
transferred into SPSS, which was later saved on csv file and transferred to Smartpls 3 software for 
analysis. As such, the data would be freed from coding errors. Nevertheless, a careful and detailed 
check against the survey instrument is made to ensure the accuracy of the transferred data.  
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4.6.1 Missing Data 
Another important issue to deal with is missing data. The software used in this study to design and 
collect data has an advantage of minimising missing data by ensuring respondents do not skip a 
question, however, such an advantage can also make respondents abandon the questionnaire which 
may drastically reduce the response rate. As such, the researcher allows participants to continue 
with the survey even when they skip a question and the approach helps, as a reasonable response 
rate is achieved and only a few respondents have a meagre amount of missing data. 
Firstly, the pattern of the missing data points should be investigated and the concern is to find 
whether the missing data points are systematically at random or otherwise. As mentioned earlier, 
only a meagre amount of data are missing and by checking the patterns of the missing values 
manually it shows that missing data points are randomly distributed. Moreover, a Missing Completely 
At Random (MCAR) test was conducted. MCAR tests a null hypothesis that data values are missing 
in a completely random pattern and a researcher should not reject the null hypothesis, if the test is 
statistically not significant, otherwise, the hypothesis should be rejected (Little and Rubin, 2014). 
Missing data not completely at random leads to bias outcomes, if not carefully handled. The test 
shows evidence that data missing is completely in a random pattern. 
After the pattern of missing data points is identified, next is to employ appropriate techniques to deal 
with the missing values. Such methods include: casewise deletion, pairwise deletion, mean 
replacement and various imputation methods. Hair Jr et al., (2016) cast doubt on the suitability of 
the statistical procedures that are used in regression approaches or the Expectation Maximisation 
(EM) algorithm for imputation to deal with missing data in PLS-SEM. Instead, the authors advise 
researchers using PLS-SEM to employ case wise deletion or mean replacement for low missing 
data. In this study, mean replacement is used to deal with missing data points because the missing 
data is negligible. Moreover, few participants were eliminated from the study due to straight line 
pattern of their responses or sending back empty questionnaire without a single answer to any 
question. 
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4.6.2 Outliers 
It is essential to investigate if outliers are present in a data before embarking on any meaningful 
analysis. An extreme response, which is far above or below the rest of responses to a particular 
question or all questions, is called an outlier (Huck, 2013). Initially, all data points that are greater 
than Q3+1.5*Inner Quarter Range (IQR) or are less than Q1-1.5*IQR are regarded as outliers (Simola 
et al., 2009).  
Preliminary findings indicate that few items scores are outliers, but Pallant (2007) advice is followed 
and an analysis conducted to assess the extent of a problem the outlier values may cause and 
determine whether the outliers are really affecting the results. Trimmed mean (cancels the highest 
and lowest scores, then the sum of other scores is divided by the total scores) is used to test whether 
there is a significant difference between initial and trimmed means. Findings revealed no statistical 
differences between the two means, as such no significant problem caused by outliers were found 
in the data set for the current study. Notwithstanding, some few extreme outliers are deleted from 
the data set in order to minimise the skewness. 
4.6.3 Data Distribution 
Data that resemble bell-shaped curves are normally distributed; the scores are clustered close to 
the mean and gradually decrease in frequency in both directions away from the centre (Huck, 2013). 
Skewness and kurtosis are the two main measures of distribution that a researcher using PLS-SEM 
may consider to examine (Hair Jr et al., 2016).  
Skewed data is not symmetrical, the distribution of responses bundle toward one side of the 
distribution tail (Huck, 2013). Left-skewed or negative-skewed is when the distribution has a long tail 
to the left, while positive-skewed or right-skewed occurs when the data distribution has a long tail to 
the right. Kurtosis measures ‘peakedness’ of the distribution whether the majority of responses are 
at the centre or both tails are thicker than the bell-shaped curve (Huck, 2013).  
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Researchers are advised to use Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilks to test a null hypothesis 
that predicts data is normally distributed. When the test shows a significant level (p < 0.05) it means 
the data is normally distributed, hence, the null hypothesis should be accepted. Conversely, an 
insignificant result (p > 0.05) shows that the data is not normally distributed and therefore, the null 
hypothesis should be rejected in this instance. 
The normality test conducted shows that some of the variables had skewness and kurtosis, but within 
the acceptable threshold of -2.58 and +2.58 (Hair et al., 2006). The skewness and kurtosis values 
of all latent variables are divided by their standard errors and the majority of the results are not within 
the range of -1.96 to +1.96. Similarly, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilks tests show that 
the null hypothesis for normality is rejected for most of the variables, as the significant level is greater 
than 0.05. This is not unexpected as non-normal data distribution is common in survey studies (Hair 
et al., 2006). The importance of normal data distribution is less essential in this study, as the analysis 
tool employed requires less restriction on data normality. PLS-SEM, which is the main data analysis 
tool employed for this study uses the bootstrapping procedure, allows data to be non-normal and 
uses a nonparametric test to assess the significance level of the results (Hair Jr et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, it is essential to ensure data is not extremely non-normal, as this may likely lead to 
difficulties in assessing parameters’ significance (Hair Jr et al., 2016). Data for this research are not 
extremely non-normal, as the skewness and kurtosis are within the acceptable range of -2.58 and 
+2.58 (Coakes et al., 2003; Hair et al., 2006). 
4.6.4 Non-Response Bias 
Non-response bias is another important potential bias that may discredit the generalisation of a 
study’s findings. Although an appropriate sampling approach allows the researcher to make 
inference with the population, non-response bias needs to be recognised and dealt with in order to 
make an accurate justification on generalisation. Dillman (2011), categorised sources of possible 
errors into sampling error, coverage error, measurement error, and non-response error. The first two 
biases are not issues to deal with in this study since the whole population serves as the research 
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sampling frame. Similarly, measurement error is minimised by using items that possess maximum 
reliability and validity. However, this research needs to address the last category of error (non-
response error). 
Lindner et al., (2001) explain that non-response bias occurs when “people included in the sample 
fail to provide usable responses and are different than those who do on the characteristics of interest 
in the study” (p.44). Researchers are encouraged to assess whether those that responded are 
significantly different from those that did not. If the difference does exist, then the findings of the 
study cannot be generalised to the whole sample or population, rather the findings are only valid to 
those that participated.  
Scholars employ different methods to address non-respondents bias. Some researchers used 
telephone follow-up survey of a certain percentage or number of non-respondents and conducted t-
test analysis to find whether significant differences exist between the respondents and non-
respondents (Allen et al., 1995; Dollisso and Martin, 1999). Researchers also compared the 
characteristics of the sample with the population (Miller, 1999), while others compared the means of 
earlier and late respondents (Matteson et al., 1984; Connors and Elliot, 1994), taking late 
respondents as proxy for non-respondents. 
Consistent with the last approach, the independent t-test, which is available from SPSS software, is 
used to test whether the means of the early and late respondents are the same or different. Early 
respondents are those that returned their survey during the first two weeks, whereas late 
respondents are those that submitted their questionnaire during the last two weeks and are 
considered as a proxy for non-respondents (Connors and Elliot, 1994). Variance homogenous 
assumption predicts that there is no difference in regard to variances of the two groups. A t-test result 
with the significant level of p < 0.05 indicates that there is a significant biased response, while 
insignificant results (p > 0.05) means that the responses did not significantly differ (Lindner et al., 
2001), therefore, the null hypothesis of equal variance should not be rejected.  
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Similar to the work of Armstrong and Overton (1977), 25 percent of each group of respondents were 
computed and used to test non-response error for each variable. In total, 189 usable responses were 
received, therefore, 47 samples for both early and late responses were used to test non-response 
bias. An independent t-test for non-response bias indicates that there are no significant differences 
between answers from early and late respondents.  Specifically, for each variable under study, a t-
test comparison was performed between groups’ mean and standard deviations. The test shows that 
the majority of the variables have insignificant test scores at values greater than the recognised 
threshold of p > 0.05. Nevertheless, five out of the thirty-four items demonstrated unequal variance 
between the early and late respondents with significant values of p < 0.05, but this does not mean 
the null hypothesis of homogeneous variance to be rejected because of these few cases (Hirst and 
Goeltz, 1984).   
4.7 Structural Equation Modelling 
This study sheds light on board effectiveness, beyond the traditional board characteristic 
(observable) variables. Many latent (unobservable) variables are included in the study’s model and 
indicators will be used to measure all the latent variables. Structure equation modelling technique, 
which was developed by Joreskog in the 1970s (Chin, 1998) is used as the main analysis tool. 
Structure equation modeling (SEM) is a second generation and multivariate analysis technique used 
to establish the relationship among variables of interest. It can (a) test relationships between multiple 
independent and dependent variable (b) account for measurement errors of manifest variables and 
(c) simultaneously test measurement and structural models through path analysis (Barroso et al., 
2010). This technique is used to test the hypothesised relationships between board characteristics, 
board processes, board task and corporate social responsibility activities. Zattoni et al., (2015) 
applied SEM to analyse data collected in order to investigate the mediating effects of board 
processes and task performance on the relationship between family involvement and firm financial 
performance.  
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4.7.1 Two Stages of Structural Equation Modelling 
Basically, SEM has two stages: measurement model and structural model. The former is concerned 
with the relationships between latent constructs and their respective indicators. Latent (unobserved) 
variables cannot be measured directly instead, indicators are used to measure the variables 
indirectly. Good indicators (manifest variables) should be able to provide sufficient component scores 
of the respective latent constructs they intend to measure and the scores can be used to predict the 
relationship between latent constructs in the model (Chin, 1998). Validity and reliability are the major 
tests conducted at the measurement model stage. At this level, the manifest (observed) variables 
are assessed to ensure appropriate measurement of the latent constructs.  
Rather assessing the relationships between indicators and their latent constructs, the structural 
model is concerned with the relationships between latent constructs in the model. As SEM is a non-
parametric analysis tool, parametric analyses are not appropriate for researchers using the 
technique. Non-parametric, prediction-oriented measures should be used by researchers using PLS-
SEM (Hair et al., 2011). Such measures in the structural model include: estimates of the R-squares, 
the stability of estimates through bootstrapping procedure, effect size (f2) and the Stone-Geisser (Q2) 
technique for the predictive relevance of the model.  
4.7.2 Reflective and Formative Indicators 
The direction of the relationships between manifest variables (indicators) and their respective 
constructs can be either reflective or formative and a model can be formed of reflective constructs, 
formative constructs or even both. Studies that use a model that consists only of reflective indicators 
or formative indicators are termed as Mode A or Mode B respectively, but a model with both reflective 
and formative manifest variables is referred to as Mode C (Chin, 1998).  Figure 4.1 below 
demonstrates the relationship between latent constructs and its manifest indicators in Mode A and 
Mode B. 
In Mode A, reflective indicators (outward arrows) for a latent variable are assumed to be different 
ways of measuring that particular construct and any change in the latent construct leads to changes 
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in the indicators, in the same direction. Chin (1998) explains that the loadings of each item 
determines the level of changes, as a result of changes in the latent construct it intends to measure. 
Therefore, outer loading of a reflective indicator is the key determinant of the suitability of an item to 
be included or otherwise for Mode A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bollen and Lennox (1991) 
In contrast to reflective indicators, formative items (inner arrows) are not expected to correlate with 
each other or serve as a different approach to measure a particular latent construct instead they are 
viewed as items that caused the latent variable. Thus, correlations among manifest variables and 
internal consistency are inappropriate measures in the Mode B model (Bollen, 1984).  
Chin (1998) summarises three major considerations on whether the indicators are to be considered 
as reflective or formative: theory knowledge, research objectives and empirical considerations (see 
Table 4.6). Reflective indicators are more appropriate to use, if the causation is from the construct 
to the indicator and if the objective of the study is to predict or explain the observed measure, as it 
      
 
 Figure 4.1: Mode A (Reflective Construct) and Mode B (Formative Construct) 
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minimises the error variance for the measurement model. Similarly, reflection items are more 
suitable, if there are concerns about the sample size and multicollinearity among each set of 
indicators. 
Table 4.6:  Reflective or Formative 
 Reflective  Formative 
    
Theory knowledge Causation is from the construct to 
the indicators 
 Causation is from the indicators to the construct 
Research objectives Predict the observed measures  Account for unobserved variance 
Empirical 
considerations 
If there are concerns about small 
sample size and multicollinearity 
 Large sample size and lack of multicollinearity 
among items 
Source: Chin (1998) 
 
4.7.3 Covariance SEM and Partial Least Squares SEM 
There are two common statistical techniques of structural equation modeling (SEM): covariance-
based (CB-SEM) and partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). The 
covariance-based SEM has been in existence since the 1970s and was developed by Jöreskog 
(1970), Wiley et al., (1973) and Keesling (1972). CB-SEM is an approach used to confirm or reject 
theories; it serves as a tool to estimate the covariance matrix for sample data (Hair Jr et al., 2016). 
CB-SEM technique is the most popular method compared to PLS-SEM. However, the latter serves 
as an alternative method to the former. CB-SEM has many restriction assumptions to be met (such 
as large sample size and data normality) before a researcher can use it. Similarly, the method is 
more useful, if the theories in the field under study are well developed.  
Henseler et al., (2012) explain that PLS-SEM is a “non-parametric, regression-based, estimation 
method whose focus is on prediction by means of a specific set of hypothesized relationships, 
maximizing explained variance in more or less the way that OLS regression does” (p.261). This 
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approach is more appropriate, if the aim is to predict relationships and minimize the residual variance 
(error terms) of constructs. In other words, the PLS-SEM algorithm estimates path coefficients that 
maximize the coefficient of determination values of the dependent (endogenous) variable (Hair Jr et 
al., 2016).  
Unlike CB-SEM, the PLS-SEM approach has less or no restrictions based on traditional multivariate 
techniques’ strict assumptions (Wold, 1980) and can be used where theories are less developed 
(Chin, 1998). Although the technique has rigorous and robust mathematical and statistical 
procedures, it is also referred to as the ‘soft model’ (Chin, 2010) because it has fewer requirements 
for normality and large sample assumptions. Moreover, unlike CB-SEM that focuses on theory 
testing, PLS-SEM can be used for both confirmatory (testing theory) and exploratory (building theory) 
analysis (Barroso et al., 2010).  
While in CB-SEM only reflective indicators are suitable, in order to avoid problems associated with 
the identification, in PLS-SEM both reflective and formative indicators can be used in a model (Hair 
et al., 2011). Partial least squares technique modelled constructs as determinate, that is construct 
scores are the composite of its items, while in CB-SEM variables are modelled as indeterminate, 
that is the construct score is the composite of indicators plus measurement error (Fornel, 1982).  
Researchers using CB-SEM might face difficulties in dealing with a complex model that has multiple 
relationships. PLS-SEM handles a complex model (Hair Jr et al., 2016) with multiple indicators, many 
variables and relationships. Moreover, a model with both a unidirectional (recursive) and bidirectional 
(non-recursive) relationship is more suitable in covariance SEM technique, but variance based SEM 
works with only recursive relationships (Barroso et al., 2010). 
Wold (1980) warns that the two SEM techniques should not be considered as competitive, but rather 
complementary to each other. Using either covariance-based or variance-based structural equation 
modelling depends on the research objectives, sample size, type of model, and the normality of data 
and direction of the relationship investigated. Table 4.7 below summarises the differences between 
CB-SEM and PLS-SEM.  
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Table 4.7: Differences between CB-SEM and PLS-SEM 
 CB-SEM 
 
PLS-SEM 
Aim 
 
Theory testing and theories 
comparison. Minimise the 
differences between the sample 
covariance and those predicted 
by the theoretical model (Hair et 
al., 2011) 
Predict relationships between 
the variables of interest. 
Minimise the residual variance 
of constructs and is used for 
both confirmatory and 
explorative analysis (Barroso et 
al., 2010) 
Model Less complex models are more 
suitable (Hair Jr et al., 2016) 
Complex models with many 
indicators, constructs and 
relationships can be handled 
(Ferris and Yan, 2007). 
 
Epistemic Suitable with reflective 
indicators, so that problems 
associated with identification 
can be avoided (Hair Jr et al., 
2016). 
Allows both reflective and 
formative indicators (Fornell 
and Bookstein, 1982). 
Assumptions Strong restrictions on normality 
and sample size apply (Hair Jr et 
al., 2016) 
No restriction on normality and 
small sample size can be used, 
and the technique is referred as 
the ‘soft model’ (Chin, 2010) 
Direction of relationship Structural model can be 
recursive or non-recursive 
relationships (Barroso et al., 
2010) 
 
Only model with recursive 
relationships are allowed 
(Barroso et al., 2010) 
Variables scores Latent variables are modelled as 
indeterminate (Fornel, 1982) 
Constructs are modelled as 
determinate (Fornel, 1982) 
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4.7.4 Justifications for using SEM (PLS)  
SEM is more appropriate for this study since the model includes many latent (unobserved) variables, 
mediating variables, multiple dependent variables and multiple relationships. Alternatively, 
hierarchical regression (HR) method could be used as it accounts for mediation effects, however, 
not simultaneously. HR does not perfectly account for measurement error as it assumes perfect 
measurement of constructs, unaccounted measurement errors would attenuate this study’s findings 
(Brown, 2015).  
SEM, on the other hand, permits simultaneous estimation of more than one single relationship 
between constructs that involve mediation variables and account for measurement error (Zattoni et 
al., 2015). It also allows variables to correlate with one another, whereas in regression other 
independent variables must be controlled in order to assess the effect of a particular independent 
variable on the dependent variable (Dwyer et al., 2012). Similarly, as this study has multiple 
dependent variables, an ordinary regression analysis would not be appropriate; although multiple 
regressions can be used, but not at once. However, with SEM (PLS) the entire model can be tested 
at once (Gefen et al., 2000). Moreover, most of the data collected are not normally distributed and 
so a non-parametric analysis tool, such as SEM, is more suitable to employ. 
Within the two common SEM approaches (CB-SEM and PLS-SEM), the PLS-SEM algorithm is 
chosen as the most appropriate for this study because the aim of the current study is to predict 
relationships between variables of interest. Specifically, the research intends to estimate path 
coefficient on the links between board characteristics, board processes, board task and CSR. The 
aim here is to maximize the R squares values of all endogenous variables in the model. Additionally, 
the model for the research is too complex with many latent variables and relationships; therefore, 
PLS-SEM is the best method to use. PLS-SEM allows a complex model because PLS algorithm 
involves OLS regressions for separate parts of the model (Henseler et al., 2012) and this does not 
necessitate using a large sample size.  
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The strict assumptions of large sample size and data distribution are other factors that limit this study 
to using CB-SEM. In this study, a survey questionnaire was sent to all directors (1,430) sitting on the 
boards of listed firms in Nigeria and usable responses of 189 were received. This seems a relatively 
small sample size to use CB-SEM, thus PLS-SEM serves as the best analysis tool to use in this 
study. PLS works perfectly with small sample sizes, as some studies have recently shown (see 
Reinartz et al., 2009).  
The model for this study is complex as various latent variables, indicators and path relationships are 
considered in the model. Similarly, all the directions of relationships between constructs in the model 
are recursive (one-way). These reasons also make partial least squares structural equation modeling 
the most appropriate analysis tool to employ for this research. 
4.8 Assessing and Reporting PLS Analysis 
All structural equation modeling techniques consist of two parts: measurement model and structural 
model. For PLS-SEM, these are referred to as the outer model and inner model respectively (Hair et 
al., 2011). The former is concerned with the relationship between construct and its indicators, while 
the latter relates to the relationship between the latent constructs in the model. As mentioned earlier, 
latent variables can be measured reflectively or formatively. The reflective measurement means the 
causality is from the latent variable to its indicators, but if the assumption is that indicators caused 
the construct, then the measurement is formative (Mateos-Aparicio, 2011). In PLS-SEM, a non-
parametric method known as ‘bootstrapping’ is used to investigate the significance of the 
relationships (Chin, 1998). 
4.8.1 Measurement Model 
The quality of indicators used to measure reflective latent contracts is assessed through the 
measurement model and this assessment is done through reliability and validity tests. Validity tests 
are performed to ensure the manifest indicators are really good measures of the unobserved 
variables, while reliability tests are concerned with the consistency of the measure.  
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In PLS-SEM, internal consistency reliability is achieved using composite reliability, instead of 
traditional criterion for internal consistency, known as Cronbach’s Alpha (Hair Jr et al., 2016). In 
contrast to Cronbach's Alpha, that assumed equal indicator’s outer loadings on the construct,  
composite reliability considers the different outer loading of each indicator, as PLS prioritizes the 
indicators based on their individual reliability (Hair Jr et al., 2016).  
Values of 0.70 to 0.90 are satisfactory, however, the composite reliability of 0.95 and above is not 
desirable, as such indicates the researcher used redundant indicators (Hair et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, an item with loading below the threshold can be retained if such indicator is important 
to the variable under investigation (Chin, 1998),  especially if deleting the item may have an adverse 
effect on validity (Hair Jr et al., 2016). Reliability of construct can be established through composite 
reliability (Pc) measure, introduced by Werts et al. (1974) and mathematically presented as:  
𝑝𝑐 =
( 𝑙𝑖
∑
𝑖)
2
( 𝑙𝑖
∑
𝑖)
2
+   𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑒𝑖)𝑖
∑
 
Where 𝑙𝑖  stands for outer loadings of the item, variable 𝑖  of a particular construct, 𝑒𝑖  is the 
measurement error, and 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑒𝑖) is the variance of the measurement error (Hair Jr et al., 2016). 
Discriminant validity and convergent validity are the two common methods used to assess validity in 
PLS-SEM. Convergent validity for reflective measures is the extent to which each indicator is truly a 
different approach to measure the same latent variable. This is the extent to which items measuring 
a particular construct correlate positively with each other. Two approaches are used to assess 
convergent validity of reflective measures in PLS-SEM. These are indicators’ outer loadings and 
average variance extraction (AVE). A broad principle is that an outer loading should be at a critical 
threshold value of 0.708 (approximately 0.70) or above and AVE value should be 0.50 or higher, 
which means that on average the variance shared between indicators and construct is higher than 
measurement error variance (Hair et al., 2011).  
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Discriminant validity is achieved if empirically constructs differ with each other, this means that a 
variable is unique and represents phenomena not captured by other constructs in the model (Hair Jr 
et al., 2016). Two common approaches are used in assessing discriminant validity: cross-loadings 
and Fornell-Larcker criterions. In the former, the outer loading of an indicator to another construct 
should be less than loading to its main construct (Farrell, 2010). For the Fornell-Larcker criterions, 
the square root of each variable’s AVE should be larger than the highest correlation with any other 
construct in the model  (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
4.8.2 Structural Model 
When the measurement model is properly assessed and validity and reliability of the constructs are 
confirmed, the subsequent step is to assess the structural model, also known as an inner model. 
This consists of estimations of the coefficient of determination (R2), effect size (f2), the path coefficient 
(relationships between variables), significant level (bootstrapping procedure) and predictive 
capabilities of the model (Q2).   
Values and interpretations of R2 in PLS is the same as in other statistical techniques, the value is 
the amount of variance found in the endogenous variables that can be explained by exogenous 
variables and can be from zero to one (Hair Jr et al., 2016). It is worth mentioning that no standard 
threshold of R2 is set for all studies, as the level of accepted R2 varies with the individual research 
area and model complexity (Hair Jr et al., 2016). 
The second stage in the structural model is to assess the importance of each explanatory variable 
on dependent variable through effect size (f2). The f2 shows the changes that occur in the dependent 
variable total variance explained as a result of including or excluding a particular exogenous variable 
(Chin, 1998). It can be calculated as:  
𝑓2 =
𝑅2 included − 𝑅2 exculuded
1 − 𝑅2 included
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Where ‘R2 included’ is the total variance explained of the dependent variable, when the R2 of the 
independent variable is included and ‘R2 excluded’ is the R2 of the dependent variable when the 
variance explained of the independent variable is excluded from the model (Chin, 1998). It can also 
be calculated by simply deducting the R squares of a particular independent variable from the total 
R squares. Chin (1998) explains that an effect size can be small (0.02), medium (0.15) or large 
(0.35). 
The next stage is to evaluate the relationships between exogenous and endogenous constructs in 
the model through path coefficients. The estimates of structural model relationships obtained from 
PLS-SEM algorithms are interpreted the way standardised regression coefficients are interpreted 
(Gefen et al., 2000). A significance level of the path coefficients needs to be ascertained.  
Parametric tests to assess the significance level of relationships are not suitable for PLS, since the 
technique is non-parametric. Instead, a non-parametric test, known as bootstrapping, is used. The 
technique creates n sample sets and obtained n estimates for each parameter in the model; each 
sample is created by sampling with replacements from the original data set until the number of cases 
is identical to the original sample set (Hair Jr et al., 2016). Literature has supported the use of 500, 
1000 and 5000 iterations in order to obtain estimates for the bootstrapping confidence interval. 
The last stage of structural model evaluation is assessing the Stone-Geisser’s (Q2) value which 
investigates the model’s predictive capability through a cross-validation redundancy measure. Model 
predictive validity is gauged using a technique developed by Stone (1974), and Geisser (1975). The 
technique is a measure that explains how sufficient the model possesses predictive relevance and 
is applicable to only reflective (not suitable for formative) endogenous constructs. The predictive 
relevancy is illustrated as: 
      
𝑄2 = 1 − 
∑𝑑 𝐸𝑑
∑𝑑 𝑂𝑑
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Where E is the sum of squares of prediction error, O is the sum of squares using the mean for 
prediction and d is the distance point (Chin, 1998). A general guideline is that for any predictive 
relevancy to be guaranteed, the Q2 measures must be greater than 0, but if the Q2 is less than 0, 
then the model lacks predictive relevancy (Chin, 2010). In smartPLS, the model’s relevancy is 
assessed using a procedure called blindfolding, it omits every data point (dth) in the dependent 
variable’s indicators and evaluate the quality of the parameters with the remaining data points (Chin, 
1998). The procedure is repeated until every data point has been omitted and estimated. 
4.9 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter provides explanations of the research methodology employed in this study. It begins 
with brief discussions on the methodologies used by previous relevant studies and at the end, the 
current study is aligned with the most appropriate approach. This chapter also discusses research 
paradigms, and this study adopts positivism philosophical assumptions to investigate the 
relationships between board characteristics, processes, tasks and CSR legal and ethical 
dimensions. Moreover, this chapter explains the research ethical consideration, population and 
sample, main data collection instrument (survey) and measurements of the variables under study. 
Analytical techniques, explanations and justification for the chosen analysis tool (partial least 
squares structural equation modeling) were also presented in this chapter. The next chapter presents 
the quantitative results that test the relationships between the variables of interest with a means to 
answer the research questions and achieve the research aim.  
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CHAPTER 5: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS & RESULTS FROM MEASUREMENT AND 
STRUCTURAL MODELS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
Firstly, this chapter discusses the results of the descriptive analysis conducted using Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The background and profile of respondents are presented 
in section 5.1. This includes directorship type, industry classification, number of employees and 
director interlocks. Additionally, the descriptive analysis of board characteristics, which involve board 
size, board composition, board gender diversity and separation of duties between the CEO and the 
chairman, are discussed in section 5.2. The frequencies, means and standard deviations of board 
processes, board task and corporate social responsibility activities were presented in sections 5.3, 
5.4 and 5.5 respectively.  
Secondly, the chapter presents results from the research analysis tool (partial least squares 
structural equation modeling). Specifically, the chapter discusses results in relation to reliability, 
validity, R squares, path coefficient and predictive relevancy tests. Section 5.6 discusses the results 
obtained from the measurement (outer) model. The section examines the relationships between 
latent constructs and their manifest variables. Section 5.7 presents findings from the structural (inner) 
model, which investigates the relationships between the latent variables.  Finally, the chapter was 
summarised in section 5.8. 
5.1 Background and Profile of Respondents 
The survey was sent to all directors of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
which include both inside, outside, and senior independent non-executive directors. The descriptive 
analysis indicates that approximately 122 (64.6%) participants of the research are outside directors; 
including senior independent NEDs (Figure 5.1). However, only sixty-seven (35.4%) of participants 
are executive directors.   
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Figure 5.1: Directorship Type 
 
Nigerian listed companies are categorised into eleven different sectors and the current study sent 
survey questionnaires to all directors of listed companies cutting across all of the eleven different 
industries. The results in table 5.1 show that the majority of the respondents (33.3 per cent) are from 
the financial sector, followed by consumer goods (18 per cent), then industrial goods (12.2 per cent) 
and oil and gas (8.5 per cent). The large responses received from the financial sector replicate the 
size of the industry, as more than 35 per cent of the total numbers of quoted companies are from 
this sector (see Table 2.1). Furthermore, the companies were classified into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms, the analysis shows that at least seventy-eight, which represents 41.27 per cent 
of the responses, are from manufacturing firms while 111 (58.73%) responses are from non-
manufacturing firms (Figure 5.2).  
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Table 5.1: Classification of Industries 
Type of industry 
 
Frequency (N=189) Percent Cumulative percent 
Oil and Gas 16 8.5 8.5 
Industrial goods 23 12.2 20.6 
Consumer goods 34 18.0 38.6 
Conglomerates 7 3.7 42.3 
Financial services 63 33.3 78.3 
Healthcare 5 2.6 78.3 
Natural Science 6 3.2 81.5 
Service 12 6.3 87.8 
Construction 12 6.3 94.2 
ICT 7 3.7 97.9 
Agriculture 4 2.1 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Type of Firm 
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In regard to the number of full-time employees, for directors of companies that participate in this 
study, substantial numbers (38.1 per cent) of respondents indicate that their firms have numbers of 
employees ranging from 100 to 500. Companies with employees between 1001 to 2000 and 2001 
to 3000 represent 11.6 per cent and 13.2 per cent respectively. Moreover, 19 per cent of the 
responses came from board members of companies with less than 100 employees (Table 5.2). It is 
essential to mention that the majority of the large multinational companies operating in the country 
are not listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
Table 5.2: Number of Full-Time Employees 
Number of full time 
employees 
Frequency (N=189) Percent Cumulative percent 
    
Less than 100 36 19.0 19.0 
100-500 72 38.1 57.1 
501-1000 27 14.3 71.4 
1001-2000 22 11.6 83.1 
2001-3000 25 13.2 96.3 
Over 3000 7 3.7 100.0 
 
Director interlocks is a situation whereby a particular director serves on more than one board. Figure 
5.3 below indicates that out of the total number of directors that took the survey, only eight directors 
serve on multiple boards of listed firms. This corresponds to the total number of directors of listed 
firms with board interlocks. A document from NSE shows that only 48 out of 1,430 total directors 
have multiple directorships in which thirty-two directors serve on two boards, eight directors serve 
on three boards, two board members serve on four boards, and a single director serves on five 
boards of listed firms (ngx.onmicrosoft.com). 
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Figure 5.3: Director Interlock 
 
5.2 Board Characteristics 
Board characteristics serve as the main exogenous variables in this study and are limited to those 
board structures that have been frequently used in previous corporate governance literature: board 
size, board composition, CEO duality and gender diversity. Below is the descriptive analysis of these 
‘usual suspects’ in relation to the Nigerian listed companies. 
5.2.1 Board Size 
Board size is the total number of both executive and non-executive directors of a firm. The Security 
and Exchange Commission Code (2011) stresses that board size should not be less than five, but 
more importantly that companies have a board of a sufficient size appropriate to deal with the 
complexity of the company’s operation.  
Data from the responses indicate that the mean of the board size is 9.36 with the median of 9 (see 
Table 5.3). The results indicate that the smallest board size of the listed firms in Nigeria is 4 and the 
maximum board size is 19. Table 5.4 shows that the frequent size of boards is 7 (19.6%), 9 (17.5%), 
8 (12.7%) and 11 (12.2%). The majority of the respondents are from directors of firms in the financial 
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sector and the Code of Corporate Governance (2006) issued for banks by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
permits the board to be as large as 20.  
Table 5. 3: Means, Median and Mode of Board size and Non-executive Directors 
 Mean Median Mode Maximum Minimum 
Board Size 9.36 9.00 7 19 4 
NEDs 6.69 6.00 6 15 2 
 
 
Table 5.4: Frequency of Board Size 
Board size (Number of 
directors) 
Frequency (N=189) Percent Cumulative percent 
4 3 1.6 1.6 
5 6 3.2 4.8 
6 11 5.8 10.6 
7 37 19.6 30.2 
8 24 12.7 42.9 
9 33 17.5 60.3 
10 15 7.9 68.3 
11 23 12.2 80.4 
12 12 6.3 86.8 
13 6 3.2 89.9 
14 12 6.3 96.3 
15 1 0.5 96.8 
16 2 1.1 97.9 
17 1 0.5 98.4 
18 1 0.5 98.9 
19 2 1.1 100.0 
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5.2.2 Board Composition 
The presence and importance of non-executive directors in the affairs of Nigerian corporations are 
prevailing as almost all the firms have a number of outside directors greater than inside directors. 
Table 5.5 shows that 18.0 per cent of the respondents indicate that six out of the total number of 
directors of their firms are outside directors. Seven (17.5 per cent) and five (16.9 per cent) are the 
number of outside directors that also have a higher frequency in the data. The average number of 
non-executive directors of Nigerian listed firms is 6.69 and the median is six (Table 5.3). Moreover, 
the analysis evinces that the highest frequencies of the proportion of NEDs are 67 per cent and 86 
per cent (see Appendix G). The results indicate that the average mean of the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board of listed companies in Nigeria is 71.47 per cent.  
This shows that listed firms in Nigeria are complying with the provision of the governance code in 
regard to the proportion of outside directors on the board. The Nigerian Security and Exchange 
Commission Code (2011) proposes firms have a board with an appropriate mixture of executive and 
non-executive directors, with majority board members to be NEDs and at least one to be an 
independent non-executive director.  
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Table 5.5: Frequency of Non-Executive Directors 
NED (Number of NEDs) Frequency (N=189) Percent Cumulative percent 
2 5 2.6 2.6 
3 6 3.2 5.8 
4 18 9.5 15.3 
5 32 16.9 32.3 
6 34 18.0 50.3 
7 33 17.5 67.7 
8 19 10.1 77.8 
9 23 12.2 89.9 
10 7 3.7 93.7 
11 7 3.7 97.4 
12 4 2.1 99.5 
15 1 0.5 100.0 
 
5.2.3 Board Leadership 
Generally, there are two common board leadership styles: CEO duality and non-duality. The former 
is a situation where both the duties of chairperson and that of CEO are merged and assumed by a 
single individual, while the latter is concerned with the separation of duties between the chief 
executive officer and the chairperson of the board; the aim is to ensure diffusion of power and 
enhance board independence.  
Section 5.1b of the Nigerian Corporate Governance Code puts emphasis on boards to be 
independent of the management and recommends that the positions of chairman and CEO be 
separate. To some extent, Nigerian firms comply with section 5.1b of the SEC (2011) code as 97.35 
per cent of the respondents show that their board separates the duties between these two important 
positions (Figure 5.4). 
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Figure 5.4: Board Leadership 
 
 
5.2.4 Board Gender Diversity 
Gender diversity of boards is an area that has recently received greater attention from strategic 
management and corporate governance scholars. However, the inclusion of women for decisions at 
the higher level of organisations is an area that needs improvement, especially in developing nations. 
The descriptive analysis shows that about 80.42 per cent (152) of respondents of the survey are 
male directors with only 37 (19.58%) responses from female directors (Figure 5.5). Generally, 
women are underrepresented on Nigerian boards and other governmental and non-governmental 
agencies in the country.  Female inclusion on the boards of Nigerian’s listed firms requires 
improvement as the survey data indicates that more than half of the participants either have one 
female director (20.6 per cent) or not a single female director (31.7 per cent) sitting on their boards 
(see Table 5.6). 
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of Female Participants  
 
 
Table 5.6: Number of Women Directors 
 
Number of female 
directors 
Frequency (N=189) Percent Cumulative percent 
0 60 31.7 31.7 
1 39 20.6 52.4 
2 49 25.9 78.3 
3 27 14.3 92.6 
4 13 6.9 99.5 
5 1 0.5 100.0 
 
5.3 Board Processes 
Three board processes variables are included in this study: board commitment, challenge, and 
knowledge utilisation. These board processes variables are treated as latent constructs and 
indicators were used to indirectly measure each of the constructs. Frequency, mean, and standard 
deviation scores were estimated for each latent board process variable and corresponding items that 
measured the constructs. In this section, results of these descriptive analyses are presented. 
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5.3.1 Commitment 
Board commitment refers to efforts made by directors inside and outside the boardroom. It involves 
active participation before and during board meetings. The construct was measured with five 
manifest variables on a five-point Likert scale; it demonstrates how committed Nigerian directors are 
toward their board activities. 
Board members taking notes during board meetings (mean score of 2.58), and active participation 
in the board meetings (mean score of 2.47) received the highest ratings by the participants. The next 
important item is the board members availability when needed for emergency meetings both at 
committee and board levels (mean score of 2.46). However, the item with the lowest rating by 
directors is the critical analysis of information presented by managers (mean score of 2.37). These 
results indicate inadequate oversight function of directors, as they are less committed to scrutinise 
management proposals. The descriptive results show that the level of directors’ active involvement 
in discussions and their presence when needed are the key elements influencing board commitment. 
Table 5.7 below summarises the descriptive results of board commitment variable. 
Table 5.7: Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations of Board Commitment 
Commitment 
 Items 
Strongly 
agree 
Some
what 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Board members 
critically analyse any 
information provided 
by the managers 
prior to board 
meetings 
 
52 71 25 27 14  
2.37 
 
1.23 
27.5% 37.6% 13.2% 14.3% 7.4% 
Board members 
participate actively in 
discussion during 
meetings 
 
34 74 50 20 11  
 
2.47 
 
 
1.08 
18.0% 39.2% 26.5% 10.6% 5.8% 
Board members take 
notes during 
meetings 
 
34 82 25 26 22  
2.58 
 
1.26 
18.0% 43.4% 13.2% 13.8% 11.6% 
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Board members are 
available when 
needed for 
emergency meetings 
at both committee 
and board levels 
 
47 68 33 23 18  
 
 
2.46 
 
 
 
1.25 
24.9% 36.0% 17.5% 12.2% 9.5% 
Board members 
acquire knowledge 
on issues that are 
relevant to the firm 
before attending 
board meetings 
 
51 62 37 21 18  
 
 
2.43 
 
 
 
1.26 
27.0% 32.8% 19.6% 11.1% 9.5% 
 
5.3.2 Challenge 
Board level of challenge, also known as cognitive conflict, entails the directors’ level of 
disagreements or differences on opinions and ideas. Task-related disagreements provide an avenue 
where directors can engage in open discussion, critical analysis of ideas and opinions presented in 
the boardroom on matters is of great importance to the board and the firm in general. 
Like board commitment, challenge was measured with five items on a 5-point Likert scale. The 
results from the descriptive analysis (Table 5.8) indicate that critical discussion of alternatives 
presented in the boardroom received the highest ratings among participants with mean score of 2.74 
and standard deviation of 1.07, followed by the frequent disagreements about ideas and opinions in 
the boardroom with an average mean score of 2.44. The item with the lowest rating is having different 
views in the board meetings on how to pursue firm objectives (mean score of 2.34). This means that 
having a board with directors that disagree with each other’s ideas and opinions are more likely to 
influence board level of challenge. 
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Table 5.8: Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations of Challenge 
Challenge  
Items  
Strongly 
agree 
Some
what 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
There are frequent 
disagreements about 
ideas and opinions in 
the boardroom 
42 84 20 24 19  
2.44 
 
1.25 
22.2% 44.4% 10.6% 12.7% 10.1% 
There are frequent 
debates before board 
agrees on a particular 
decision 
50 76 25 19 19  
 
2.37 
 
 
1.26 
26.5% 40.2% 13.2% 10.1% 10.1% 
There are different 
views in the 
boardroom on how to 
pursue the firm's 
objectives 
53 75 20 26 15  
 
 
2.34 
 
 
 
1.24 
28.0% 39.7% 10.6% 13.8% 7.9% 
The best alternatives 
for the firm are 
critically discussed 
 
20 67 57 33 12  
2.74 
 
1.07 
10.6% 35.4% 30.2% 17.5% 6.3% 
There are frequent 
debates on the 
interests of 
shareholders and 
stakeholders 
59 66 17 27 20  
 
 
2.38 
 
 
 
1.34 
31.2% 34.9% 9.0% 14.3% 10.6% 
 
 
5.3.3 Knowledge Utilisation 
Knowledge utilisation is the extent to which the board put to use the human capital available in the 
boardroom. Five items on a 5-point Likert scale were used to measure this latent variable. The 
indicator that received the greatest rating is:  directors with relevant knowledge and experience on 
issues dominate the discussion of that issue in the board meeting (mean score of 2.75). The second 
most rated item, is the division of labour among directors (mean score of 2.31) with 61 (32.2 per 
cent) of participants strongly agreeing with the item. 
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The indicators that received the lowest ratings are: knowledge and skills available in the boardroom 
are coordinated to achieve more constructive discussions (mean score of 2.17) and quick information 
flow among board members (mean score of 2.20). These results show that directors of Nigerian 
listed firms considered allowing a director or group of directors with vast knowledge and experience 
on a particular issue to have much influence when discussing such issues as a key to knowledge 
utilisation in the boardroom. Table 5.9 below presents the results of the descriptive analysis for 
knowledge utilisation. 
Table 5.9: Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations of Knowledge Utilisation 
Knowledge utilisation 
Items  
Strongly 
agree 
Some
what 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Board members are 
aware of each other’s 
knowledge and area 
of expertise 
58 73 27 22 9  
2.21 
 
1.14 
30.7% 38.6% 14.3% 11.6% 4.8% 
There is quick 
information flow 
among board 
members 
44 98 20 19 8  
 
2.20 
 
 
1.04 
23.3% 51.9% 10.6% 10.1% 4.2% 
There is a clear 
division of labour 
among board 
members 
61 64 26 21 17  
 
2.31 
 
 
1.28 32.3% 33.9% 13.8% 11.1% 9.0% 
Knowledge and skills 
available in the 
boardroom are 
coordinated to 
achieve more 
constructive 
discussions 
 
55 78 29 22 5  
 
 
2.17 
 
 
 
1.06 
29.1% 41.3% 15.3% 11.6% 2.6% 
When discussing 
issues in the 
boardroom, the most 
knowledgeable 
directors have the 
most influence 
 
19 69 60 23 18  
 
 
2.75 
 
 
 
1.10 
10.1% 36.5% 31.7% 12.2% 9.5% 
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5.4 Board Tasks 
In this study two distinct board roles are considered: board control and service tasks. These roles 
are treated as latent constructs and items were used to measure each construct indirectly.  Below 
are the frequencies, means and standard deviation of board control and service tasks. 
5.4.1 Control Task 
Board control or monitoring role refers to the ability of directors to monitor the activities of 
management to ensure agency problems that may arise are minimised or eradicated. This construct 
was measured with five items on a 5-point Likert scale. The descriptive results summarised in table 
5.10 show that the items with higher ratings from participants are: board ensures substantial 
expenditure are justifiable (mean score of 2.48); board decides remuneration of CEO/MD and other 
internal directors (mean score of 2.31); and board monitors the activities of CEO/MD and other 
managers (mean score of 2.22). 
The indicator with the least rating among directors is: board is fully informed about the financial 
position of the firm (2.15). This result indicates the problem of information asymmetry between 
managers and the board in Nigeria, as the disclosure of the financial statement to the board of 
directors received the lowest rating among participants (directors). Nevertheless, the directors of 
Nigerian listed firms considered scrutinising expenditure to ensure the corporation's assets are not 
wasted unnecessarily and mitigating higher pay package for executives as important factors for an 
effective oversight function. Table 5.10 summarises the descriptive analysis results for board control 
role. 
 
 
 
 
 169 
 
Table 5.10: Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations of Board Control Task 
control task  
Items 
Strongly 
agree 
Some
what 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Your board decides 
remuneration of CEO 
and other internal 
directors 
54 78 20 19 18  
2.31 
 
1.25 
28.6% 41.3% 10.6% 10.1% 9.5% 
Your board is fully 
informed about the 
financial position of 
the firm 
73 60 20 26 10  
 
2.15 
 
 
1.23 
38.6% 31.7% 10.6% 13.8% 5.3% 
Your board ensures 
substantial 
expenditures are 
justifiable 
 
26 87 47 18 11  
 
2.48 
 
 
1.03 13.8% 46.0% 24.9% 9.5% 5.8% 
This board establishes 
plans and budget for 
the firm's operation 
58 82 19 17 13  
 
 
2.18 
 
 
 
1.17 
30.7% 43.4% 10.1% 9.0% 6.9% 
This board sufficiently 
monitors activities of 
the CEO/MD and 
other managers 
59 73 28 15 14  
 
 
2.22 
 
 
 
1.18 
31.2% 38.6% 14.8% 7.9% 7.4% 
 
5.4.2 Service Task 
Board service task in this study comprises of both strategic and resource provision roles; it refers to 
the ability of directors to provide human and relational capital to the firm. It also involves the provision 
of strategic advice and counsel to the executives and other resources, such as expertise, knowledge, 
finance and reputation. The service role was gauged with five items on a 5-point Likert scale.  
The Majority of directors somewhat agree (41.8%) and strongly agree (16.4%) that their boards 
positively link the firm with the society (mean score of 2.50 and standard deviation of 1.08). Making 
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initiatives on strategy proposals (mean score of 2.27) is the second most rated item. However, 
provision of useful advice on financial issues (mean score of 2.02) and making long-term strategy 
plans (mean score of 2.04) received the least rating among participants. These results indicate that 
the Nigerian directors are less likely to consider long-term strategic plans as one of the service tasks 
they are expected to perform. A summary of the results for the board service role is presented in 
table 5.11 below. 
Table 5.11: Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations of Board Service Task 
Service task  
Items 
Strongly 
agree 
Some
what 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Your board provides 
useful advice on 
management 
59 86 15 16 10  
2.14 
 
1.16 
31.2% 45.5% 7.9% 8.5% 6.9% 
This board positively 
links the firm with 
society 
 
31 79 42 28 9  
2.50 
 
1.08 
16.4% 41.8% 22.2% 14.8% 4.8% 
This board provides 
useful advice on 
financial issues 
79 64 20 16 10  
 
2.02 
 
 
1.16 
41.8% 33.9% 10.6% 8.5% 5.3% 
Your board makes 
initiatives on strategy 
proposal 
56 80 17 18 18  
 
 
2.27 
 
 
 
1.25 
29.6% 42.3% 9.0% 9.5% 9.5% 
This board makes 
long-term strategy 
plans 
80 64 18 12 15  
 
 
2.04 
 
 
 
1.22 
42.3% 33.9% 9.5% 6.3% 7.9% 
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5.5 Corporate Social Responsibility 
In this study, firms’ engagement in corporate social responsibility activities is considered as firm-
level effectiveness. However, two dimensions of negative CSR (legal and ethical) introduced by 
Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) are selected as a proxy for corporate social responsibility activities. 
These legal and ethical CSR activities are treated as latent variables and items were used to 
measure the constructs. This section discusses the descriptive analysis of these variables which 
includes frequencies, means and standard deviations. 
5.5.1 CSR Legal 
This study considers two dimensions of CSR: legal and ethical corporate social responsibility 
activities. The legal CSR dimension is social responsibility activities which deal with issues related 
to the law of the land. Companies are expected to comply with all laws of the society where it 
operates. Four indicators were used to assess the CSR legal dimension using a 5-point Likert scale. 
As seen in table 5.12 below, complying with the norms defined in the law when carrying out firm 
activities (mean score of 2.25) is the most rated item by the participants, followed by complying with 
the environmental laws (mean score of 2.21). The lowest rated items are: the firm pays taxes and 
other tax-related as and when due (mean score of 2.04) and complying with laws regarding hiring 
and benefits of employees (mean score of 2.18). 
5.5.2 CSR Ethical 
The CSR ethical dimension is concerned with those CSR activities that firms engage in because it 
seems morally good and it is seen as “the right thing to do”. Five questions on a 5-point Likert scale 
were used to gauge this construct. As can be observed from table 5.13 below, items that received 
the highest rating by directors are: not giving donations to political rallies and other unethical activities 
(mean score of 2.64), having an effective code of conduct (mean score of 2.54) and monitoring the 
potential negative impact of firm activities on society (mean score of 2.39).  
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Items that received lower ratings are: firm follows the professional and ethical standard (mean score 
of 2.20) and having a confidential procedure in place for employees to report any misconduct (mean 
score of 2.36). Table 3.7 summarises the descriptive results of corporate social responsibility 
(ethical) dimension. 
 
Table 5.12: Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations of CSR Legal Dimension 
CSR (Legal) 
 Items 
Strongly 
agree 
Somew
hat 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Directors of this firm 
try to comply with the 
environmental laws 
62 74 19 19 15  
2.21 
 
1.23 
32.8% 39.2% 10.1% 10.1% 7.9% 
Our firm seeks to 
comply with all laws 
regarding hiring and 
benefits of employees 
56 89 13 16 15  
 
2.18 
 
 
1.18 
29.6% 47.1% 6.9% 8.5% 7.9% 
We always comply 
with the norms 
defined in the law 
when carrying out our 
activities 
59 75 17 24 14  
 
 
2.25 
 
 
 
1.23 
31.2% 39.7% 9.0% 12.7% 7.4% 
Our firm pays taxes 
and other tax-related 
as and when due 
82 66 8 17 16  
 
 
2.04 
 
 
 
1.27 
43.4% 34.9% 4.2% 9.0% 8.5% 
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Table 5.13: Frequencies, Means and Standard Deviations of CSR Ethical Dimension 
CSR (Ethical)  
Items 
Strongly 
agree 
Some
what 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Managers monitor the 
potential negative 
impact of our 
activities on society 
49 77 23 21 19  
2.39 
 
1.26 
25.9% 40.7% 12.2% 11.1% 10.1% 
We follow 
professional and 
ethical standards 
53 82 27 18 9  
 
2.20 
 
 
1.10 
28.0% 43.3% 14.3% 9.5% 4.8% 
Our firm has a 
confidential 
procedure in place for 
employees to report 
any misconduct at 
work 
 
47 86 16 21 19  
 
2.36 
 
 
1.25 24.9% 45.5% 8.5% 11.1% 10.1% 
Our company has an 
effective code of 
conduct in place 
40 62 51 17 19  
 
 
2.54 
 
 
 
1.21 
21.2% 32.8% 27.0% 9.0% 10.1% 
We don't give 
donations to political 
and other unethical 
activities 
29 70 48 24 18  
 
 
2.64 
 
 
 
1.17 
15.3% 37.0% 25.4% 12.7% 9.5% 
 
5.6 PLS: Measurement Model 
In the first instance, the measurement model, also referred to as an outer model in PLS-SEM, needs 
to be assessed. The relationships between latent constructs and their manifest indicators are 
examined to ensure that the items clearly measured the latent constructs they are assigned to and 
this is done through validity and reliability tests. A good measurement model is the starting point for 
any meaningful results from the PLS-SEM algorithm. This study uses reflective latent constructs; 
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therefore, the measurement model is assessed using indicator reliability, composite reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity.  
5.6.1 Indicator Reliability 
Indicators reliability, also is known as outer loadings for reflective items, is assessed and the aim is 
to ensure that all items used in this study shared greater variance with their associated latent 
constructs.  According to Hair Jr et al. (2016), the indicator, also known as an item or manifest 
variable, is reliable only if the loading to its construct meets the threshold of 0.708 (0.7082 = 0.50), 
approximately 0.70. This means a latent construct should explain at least 50 per cent of the 
indicator’s variance.  
At the initial examination of the loadings, the majority of the items load above the critical values of 
0.70. However, three indicators which are chlg4, comt2 and srvc2 were deleted because they have 
poor loadings of 0.513, 0.434, and 0.478 respectively (see Appendix F). All the constructs used in 
this study are reflective which means the latent construct caused the items, not the other way round. 
Unlike formative construct, deleting an item with poor loadings for reflective construct will not change 
the meaning of the construct (Chin, 1998).  
There were minimal items (csrEth5=0.629 and knwlg5=0.636) that had loadings below the threshold 
of 0.70, but they were retained as their removal failed to improve the composite reliability and 
average variance extraction (AVE) of their associate latent variables. Indicators that load below a 
value of 0.70 should be considered for deletion only if that improves the reliability and AVE of the 
latent variables they intend to measure (Chin, 2010). Moreover, low loading is common for a newly 
developed indicator, such as csrEth5. 
Few indicators with poor loadings, specifically those with adverse effects on discriminant validity and 
average variance extraction, were deleted. Subsequent measurement results indicate that all the 
items load above the threshold of 0.70 (see Table 5.14). The only exceptions are csrEth5 and 
knowlg5 which have loadings below the critical value, but without decreasing discriminant validity 
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and AVE of their respective constructs. Moreover, the bootstrapping results show that all the loadings 
are statistically significant at (p < 0.001). 
Table 5.14: Summary of Results from Measurement Model 
Constructs Manifest 
variables 
Outer 
loadings 
Composite 
reliability  
Cronbach’s 
Alpha (CA) 
AVE 
   (CR)   
Board Size Board_size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
      
 CEO Duality Boardlead1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
      
 Board composition Prop_outsidedir 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
      
Board Gender 
diversity 
Prop_femaledir 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
      
Commitment Comt1 0.785 0.882 0.823 0.653 
 Comt3 0.779    
 Comt4 0.842    
 Comt5 0.823    
      
Challenge Chlg1 0.712 0.879 0.827 0.646 
 Chlg2 0.788    
 Chlg3 0.871    
 Chlg5 0.836    
      
Knowledge 
utilisation 
Knwd1 0.712 0.867 0.808 0.569 
 Knwd2 0.842    
 Knwd3 0.726    
 Knwd4 0.834    
 Knwd5 0.636    
      
Control task Contr1 0.702 0.895 0.854 0.632 
 Contr2 0.859    
 Contr3 0.720    
 Contr4 0.842    
 Contr5 0.839    
      
Service task Srvc1 0.875 0.911 0.869 0.719 
 Srvc3 0.852    
 Srvc4 0.788    
 Srvc5 0.872    
      
CSR (legal) CsrLg1 0.746 0.883 0.823 0.654 
 CsrLg2 0.848    
 CsrLg3 0.809    
 CsrLg4 0.828    
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CSR (ethical) CsrEth1 0.854 0.886 0.837 0.611 
 CsrEth2 0.740    
 CsrEth3 0.793    
 CsrEth4 0.868    
 CsrEth5 0.629    
 
5.6.2 Composite Reliability 
The internal consistency reliability of each construct in the model is assessed through composite 
reliability. The major concern is to ensure each set of indicators used to measure their respective 
construct are consistent with each other. The assessment of outer loadings of the items is to ensure 
all indicators are above a critical value of 0.70 and those retained with low loadings do not lead to 
poor composite reliability and AVE. Items for a particular reflective construct should be common with 
each other, this allows internal consistency to be achieved. The internal consistency through 
composite reliability of all constructs used in this study is above the accepted value of 0.70, as 
recommended by the literature. Specifically, the composite reliability of reflective constructs ranged 
from 0.867 to 0.911 (see Table 5.14).  
5.6.3 Convergent Validity 
Validity is mainly concerned with the accuracy of the measurement and convergent validity is the 
extent to which reflective items for a particular variable relate or converge strongly to each other. In 
addition to indicator (outer) loadings, average variance extraction (AVE) is used to assess the 
convergent validity of the latent constructs. The rule of the sum is that an AVE should be 0.50 or 
above, this means more variance are shared between items and their constructs than measurement 
error (Hair Jr et al., 2016). Table 5.14 above shows that all constructs have AVE greater than 0.50. 
5.6.4 Discriminant Validity 
The distinction between constructs used in the same model is essential. If there is no clear 
identifiable difference between variables, it means that there is a problem associated with 
discriminant validity. In such situations, the constructs without clear distinction should be merged or 
else one should be deleted. As directed by Chin (1998), Henseler et al., (2009) and Hair Jr et al., 
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(2016) two approaches were used to assess the discriminant validity in this study, which are the 
Fornell-Larcker criterion and cross-loadings. For the former, the rule is that the square root of AVE 
should be greater than its highest correlation with another construct in the model (Hair Jr et al., 
2016). Table 5.15 below indicates that the square roots of AVE for the latent constructs were higher 
than its highest correlation with any other variable in the model. 
Cross-loadings are used to ensure indicators load higher on their main constructs than any other 
variable (Hair Jr et al., 2016). The cross-loadings analysis conducted (see Table 5.16) shows that 
all manifest variables load greater on their assigned constructs than other variables in the model. 
Taken together, the Fornell-Larcker criterion and cross-loadings tests indicate that each construct 
used in this study clearly represents different phenomenon not covered by another variable, thus 
discriminant validity is achieved. 
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Table 5.15: Results of the Fornell-Larcker Criterion 
 
 Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
             
             
1 Board 
composition 
1.000           
2 Board Size  0.002 1.000          
3 CEO duality  -0.226 -0.289 1.000         
4 CSR (ethical) -0.131 -0.171 -0.053 0.782        
5 CSR (legal) -0.124 -0.203 0.011 0.763 0.809       
6 Challenge  -0.072 -0.049 -0.080 0.258 0.251 0.745      
7 Commitment  -0.086 0.073 -0.031 0.218 0.243 0.187 0.742     
8 Control task  -0.066 -0.207 -0.042 0.451 0.481 0.240 0.136 0.795    
9 Gender 
diversity  
-0.222 0.225 -0.194 -0.092 -0.093 -0.024 0.030 -0.039 1.000   
10 Knowledge 
utilisation 
-0.125 0.080 -0.024 0.452 0.438 0.207 0.169 0.278 -0.102 0.754  
11 Service task -0.091 -0.090 -0.039 0.735 0.679 0.354 0.250 0.420 -0.094 0.447 0.781 
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Table 5.16: Results of the Cross-Loadings 
 Board 
composition 
Board 
size 
CEO 
duality 
CSR 
(ethical) 
CSR 
(legal) 
Challenge Commitment Control 
task 
Gender 
diversity 
Knowledge 
utilisation 
Service 
task 
            
            
Boardlead1 -0.226 -0.289 1.000 -0.053 0.010 -0.049 -0.038 -0.042 -0.194 -0.024 -0.043 
Board size 0.002 1.000 -0.289 -0.171 -0.203 -0.055 0.081 -0.207 0.225 0.080 -0.095 
Prop_NEDs 1.000 0.002 -0.226 -0.132 -0.124 -0.085 -0.096 -0.067 -0.222 -0.125 -0.088 
Propfemale -0.222 0.225 -0.194 -0.092 -0.094 -0.007 0.029 -0.039 1.000 -0.102 -0.095 
Chlg1 0.019 0.048 -0.032 0.079 0.114 0.712 0.085 0.094 -0.115 0.120 0.167 
Chlg2 -0.058 -0.008 -0.075 0.165 0.156 0.788 0.152 0.113 0.000 0.131 0.224 
Chlg3 -0.093 -0.089 0.061 0.188 0.206 0.871 0.145 0.247 -0.028 0.234 0.347 
Chlg5 -0.089 -0.063 -0.121 0.297 0.253 0.836 0.167 0.251 0.054 0.156 0.329 
Cntrl1 0.009 -0.145 0.012 0.331 0.293 0.095 0.091 0.702 -0.081 0.200 0.213 
Cntrl2 -0.101 -0.146 0.006 0.464 0.482 0.255 0.133 0.859 -0.011 0.288 0.481 
Cntrl3 -0.038 -0.141 -0.140 0.271 0.339 0.091 0.068 0.720 -0.017 0.102 0.202 
Cntrl4 -0.050 -0.245 0.003 0.362 0.408 0.236 0.172 0.842 -0.030 0.257 0.410 
Cntrl5 -0.059 -0.141 -0.086 0.325 0.353 0.245 0.041 0.839 -0.034 0.214 0.333 
Cmmt1 -0.061 0.128 -0.049 0.155 0.183 0.122 0.785 0.058 -0.034 0.162 0.148 
Cmmt3 -0.051 -0.010 -0.041 0.187 0.186 0.123 0.779 0.119 -0.032 0.136 0.221 
Cmmt4 -0.066 0.090 -0.007 0.192 0.223 0.174 0.842 0.125 0.021 0.177 0.212 
Cmmt5 -0.125 0.063 -0.031 0.168 0.189 0.145 0.823 0.119 0.122 0.100 0.205 
csrEth1 -0.186 -0.167 0.002 0.854 0.629 0.232 0.274 0.468 -0.071 0.342 0.619 
csrEth2 -0.158 -0.268 0.061 0.740 0.578 0.151 0.072 0.284 -0.018 0.365 0.497 
csrEth3 -0.004 -0.028 -0.101 0.793 0.619 0.229 0.211 0.273 -0.079 0.377 0.604 
csrEth4 -0.134 -0.122 -0.074 0.868 0.649 0.177 0.195 0.396 -0.066 0.426 0.642 
csrEth5 -0.017 -0.102 -0.090 0.629 0.494 0.187 0.055 0.321 -0.130 0.244 0.464 
csrLg1 -0.095 -0.083 0.106 0.602 0.746 0.177 0.126 0.350 -0.036 0.274 0.500 
csrLg2 -0.134 -0.257 0.003 0.630 0.848 0.200 0.212 0.388 -0.086 0.345 0.555 
csrLg3 -0.102 -0.110 -0.007 0.620 0.809 0.233  0.171 0.394 -0.082 0.418 0.591 
csrLg4 -0.071 -0.201 -0.058 0.614 0.828 0.173 0.269 0.422 -0.095 0.370 0.543 
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Knwldg1 -0.109 0.068 0.056 0.290 0.314 0.158 0.086 0.116 -0.013 0.712 0.292 
Knwdg2 -0.082 0.058 -0.064 0.410 0.377 0.213 0.174 0.220 -0.056 0.842 0.433 
Knwdg3 -0.070 0.063 0.038 0.270 0.288 0.095 0.165 0.180 -0.120 0.726 0.257 
Knwdg4 -0.097 0.082 -0.058 0.360 0.364 0.151 0.111 0.244 -0.107 0.834 0.372 
Knwdg5 -0.117 0.029 -0.022 0.344 0.294 0.154 0.122 0.260 -0.082 0.636 0.302 
Srvc1 -0.078 -0.065 -0.078 0.660 0.590 0.293 0.204 0.339 -0.056 0.339 0.875 
Srvc3 -0.074 -0.149 -0.002 0.630 0.580 0.372 0.217 0.446 -0.142 0.416 0.852 
Srvc4 0.008 -0.065 -0.036 0.569 0.533 0.250 0.215 0.348 -0.084 0.362 0.788 
Srvc5 -0.147 -0.039 -0.032 0.610 0.596 0.280 0.200 0.335 -0.040 0.404 0.872 
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5.7 PLS: Structural Model 
After the measurement model is properly assessed and validity and reliability tests are confirmed, 
the structural model is evaluated. Structural model, also known as an inner model in PLS-SEM, 
assesses the hypothesised relationship between constructs in the model. At this stage, path 
coefficients and their significance levels; the level of variance explained by exogenous variables (R2); 
effect size (f2) and predictive relevance (Q2) of the model were assessed. However, prior to 
assessing the structural model, a collinearity test should be conducted. 
5.7.1 Collinearity Test  
Prior to evaluating the structural model, a collinearity test is conducted among each set of 
independent variables in the model. This is necessary as PLS-SEM is built on OLS regressions of 
each independent latent variable on its predictor construct and as such, any extreme levels of 
collinearity among the exogenous variables will produce a meaningless outcome (Hair Jr et al., 
2016).  
In this study, each set of explanatory (board characteristics, board processes, and board task) 
variables are tested for collinearity. Board size, board composition, CEO duality and gender diversity 
serve as predictors of board processes variables. Board commitment, challenge and knowledge 
utilisation are the explanatory variables of board tasks. Finally, the last sets of predictors in this 
model are boards control and service roles, as the exogenous variables that predict corporate social 
responsibility activities. Consistent with the advice given by Hair Jr et al. (2016), a variance inflation 
factor (VIF) above 5.00 is considered as a sign of collinearity. Table 5.17 indicates that none of the 
set of exogenous constructs has VIF above the critical value of 5.00; in fact, none is above 2.00. 
  
 182 
 
Table 5. 17: Results of the Collinearity Test 
Board characteristics 
 
VIF Board processes VIF Board tasks VIF 
Board size 1.128 Commitment 1.055 Control 1.232 
Board composition 1.143 Challenge 1.068 Service 1.322 
CEO Duality 1.206 Knowledge utilisation 1.068   
Gender diversity 1.159     
 
5.7.2 Path Coefficients 
Path coefficient is an estimation of the relationships between exogenous and endogenous constructs 
in a model. Hair Jr et al., (2016) explain that path coefficient has a value between -1 to +1; any 
coefficient close to +1 indicates a positive and strong relationship between the predictor and outcome 
variable. Conversely, a coefficient value approaching -1 means a negative and strong relationship 
and values at 0 levels show a weak and usually insignificant relationship between exogenous and 
endogenous constructs.  
Bootstrapping technique, a non-parametric test, is used in PLS-SEM to assess significance level of 
the estimated path coefficients. This bootstrapping technique is employed to test the significance 
level of both loadings and path coefficients in this study. To ensure the stability of the results 
obtained, 5000 subsamples suggested by many authors (such as Hair Jr et al., 2016) have been 
selected. Table 5.18 shows the results of path coefficients and a significance level of each 
coefficient. 
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Table 5.18: Results of the Path Coefficients and Significance Levels 
 
 
Relationships Path 
coefficient 
t-Value Significance 
level 
    
    
Board size → challenge -0.078 0.844 i/s 
Board size  → commitment 0.072 0.806 i/s 
Board size  → knowledge utilisation 0.099 1.260 i/s 
CEO duality → challenge -0.105 1.104 i/s 
CEO duality → commitment -0.046 0.647 i/s 
CEO duality → knowledge utilisation -0.071 0.787 i/s 
Gender diversity → challenge -0.036 0.403 i/s 
Genedr diversity → commitment -0.020 0.189 i/s 
Gender diversity → knowledge utilisation -0.178 2.314 ** 
Board composition → challenge -0.116 1.410 * 
Board composition → commitment -0.111 1.224 i/s 
Board composition → knowledge utilisation -0.181 2.307 ** 
Challenge → control task 0.186 2.202 ** 
Challenge → service task 0.252 3.372 *** 
Commitment → control task 0.060 0.813 i/s 
Commitment → service task 0.136 1.821 * 
Knowledge utilisation → control task 0.228 2.761 ** 
Knowledge utilisation → servicetask  0.372 4.989 *** 
Control task → CSR (ethical) 0.166 2.767 ** 
Control task → CSR (legal) 0.231 2.987 ** 
Service task → CSR (ethical) 0.657 10.983 *** 
Service task → CSR (legal) 0.578 7.333 *** 
***P<0.001, *P<0.05, *P<0.10, i/n= insignificant    
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5.7.2.1 Path Coefficients between Board Characteristics and Board Processes 
Figure 5.6 below and table 5.18 above indicate that the majority of the board characteristics variables 
in this study have inconclusive effects on a board’s level of commitment. Specifically, board gender 
diversity (β = -0.020) and board composition (β = -0.111) have negative, but weak relationships on 
board level of commitment. Similarly, CEO duality (β = -0.046) is found to have a negative, but 
insignificant effect on board commitment. The only board characteristic that shows a different 
directional relationship with commitment is board size as it has a positive (inconclusive) effect on 
board level of commitment (β = 0.072).  
The path coefficient from CEO duality to board level of challenge (β = -0.105) is negative, but not 
statistically significant and board size has a similar negative effect on the board level of challenge (β 
= - 0.078). Similarly, gender board diversity (β = - 0.036) is found to have a negative, but weak 
association with challenge. However, board composition (β = - 0.116, t = 1.410) is found to have a 
negative and statistically significant (at 0.10 level) effect on board level of challenge.   
Results from the path coefficient show that board gender diversity has a negative and strong 
relationship with knowledge utilisation (β = - 0.178) at 0.05 significant level. Similarly, board 
composition has a strong and negative path coefficient linking to knowledge utilisation (β = - 0.181) 
at 0.05 significant level. However, the relationship between CEO duality leadership structure and the 
ability of the board to utilise knowledge available (β = - 0.071) is negative, but not statistically 
significant. Interestingly, a large board size (β = 0.099) is found to have a positive, but inconclusive 
influence on board knowledge utilisation. 
5.7.2.2 Path Coefficients between Board Processes and Board Task 
The PLS-SEM algorithm results of path coefficient between board processes variables (commitment, 
challenge and knowledge utilisation) and board task illustrate the importance of this processes 
variables on board-level effectiveness. Two of the board processes have an important influence on 
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board control task. Specifically, board challenge (β = 0.186) and knowledge utilisation (β = 0.228) 
have positive and strong path coefficients on the board control task at 0.05 significant levels. 
However, board level of commitment is found to have a positive, but weak effect on control task (β 
= 0.060).  
All the board processes variables in this study have a strong effect on board service task. 
Specifically, board level of commitment is found to have a positive and sufficient influence on board 
service task (β = 0.136) at 0.05 significant level. Similarly, levels of challenge (β = 0.252) and 
knowledge utilisation (β = 0.372) are positively and strongly related to board service task at 0.001 
significant levels. 
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Figure 5.6: Results of Measurement Model and Structural Model 
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5.7.2.3 Path Coefficient between Board task and CSR  
The results from the path coefficient analysis evince that both board tasks (control and service) have 
greater influences on corporate social responsibility related to legal activities. Board control task is 
found to influence CSR legal activities positively and strongly (β = 0.231) at 0.05 significant level. 
Additionally, service task path coefficient to CSR (legal) is strong and positive (β = 0.578) at 0.001 
significant level.  
Similar to relationships between board roles and CSR (legal), board control and service tasks have 
strong and positive path coefficients on CSR (ethical) activities. Precisely, board control task (β = 
0.166) and service task (β = 0.657) all have a positive and powerful effect on CSR (ethical) with 
significant levels of 0.05 and 0.001 respectively. 
5.7.3 Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
The coefficient of determination is the amount of variance in the endogenous variables that is 
explained by the associated exogenous construct(s). PLS-SEM is an analysis tool that focuses on 
the predictive relevance of the model and a higher level of R2 means a greater level of predictive 
accuracy. However, it is worth mentioning that there is no standard guide or threshold on an 
acceptable level of R2, as it largely depends on the model complexity and the research area  (Hair 
Jr et al., 2016). As a guide, R2 of 10 to 20 per cent are considered as acceptable in social science 
studies (Gaur and Gaur, 2006). Due to the complexity of this study, R2 of 0.10 and above are 
considered to be acceptable. Table 5.19 below shows the variance explained of independent 
variables on their respective dependent variables. 
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Table 5.19: Results of the R Squares 
Construct R2  
  
  
CSR (ethical) 
 
0.554  
CSR (legal) 
 
0.503  
Challenge  
 
0.020  
Commitment  
 
0.018  
Knowledge utilisation 
 
0.050  
Control task 
 
0.117  
Service task  0.290  
 
5.7.3.1 Coefficient of Determination for Board Processes Variables 
The R2 of 0.018 for the commitment latent construct indicated that the exogenous variables 
accounted for only 1.8 per cent. As the R2 is less than 10 per cent, the board characteristics (board 
size, CEO duality, board composition, and gender diversity) as exogenous variables failed to have 
greater effects on the endogenous construct. These board characteristics explained little variance 
on board level of commitment. This clearly indicates that other variables or factors determine board 
processes, not board characteristics. 
Table 5.19 above shows that only 0.020 variances of the challenge latent construct is explained by 
the independent variables (board size, board composition, CEO duality and board gender diversity). 
The independent variables influence the outcome construct with 2.0 per cent below the 10 to 20 per 
cent acceptable R2 values set above. This is another failure of board size, board composition, board 
gender diversity and CEO duality to account for sufficient variances of one of the board process 
variable (challenge). 
Similar to other board processes variables, board characteristics as predictor variables have less 
influence on knowledge utilisation. Only 0.050 variances are explained by the exogenous variables, 
which mean that 5.0 per cent (a meagre) of the variance in knowledge utilisation is explained by 
 189 
 
board size, board composition, gender diversity and CEO duality. Other factors, rather than board 
characteristics account for 95.0 per cent R2 of knowledge utilisation. 
In summary, board commitment, challenge and knowledge utilisation were not sufficiently influenced 
by exogenous constructs (board size, CEO duality, board composition and gender diversity), as all 
the R2 of the endogenous variables are below the 10 per cent. This means that other factors, rather 
than the predictor variables, explained more variance in board processes variables. 
5.7.3.2 Coefficient of Determination for Board Tasks  
Board processes variables serve as the exogenous variables that predict board service task and 
control task in this model. The R2 value of 0.117 for board control task indicates that board processes 
variables were able to marginally influence board control task. Board level of commitment, challenge 
and knowledge utilisation were able to explain 11.7 per cent of the total variance of the endogenous 
variable (control task). Moreover, the R2 of 0.290 for board service task evinces the extent to which 
board commitment, challenge and knowledge utilisation influence board service task. The predictor 
variables explained 29 per cent of the total variance of the outcome variable. 
5.7.3.3 Coefficient of Determination for CSR  
Board control task and service task serve as the predictor variables and corporate social 
responsibility related to legal and ethical activities are the dependent variables. The independent 
variables were able to sufficiently account for 0.503 variances of the dependent variable (corporate 
social responsibility (legal) activities). This means that the direct influence of board control and 
service tasks, plus the indirect effect of board processes latent constructs account for 50 per cent of 
the total variance of CSR (legal) activities. 
The R2 value of 0.554 demonstrates how important the independent variables (board control and 
service tasks) are on the dependent variables (CSR (ethical) activities). The direct impact of board 
tasks and indirect effects of board processes variables explained 55 per cent of the total variance of 
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CSR (ethical) activities. Therefore, board control and service tasks are good predictors of corporate 
social responsibility related to legal activities. 
5.7.4 Effect Size (f2) 
In addition to assessing the values of coefficient of determination (R2) of all the endogenous 
constructs in the model, the effect size of each exogenous variable on their respective outcome 
variables has been examined. In other words, changes in the R2 values of each dependent construct 
is observed to determine if a particular predictor variable is omitted, in order to know the magnitude 
effect of that independent variable. The effect sizes of exogenous variables are calculated using the 
f2 formula discussed in chapter five. Table 5.20 shows the effect size of each independent variable 
on its associated outcome variable. As observed above, the variances of board processes explained 
by the board characteristics are not that significant, therefore, calculations of effect size are 
meaningless.  
For key determinants of board task, knowledge utilisation is the most important variable that 
explained control role (f2 = 0.049) and service role (f2 = 0.129), followed by board level of challenge 
with effect sizes of 0.033 and 0.058 for control and service tasks respectively. Board level of 
commitment is the least important variable to explain control task (f2 = 0.004) and service task (f2 = 
0.018). 
The coefficient of determination for corporate social responsibility activities related to legal and 
ethical are greatly influenced by service task with an effect size of 0.271 and 0.323 respectively. 
Board control task is less important than service task in regard to CSR activities, as it has an effect 
size of 0.042 for CSR legal activities and 0.022 for CSR ethical dimension. 
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Table 5.20: Results of Effect Size 
Endogenous 
construct 
Variable excluded R2 Included R2 Excluded Effect size (f2) 
 
     
Control task Commitment  0.117 0.113 0.004 
 Challenge  0.117 0.084 0.033 
 Knowledge 
utilisation 
0.117 0.068 0.049 
     
Service task  Commitment  0.290 0.272 0.018 
 Challenge  0.290 0.232 0.058 
 Knowledge 
utilisation 
0.290 0.161 0.129 
     
CSR (legal) Control task  0.503 0.461 0.042 
 Service task 0.503 0.232 0.271 
     
CSR (ethical) Control task  0.554 0.532 0.022 
 Service task 0.554 0.231 0.323 
 
5.7.5 Predictive Relevance (Q2) 
In addition to evaluating the R2 values for model predictive relevance, the study also examines the 
Stone-Geisser Q2 value by using the blindfolding procedure mentioned in chapter five. This measure 
assesses the model’s predictive validity through sample re-use (Chin, 1998), it predicts the data 
points of reflective dependent variables, but is not applicable to formative endogenous construct 
(Hair Jr et al., 2016). This technique is appropriate as this study uses only reflective dependent latent 
variables.  
Q2 values greater than zero indicate that the inner model has a predictive relevance, while values 
less than zero imply a lack of predictive relevance (Henseler et al., 2009). An omission distance (d) 
of 6 is used to test the predictive capability of the model used in this study. Results from the 
blindfolding procedure show that control task (Q2=0.057), service task (Q2=0.170) and CSR ethical 
(Q2=0.280), as well as  CSR legal (Q2=0.269) activities have adequate predictive relevance. 
However, board commitment (Q2=0.001), challenge (Q2=0.009) and knowledge utilisation 
(Q2=0.020) have modest predictive relevance. 
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Table 5.21 demonstrates the results of the blindfolding procedure test conducted on all endogenous 
reflective constructs (board processes, board task and CSR) in the model. The Q2 for board 
processes, board tasks and corporate social responsibility activities related to legal and ethical 
ranged from 0.001 to 0.280.  
Table 5.21: Results of the Predictive Relevance 
Latent construct Q2  
  
CSR (ethical) 
 
0.280  
CSR (legal) 
 
0.269  
Challenge  
 
0.009  
Commitment  
 
0.001  
Knowledge utilisation 
 
0.020  
Control task 
 
0.057  
Service task 0.170  
 
5.8 Summary  
This chapter presents the research findings generated from the analysis conducted. Firstly, the 
chapter discusses the descriptive analysis, this involves respondents’ background, and frequencies, 
means and standard deviations of all variables included in this model. Secondly, the chapter 
presents the results of the measurement model which assesses the reliability and validity of the 
research constructs. Finally, this chapter presents the results generated from the structural model 
analysis, which involves path coefficients, the coefficient of determination (R2), effect size (f2) and 
predictive relevance (Q2) of the model. The next chapter discusses the results in relation to the 
research hypothesis, context, theories and previous empirical findings. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The main aim of this study is to investigate board effectiveness beyond the traditional direct input-
output approach. Specifically, the relationships between board characteristics, board processes, 
board task and corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities are examined. The 
research is conducted in order to fully investigate board effectiveness beyond the demographic 
variables (usual suspects). The previous chapter presents the study findings. The current chapter 
discusses those findings in relations to the existing studies, theories, and study context. This final 
chapter starts by presenting the research overview (section 6.1), followed by presenting and 
discussions of the research findings (section 6.2). Section 6.3 highlights the research contributions 
and section 6.4 discusses the research implication for policymakers. In section 6.5, the research 
limitations were offered and directions for future scholars were highlighted. In the end, concluding 
remarks were presented in section 6.5. 
6.1 Research Overview 
This study examines the relationships between board characteristics (the usual suspects) and board 
processes; board processes and board task; board task and corporate social responsibility activities. 
Moreover, the indirect effects of board processes and board task have been examined.  The current 
study realised that a single theory will not be appropriate to fully capture all board roles and directors’ 
functioning and behaviours; therefore, following the advice given by Roberts et al., (2005) and 
Nielsen and Huse (2010), the agency, resource dependency, and stakeholders theories have been 
employed to serve as the research theoretical framework in order to fully examine board 
effectiveness. 
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This research provides evidence of board effectiveness with sample data collected from directors of 
firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, a developing country where corporate governance is 
in its developmental stage. An existing framework was adopted, amended and extended to suit the 
context under study. Hypotheses were developed and tested using partial least squares structural 
equation modeling. Board characteristics considered for this study are those referred to as the ‘usual 
suspects’ (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004) which are: board composition, board size, CEO duality and 
gender diversity. These ‘usual suspects’ have been heavily researched and are assumed to have a 
direct effect on firm performance. However, empirical findings of these variables are inconclusive 
(Daily et al., 2003). Nevertheless, these board structures are important mechanisms to consider in 
any serious board effectiveness research; for this reason, the current study includes these ‘common 
suspects’ and employed a different approach (through board processes) to fully understand their 
impact on board effectiveness.  
Board processes variables considered in this research include board commitment (effort norms), 
challenge (cognitive conflict) and knowledge utilisation. Board service and control tasks are the two 
major board roles used in board literature and were employed in this study to serve as a proxy for 
board-level effectiveness. As an extension to the existing framework, this study investigates the 
relationship between board task and corporate social responsibility activities. Rather than including 
all dimensions of the CSR pyramid developed by Carroll (1991), legal and ethical CSR 
responsibilities serve as the dependent variables in this study. These areas of CSR are generally 
neglected in Nigeria. Moreover, Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) criticised previous literature for 
focusing too much on positive CSR and neglecting the negative CSR, such as legal and ethical 
dimensions. It is essential for firms to be aware of such negative CSR activities that are likely to 
attract costs, such as fines, reputational loss, employee motivation and product boycott.  
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The researcher starts by understanding (exploring) the board processes and board task variables 
that are applicable in the Nigerian context. A theoretical framework (Figure 3.7), developed by 
Forbes and Milliken in 1999 and empirically tested in a small number of developed nations (see for 
example, Wan and Ong, 2005 and Bettinelli, 2011) was adopted, amended, expanded and tested 
empirically in Nigeria. Semi-structured interviews were initially conducted with seven directors of 
companies listed on the NSE, in order to ensure the final framework suited the context under study 
and could sufficiently answer the research questions. The interviews conducted resulted in making 
amendments to the initial framework (see Figure 3.8) and a number of items were developed, which 
are employed to measure certain latent variables used in the final framework. 
The quantitative analysis conducted in this study using partial least squares structural equation 
modeling (PLS-SEM), as an analysis tool, presented interesting findings. The researcher 
hypothesised that board characteristics (board size, board composition and gender diversity) have 
an important influence on board processes variables (commitment, challenge and knowledge 
utilisation), while non-separation of duties between CEO and Chairperson would have no significant 
impact on board processes variables. Moreover, the study predicted that board processes would 
have a strong influence on board task, which consequently improves corporate social responsibility 
(legal and ethical) activities.  
6.2 Results and discussion  
The results obtained from the measurement and structural model were presented in the previous 
sections. In this section, results of the hypotheses are presented and discussed in relation to the 
research context, theories, and previous empirical findings. The hypotheses were developed and 
tested in order to identify the relationships between board characteristics, board processes, board 
task and corporate social responsibility activities related to legal and ethical dimensions. Summary 
of the findings from hypotheses being tested, are presented in table 6.2. Thirteen out of the twenty-
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five hypotheses are confirmed and accepted, while two are partially accepted and ten of the 
remaining hypotheses were not confirmed, and consequently rejected  
6.2.1 Board Characteristics and Board Processes 
The first sets of hypotheses are developed to answer the first research question formulated in 
chapter one, which investigates the influence of board characteristics on board processes variables. 
Research question number one asks: what is the relationship between board characteristics and 
board processes of the Nigerian listed firms? This involves examination of the effects of board size, 
board composition, board gender diversity, and CEO duality on board commitment, challenge and 
knowledge utilisation. Findings in this regard are discussed in this section. 
The SEC (2011) Code prescribes board size not to be less than five but more importantly, “of a 
sufficient size relative to the scale of complexity of the company’s operation” (p.9). Thus, the Nigerian 
governance system encourages firms to have board size suitable to their activities but the size 
should not be too small. The expectation is that appropriate board size improves corporate 
performance. However, the current study did not find relevancy of board size on board processes 
which consequently enhances corporate performance. H1a of this study predicted a positive 
relationship between board size and level of challenge among directors. However, the result shows 
a negative, but insignificant effect of the predictor variable on the outcome variable (β = - 0.078, t = 
0.886, p > 0.10). Therefore, the analysis shows no support for the hypothesis. H1b assumed a 
negative impact between board size and board level of commitment and H1c predicts a negative 
influence of board size on knowledge utilisation. In contrast to the hypotheses, the study finds 
inconclusive results, as the impact of board size on board level of commitment (β = 0.072, t = 0.806, 
p > 0.10) and knowledge utilisation (β = 0.099, t = 1.345, p = > 0.10) are positive, but not statistically 
significant. Similar to H1a, H1b and H1c are not confirmed. 
In summary, results of the analysis show that board size has no significant influence on board 
processes variables. This is an interesting finding because, ideally, a large board is expected to 
present diverse knowledge, experience, opinions and ideas in the boardroom, which consequently 
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is expected to trigger series of disagreements and conflict among board members, as well as 
difficulties in apprehending and using the knowledge available effectively (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999).  
Although the findings are not statistically significant, some possible explanations for the directional 
signs contrary to the expectations will be offered. A potential explanation for this positive (instead of 
negative), but inconclusive relationship between board size and knowledge utilisation, and board 
size and commitment found in this study, is that Nigerian boards are not large enough for the size to 
adversely affect the level of cohesiveness. The descriptive analysis conducted in this study shows 
that the average and median board size of the Nigerian board are 9.36  and 9 respectively, which is 
quite within the range of what is considered a normal board size of 10 for an effective board (Ntim et 
al., 2017). Moreover, the Nigerian directors may offer less diverse knowledge and expertise, as they 
are likely to be excessively submissive to powerful directors (for example, CEOs) for directions. The 
negative, but non-significant influence found between board size and board challenge testifies to the 
notion that directors of the Nigerian firms are not too involved in questioning and challenging 
managerial activities. 
The separation of duties between chief executive and chairperson is recognised widely and 
supported by many corporate governance codes, established in numerous countries, including 
Nigeria. Section 5.1b of the Nigerian SEC code (2011) governance code recommends that the 
position of Chairman and CEO shall be separated. The intention is to avoid a situation whereby one 
single individual (CEO) becomes too powerful and makes the other board members ‘bench 
warmers’, dependent and submissive. Agency theory postulates for a clear division of ownership 
and control (Berle and Means, 1932), so that check and balance can be guaranteed. Proponents of 
this theory believe that it is necessary to separate these two important roles, where the CEO leads 
the day to day activities of the firm, while the chairperson leads the board, as such the board would 
be independent of the executives.  
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However, in the Nigerian context, the separation of these two most important positions does not 
really matter. Although, the majority of the Nigerian listed firms complied with the corporate 
governance code requirement and exercised CEO non-duality, actual board independence is not 
guaranteed. Cases exist where CEOs are promoted to chairmen of the same firm among these listed 
firms (Adegbite, 2015), which results in total domination of the firm’s affairs by these 
CEOs/Chairmen. Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) argue that for any benefits to be derived from CEO 
non-duality, the chairman should be a completely outside independent director. The current study 
shows some support for this argument, as hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c predicted non-significant 
relationships between CEO duality and board level of commitment, challenge and knowledge 
utilisation in the boardroom. The results from the structural model show that CEO duality is 
negatively, but insignificantly related to board commitment (β = -0.046, t = 0.647, p > 0.10), board 
level of challenge (β = -0.105, t = 1.104, p > 0.10) and board ability to utilise knowledge available in 
the boardroom (β = - 0.071, t = 0.787, p > 0.10). 
The relationship between duality leadership structure and these board processes variables are all 
statistically insignificant, as predicted.  Therefore, the hypotheses predicting the insignificant effect 
of board leadership structure in the Nigerian context are confirmed. Thus, H3a, H3b and H3c are all 
supported. In Nigeria, CEO duality may have insignificant relationships with all board processes 
variables because it is likely there is no real independence between the two positions.  
Recently, board gender diversity is another area that has received greater attention in the corporate 
governance literature. Corporations are increasingly appointing female directors on their boards, 
even in Nigeria there is some progress in this regard. Some scholars opine that female directors 
improve open debate (Nielsen and Huse, 2010), increase efforts in board activities (Broadbridge et 
al., 2006), add diverse knowledge in the boardroom (Zhang et al., 2013), advance the firm’s 
reputation (Bear et al., 2010) and overall CSR activities (Harjoto et al., 2015). However, the benefits 
of including female directors on the board are still ambiguous. This study finds that board gender 
diversity hinders knowledge utilisation significantly, but is statistically insignificantly related to board 
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challenge and commitment. H4a predicted that a proportion of women directors on the board improve 
boards’ level of commitment. H4b proposed that board gender diversity has a positive effect on board 
level of challenge and H4c hypothesised a negative relationship between board gender diversity and 
knowledge utilisation. The results from PLS-SEM algorithm only show support for H4c. board gender 
diversity have negative, but weak relationships on board level of commitment (β = -0.020, t = 0.189, 
p > 0.10) and board challenge (β = - 0.036, t = 0.403, p = 0.10). Moreover, the results show that a 
proportion of female directors on the board has a negative and significant effect on knowledge 
utilisation (β = - 0.178, t = 2.314, p < 0.05). 
Therefore, this study concludes that board gender diversity is a detriment to board processes or at 
least not a key determinant of board processes, which in turn hinder board task and consequently 
decrease CSR activities. This finding is aligned with the discoveries of  Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle 
(2015) who found that a female proportion on the board of NHS Foundation Trusts (NHS FTs) in 
England did not influence the service quality. 
A potential explanation for these findings could be the lack of a rigorous and transparent appointment 
process, as the majority of women (and men) directors are not appointed based on merit. Research 
evidence has shown that most of the women directors on the boards of Nigerian corporations are 
appointed based on personal ties and not because of competencies (Ujunwa, 2012). Thus, their 
abilities to challenge opinions of other dominant actors, ask probing questions, provide and utilise 
knowledge and expertise are in doubt. Additionally, female directors in Nigeria may not necessarily 
possess different experience and knowledge from their male counterparts. Huse et al. (2009) point 
out that only women with different knowledge and skills with their male counterpart are able to 
enhance board effectiveness. 
Moreover, very few numbers of women are appointed on the board of the Nigerian listed firms. Most 
of the participants in this survey indicate that their boards have a single female director (see Chapter 
5) and for any positive benefits of women inclusion on the board to manifest, a substantial number 
is required, rather than a token. Bear et al., (2010) argue that the influence of proportion of female 
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directors is more salient when their numbers increase and have a more assertive, rather than 
minority voice. Jia and Zhang (2013) also concluded that multiple women, as opposed to a single 
woman, are more beneficial to quality decision making. 
Board composition is the most debated and researched corporate governance topic. Post corporate 
scandals, various countries, including Nigeria, have focused more attention on board composition 
with emphasis on the proportion of NEDs on the board. The Nigerian corporate governance code 
emphasises that firms to have a board with majority board members to be NEDs and at least one to 
be an independent non-executive director. Nigerian firms are actually complying with the corporate 
governance code, as the majority of the board members are non-executive directors. The proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board is believed to address agency problems that may arise and 
provide critical resources, which in turn improves firm performance. This study predicts that an 
adequate proportion of outside directors improve board level of commitment, challenge and 
knowledge utilisation, which consequently lead to board-level and firm-level effectiveness. 
Specifically, H2a hypothesised a positive impact between board composition and board level of 
commitment, H2b proposed a positive relationship between board composition and level of challenge 
in the boardroom and H2c predicted board composition to have a positive effect on knowledge 
utilisation. However, in contrast to the study’s hypotheses, the results from the structural model 
indicate that the proportion of NEDs (as proxy for board composition) has a negative effect on 
commitment (β = - 0.081, t = 0.661, p > 0.10), but not statistically significant. Moreover, board 
composition is found to have negative and significant influence on challenge among directors (β = - 
0.116, t = 1,410, p < 0.10), and knowledge utilisation in the boardroom (β = -0.181, t = 2.307, p < 
0.05). These findings contradict the study hypotheses. Thus, H2a, H2b and H2c are all rejected.  
These findings could be attributed to the fact that NEDs of Nigerian boards lack independence. Okike 
(2007) reports that boards lack independence in Nigeria, as CEOs and chairmen appoint their family 
and friends as board members. For NEDs to be active, committed, and critical in opinions and 
effective in information usage, they should be completely independent from the influence of the CEO 
and should feel free to speak their minds. Westphal and Bednar (2005) explain that the lack of 
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independence of directors is the main reason they cannot challenge the CEOs opinions about the 
viability of the existing strategy. Appointing incompetent and unqualified persons as NEDs in Nigeria 
(Ehikioya, 2009) is likely to be another factor that makes outside directors ineffective in Nigeria.  
Another potential explanation for the lack of significant effect between outside directors and these 
board processes variables, is what Westphal and Bednar (2005) call, ‘pluralistic ignorance’. 
Pluralistic ignorance is a psychological bias, whereby each director is reluctant to raise concerns or 
disagree with opinions and ideas due to fear that their contribution may be rejected by other board 
members. This situation is worse where the directors lack independence. Each director is scared to 
make contributions which are against the opinions of the CEO who determines their appointments 
and remunerations. 
In summary, this study predicts that board characteristics have significant and direct effects on the 
board processes variable and an indirect impact on board-level effectiveness, which consequently 
influences corporate social responsibility activities. However, the findings indicate that these board 
structures either have adverse effects or an insignificant effect on board processes variables which 
indirectly do not have any meaningful influence on board-level and firm-level effectiveness. Board 
commitment, challenge and knowledge utilisation were not sufficiently influenced by the independent 
variable (board size, CEO duality, board composition and gender diversity) as assumed, as all the 
R2 of the endogenous variables are below 10 per cent. 
6.2.2 Board Processes and Board Tasks 
As there is no unanimity on the direct effect of board structure on firm performance from previous 
studies, board researchers have recently shifted their focus on opening the ‘black box’ to investigate 
the influence of board processes on board task effectiveness. This is what the current study does by 
addressing the second research question raised in chapter one. This research question intends to 
investigate the empirical relationship between board processes and board task (control and service 
tasks) in the Nigerian context. The results of the analysis to address this question are discussed in 
this section. 
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Six hypotheses were developed to test the relationship between board processes variable and board 
tasks effectiveness. The board level of commitment was proposed to have a positive influence on 
control (H5a) and service task (H5b); challenge was predicted to influence control task (H5c) and 
service task positively (H5d) and knowledge utilisation was assumed to have a positive relationship 
with control role (H5e) and service task (H5f).  
Results from the structural model fully supported H5c and H5d, as board level of challenge positively 
and significantly influence board control task (β = 0.186, t = 2.202, p < 0.05) and service task (β = 
0.252, t = 3.372, p < 0.001). Similarly, H5e and H5f are confirmed, as knowledge utilisation in the 
boardroom is found to have a positive and strong effect on control task (β = 0.228, t = 2.761, p < 
0.05) and service task (β = 0.372, t = 4.989, p < 0.001). However, board level of commitment is only 
significantly related to service task (β = 0.136, t = 1.821, p < 0.10), not control task. The relationship 
between commitment and control task is positive, but not statistically significant. Thus, H5a is 
supported, while H5b is rejected.  This supports, as well as contradicts Payne et al., (2009) research 
which reports that maximum time spent on activities by directors have a positive and significant effect 
on both board control and service tasks.  
The insignificant result found on the relationship between board commitment and control task could 
be that Nigerian directors are more active in providing resources to the firm, than monitoring the 
activities of powerful CEOs. It is probable directors are appointed on the board due to their closeness 
to the CEO and personal connections in the society, as such the oversight function of the board, 
required by agency theory, may be weak, but more emphasis is given to other roles, such as strategy, 
link to society as well as advice and counsel (as desired by resource dependency theory) which are 
directly related to board service task.  Recently, a study in New Zealand evinces that directors have 
started to realise the importance of other roles, such as service task, rather than the control role 
emphasised by agency theory (Ingley and Van Der Walt, 2005). 
Other board processes variables (challenge and knowledge utilistion) have a positive and statistically 
significant influence on both board tasks (control and service). Specifically, directors’ ability to ask 
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questions, disagree with opinions and ideas related to work presented by other board members 
improves both effective control and provision of resources needed for the firm. These board 
processes were found to have have greater influence on board control and service tasks. 
Specifically, board level of challenge and knowledge utilisation were able to explain 11.7 and 0.290 
per cent of the total variances of the control and service roles, respectively. This contradicts works 
of Minichilli et al., (2012) and Zona and Zattoni (2007) that failed to find any significant effect of 
cognitive conflict (challenge) on the board roles. However, the findings are consistent with previous 
board research in Italy that reported the positive and significant relationship between cognitive 
conflict (challenge) and board monitoring and service/strategy tasks  (Zattoni et al., 2015).  
 
This study’s finding indicates that proper use of knowledge available in the boardroom assists boards 
in monitoring and provision of resources to the firm. In other words, a clear division of labour among 
board members, access to information available by all directors and coordination of available 
knowledge are all key determinants of board task effectiveness. This is similar to what other board 
processes scholars have reported (Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Minichilli et al., 
2012). Similarly, Andrés‐Alonso et al. (2010) reported that the availability of diverse knowledge, 
experience in the boardroom and active engagement attitudes of directors to utilise knowledge 
improved efficiency (effective resource allocations) of 119 Spanish Foundations.  
6.2.3 Board Tasks and Corporate Social Responsibility  
The importance of linking corporate governance with corporate social responsibility has been 
documented by various authors (such as Jamali et al., 2008; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). A large 
number of the past scandals were attributed to the ‘cutting-corners’, unethical and irresponsible 
behaviors of directors. These directors targeted higher short-term economic performance, which is 
directly linked to their remuneration. Nowadays, companies have started to realise that much 
emphasis on long-term, rather than short-term, performance should be given attention and this can 
be achieved through long-term strategies initiatives, such as CSR programmes.   
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Stakeholder theory posits that an effective board should be able to consider the interest of various 
groups, rather than shareholders alone. The theory contends that firms should operate socially, 
ethically and morally for the benefits of all those that affect or can be affected by the activities of the 
corporation (Freeman, 1984). This study investigates the link between board task and corporate 
social responsibility (ethical and legal) activities directly. In this regard, a specific research question 
formulated in this study is:  to what extent do board tasks influence corporate social responsibility 
(legal and ethical) activities in the context of the Nigerian listed firms? Moreover, the indirect effects 
of board task on the relationships between board processes and corporate social responsibility are 
also investigated.  
As the previous studies on CSR received criticism on the basis of combining negative and positive 
CSR or neglecting negative CSR (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011), this thesis concentrates on 
negative CSR (ethical and legal) social responsibility activities. The relationships between each 
board task and each dimension of negative CSR are examined.  
A series of hypotheses were developed and tested to find the relationships between board tasks and 
corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities. H6a and H6b predicted that board control 
task has a positive influence on CSR legal and CSR ethical activities. The structural model and 
bootstrapping test show full support for both H6a and H6b. Board control task is found to have a 
positive and significant effect on CSR legal (β = 0.231, t = 2.987, p < 0.05) and CSR ethical (β = 
0.166, t = 2.767, p < 0.05) activities. 
Hypotheses 7a and 7b predicted that board service task improves CSR legal and CSR ethical 
activities respectively. The analysis fully confirmed both H7a and H7b; the path coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant. Service task has a positive and strong effect on CSR legal (β = 
0.578, t = 7.333, p < 0.001) and CSR ethical (β = 0.657, t = 10.983, p < 0.001) activities. This clearly 
demonstrates that the ability of board members to perform control and service tasks effectively leads 
to better corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities. 
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The results of R squares indicate that board control and service tasks account for 50 and 55per cent 
of the total variances of CSR legal and ethical activities, respectively. Moreover, consistent with the 
research hypotheses, the results show that board control and service roles have important 
explanatory power on legal and ethical corporate social responsibility activities. This is an interesting 
finding, as the result contradicts the classic agency theory perspective. The theory views the board 
as an internal monitoring mechanism, which mitigates the utility maximisation of the agent, and 
upholds the main aim to maximise shareholders’ wealth, which is consistent with the classical 
economy argument of Milton Friedman. In this regard, expenditures related to CSR are considered 
as a waste of corporate assets and not in the best interest of the shareholders. Therefore, effective 
board control task should mitigate CSR activities. In a recent study from China, it was found that 
board structure designed based on conventional agency theory have insignificant relations with 
corporate social responsibility performance (Lau et al., 2016). Moreover, Brown et al., (2006) argue 
that firms with a greater proportion of outside directors reduce cash contribution to charity. However, 
it is essential to note that agency theory does not only address the agency problems that arise in a 
principal-agent relationship, rather it also intends to minimise shareholder-stakeholders conflict that 
may arise (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Raelin and Bondy, 2013). 
Ideally the board monitoring role is directly linked to short-term performance, rather than long-term 
performance (Melkumov et al., 2015). However, this study’s findings show otherwise, as control task 
is positively (weakly) linked with CSR which likely leads to long-term performance. This means that 
the higher the monitoring capabilities of the board, the more the firm engages in corporate social 
responsibility (ethical and legal) activities. A potential explanation for this positive effect of control 
role on CSR is that it is likely main concern of the directors of the Nigerian listed firms is to maximise 
profit, as a result they engage in monitoring of the executives to ensure the firm operates in an ethical 
and responsible manner, so as to avoid violation of laws and other unethical activities that could 
reduce profits through undesirable consequences, such as payments of fines, penalties and loss of 
corporate reputation. Thus, Nigerian boards may likely view CSR as a strategy that improves the 
firms’ financial performance and shareholders’ funds (Hong et al., 2016), especially in the long-term. 
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Therefore, in this study, effective board control role is linked positively with CSR activities. This is 
consistent with the study of Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) that find positive influences of control 
mechanisms (such as the proportion of NEDs) on CSR disclosure of South African non-financial 
listed firms. 
As mentioned earlier, like board control task, service role has a significant influence on corporate 
social responsibility on both ethical and legal dimensions. However, the influence of service task on 
CSR activities is stronger than that of control task. This is not surprising as advice and counsel, 
strategy formulation and provision of critical resources are expected to strongly relate to corporate 
social responsibility. This is consistent with the findings of other researchers, such as Zhang et al., 
(2013), Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Oh et al., (2006). Taking stakeholders and resource provisions 
perspectives, boards are expected to serve as ‘boundary spanners’ in which the interest of various 
stakeholder groups are satisfied and at the same time co-opt critical resources and reputation from 
the society to the firm. As such, it is quite possible that the more service task provided by the 
directors, the more likely the firm engage in corporate social responsibility activities.  
6.2.4 Test of Mediation 
This study has serial and double mediations. The assumptions are that board processes variables 
mediate the relationship between board characteristics and board task, and board processes have 
an indirect effect on corporate social responsibility through board roles. The RQ4 is developed in 
order to find the mediating effect of board processes on the relationship between board 
characteristics and board tasks. RQ5 intends to examine the indirect influence of board tasks on the 
relationship between board processes and CSR (legal and ethical) activities in the Nigerian context. 
Mediation analysis is run with the aid of PLS-SEM (SmartPLS software). To investigate the 
significance of mediating effects, a bootstrapping procedure is employed.   
Baron and Kenny (1986) stated four conditions necessary for mediation effect: there must be positive 
and significant relationships between (1) exogenous and endogenous variables, (2) exogenous with 
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mediators, (3) mediators with endogenous variables, and lastly, (4) the effect of exogenous variables 
must change when controlling for the mediating variables. This study’s findings provide support for 
the condition necessary for mediation in the relationships between board processes, board task and 
CSR (legal and ethical) activities, but not on the path coefficients between board characteristics, 
board processes and board task.   
Board characteristics have no significant effect on board processes; therefore, board processes 
variables do not mediate the relationship between board characteristics and board task as H8 
predicted. With the exception of board size, that has positive (insignificant) effects on knowledge 
utilsation and commitment, all other board characteristics variables have negative (mostly 
insignificant) influences on the board processes variables. Thus, one of the condition necessary for 
mediation is not met (Baron and Kenny, 1986), therefore, H8 that predicts a positive and signifacant 
mediating effects of board processes on the relationship between board characteristics and board 
task is not supported. This is consistent with the work of Wan and Ong (2005) in Singapore and 
contradicts Neilson and Huse (2010) who argue board processes variables mediate the relationship 
between board gender diversity and strategic controls. Additionally, a moderation test conducted 
indicated insignificant effect of each board process variable on the relationship between board 
characteristics and board tasks (see Appendix M).  
Investigating the mediating effect of board tasks on the relationship between board processes and 
CSR (legal and ethical) activities, two hypotheses are tested. Hypothesis 9a predicts that board 
control role mediate the relationship between board processes and CSR (legal and ethical) activities, 
and H9b assumes board service task to have an indirect influence on the relationship between board 
processes and CSR (legal and ethical) activities. The analysis indicates that both hypotheses H9a 
and H9b are partially supported as these board tasks have different effects on the link between board 
processes and CSR (legal and ethical) activities. This contradicts the work of Payne et al., (2009) 
which report that the mediation effect of board effectiveness on the board-firm performance is not 
detected. 
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The board control task mediates only the relationship between knowledge utilsation and CSR 
activities, but it has no mediating effect on the link between other board processes and dependent 
variable. Therefore, H9a is partially supported. For the relationship between board level of 
commitment and corporate social responsibility only service, not control task, fully mediates the 
relationship at 81 per cent (see Table 6.1). 
The path coefficient between commitment and control task is not statistically significant and 
subsequently, did not meet one of the causational conditions introduced by Baron and Kenny. 
Therefore, control task do not mediate the relationship between commitment, a board process, and 
CSR activities.  However, service task mediates the relationship between commitment and CSR 
legal and ethical activities. As indicated in figure 6.1, the total (direct) effect between commitment 
and CSR ethical activities (0.250. t = 3.042, p < 0.05) and the indirect effect through service task 
(0.246 * 0.719 = 0.177, t = 2.921, p < 0.05) are all positive and significant. Additionally, the direct 
effect of commitment on corporate social responsibility legal activities (0.255, t = 3.445, p < 0.001) 
and indirect effects through service task (0.246 * 0.659 = 0.162, t = 2.831, p < 0.05) are positive and 
significant. The decrease of effect between board commitment and the two dimensions of corporate 
social responsibility activities when the mediator (service task) is included in the model (Figure 6.2) 
indicates that board service task serves as a variable that mediates the relationship between these 
exogenous and endogenous constructs. A previous study has also shown that there is link between 
board processes and CSR activities through effective management of resources available in the firm 
(Coombes et al., 2011). 
This means that the relationship between the two variables is not direct, but rather an indirect effect 
through service task. Linking resource dependency and stakeholder theories, directors’ 
engagements and efforts toward their responsibilities improves their ability to acquire resources for 
their firm and offer useful advice and counsel to the management, which in turn leads to activities 
related to CSR legal and ethical dimensions because of the avalability of resources to satisfy various 
stakeholders claims (Zhang et al., 2013).  
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Moreover, those boards that are committed and challenge opinions of other directors in order to 
satisfy the interest of all stakeholders rather than shareholders alone, are more likely to improve 
strategic participation roles such as CSR initiatives which improve external legitimacy and reputation 
(Melkumov et al., 2015).  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The Total Effect of Commitment on CSR Legal and Ethical 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The Indirect Effect of Commitment through Service Task on CSR Legal and Ethical 
activities 
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Surprisingly, board control and service tasks serve as suppressors, rather than mediators on the 
relationship between board challenge in the relationship between ‘challenge’ as an independent 
variable, and CSR ethical and legal activities, as dependent variables. The total effect of challenge 
on CSR ethical activities (β = 0.261, t = 3.424, p < 0.001) and legal (β = 0.247, t = 3.231, p < 0.001) 
are positive and significant (Figure 6.3). Similarly, the indirect effect of the independent variable on 
CSR ethical activities through control task (0.243 * 0.169 = 0.041, t = 2.064, p < 0.05) and service 
task (0.353 * 0.665 = 0.235, t = 4.272, p < 0.001) are positive and statistically significant (Figure 6.4). 
Moreover, the indirect effects of challenge through control task (0.243 * 0.233 = 0.057, t = 1.930, p 
< 0.05) and service task (0.353 * 0.584 = 0.206, t = 4.015, p < 0.001) on corporate social 
responsibility (legal) activities are positive and strongly significant. 
 
 As observed, when control and service tasks are included in the model as mediators, the positive 
direct relationship between the predictor (challenge) and criterion (CSR) changed to a negative sign. 
Suppression occurs in a situation whereby the direct and indirect effects are of opposite signs 
(Tzelgov and Henik, 1991). In this case, both control and service tasks serve as suppressors as the 
indirect effects are positive and statistically significant, while the direct effects are negative and 
statistically significant.  Board control and service roles quell the positive and significant relationship 
between the exogenous and endogenous variables when added in the model. Thus, board members’ 
ability to challenge each other’s opinions and ideas through asking probing questions, open debate, 
brainstorming and disagreeing have a direct influence on corporate social responsibility, without the 
mediating effects from other factors, such as control and service tasks. This is consistent with the 
second layer of agency theory (shareholder-society relationship) introduced by Raelin and Bondy 
(2013), which implies that effective monitoring of executives should be performed in the best 
interests of the host community.   
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Figure 6. 3: The Total Effect of Challenge on CSR Legal and Ethical Activities 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 4: The Indirect Effects of Challenge on CSR through Control and Service Tasks 
 
The mediation analysis signifies the importance of control and service tasks as mediators on the 
relationship between knowledge utilisation and CSR legal and ethical activities. The total effect of 
knowledge utilisation on the CSR ethical (β = 0.455, t = 6.858, p < 0.001) and legal (β = 0.442, t = 
5.989, p < 0.001) activities are all positive and strong (figure 6.3a). The indirect impact (figure 6.3b) 
of the exogenous variable on CSR legal activities through control (0.274 * 0.217 = 0.060, t = 2.038, 
p < 0.05) and service (0.448 * 0.519 = 0.233, t = 4.397, p < 0.001) tasks are all positive and 
statistically significant. Similarly, the indirect effect of knowledge utilisation on CSR ethical activities 
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through control (0.274 * 0.153 = 0.042, t = 1.933, p < 0.05) and service (0.448 * 0.600 = 0.269, 5.526, 
p < 0.001) tasks are positive and statistically significant.  
This implies that the more a board shares knowledge and coordinates the information available in 
the boardroom, the higher they perform their tasks (Zhu et al., 2016). These tasks include oversight 
function (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and provision of reputation as well as legitimacy (Mallin and 
Michelon, 2011), which is possible with effective strategies on corporate social responsibility (legal 
and ethical) activities. The mediation effect of a service task is greater than that of the control role 
on the relationship between board knowledge utilisation and corporate social responsibility activities 
(see Table 6.1).  
 
 
Figure 6. 5: The Total Effect of Knowledge Utilisation on CSR Legal and Ethical Activities 
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Figure 6. 6: The Indirect Effect of Knowledge Utilisation on CSR through Control and Service 
Tasks 
 
In summary, the decrease in the influence of the direct relationships between exogenous and 
endogenous variables, when the mediators are included in the model (see Figures 6.2 and 6.6), 
indicates that board control and service tasks, to some extent, serve as variables that mediate the 
relationship between these board processes (commitment and knowledge utilsation) and corporate 
social responsibility activities along legal and ethical dimensions.  
In order to determine the magnitude of the indirect effect of these mediators in relation to the total 
effects, Variance Accounted For (VAF) is estimated. According to Hair Jr et al. (2016), VAF can be 
calculated as: 
 𝐴𝑉𝐹 =
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
 
A VAF of less than 20 per cent is regarded as non-mediation and 80 per cent and above considered 
full mediation. A VAF above 20 per cent, but less than 80 per cent is termed as partial mediation 
(Hair Jr et al., 2016). Table 6.1 below summarises the size of mediation effect of each mediator 
included in the model, and the VAF of each mediator is also calculated and presented in the table. 
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The results show that service task has perfect mediation effect on the relationship between board 
‘commitment’ and CSR ethical activities. Board (control and service) tasks  has partial mediation 
effects on the relationship between knowledge utilisation and CSR legal and ethical activities.   
 
Table 6.1: Results of the Mediating Effects of Board task on the Relationship between Board 
Processes and CSR 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variable 
Mediator Dependent 
variable 
t-statistics p size 
Commitment  Service task CSR ethical 2.921 .04 0.81% 
Commitment    Service task CSR legal 2.831 .05 0.67% 
Knowledge utilisation  Control task CSR ethical 1.933 .05 0.23% 
Knowledge utilisation  Service task  CSR ethical 5.526 .00 0.66% 
Knowledge utilisation  Control task  CSR legal 2.038 .04 0.29% 
Knowledge utilisation  Service task  CSR legal 4.387 .00 0.61% 
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Table 6.2: Summary of the Results for Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses Statements Findings Accept/Reject 
H1a Large board size is positively related to the board level of 
challenge 
 
Negative (non-significant) relationship Rejected 
H1b Large board size is negatively related to the board commitment 
 
Positive (insignificant) effect 
 
Rejected 
H1c Large board size is negatively related to the board knowledge 
utilisation 
 
Positive (insignificant) relationship Rejected 
H2a Board composition is positively related to board level of 
commitment 
 
Negative, but insignificant relationship is 
discovered 
Rejected 
H2b Board composition is positively linked to challenge in the 
boardroom 
 
Negative and statistically significant 
relationship is found 
Rejected 
H2c Board composition is positively related to board knowledge 
utilisation 
 
Negative and statistical effect is found Rejected 
H3a CEO duality has no significant effect on board level of 
commitment 
 
insignificant (positive) relationship Accepted 
H3b CEO duality has no significant influence on level of challenge in 
the boardroom 
 
Insignificant (negative) effect  Accepted 
H3c CEO duality has an insignificant effect on board knowledge 
utilisation 
Insignificant (negative) effect Accepted 
H4a A proportion of women directors on the board is positively related 
to  the board level of commitment 
Negative, non-significant relationship is 
found 
Rejected 
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H4b A proportion of women directors on the board is positively related 
to challenging among directors  
 
Negative, but weak relationship is 
discovered  
Rejected 
H4c A proportion of women directors on the board is negatively 
related to board knowledge utilisation 
 
Negative and significant effect between 
the variables is found 
Accepted 
H5a Board level of commitment is positively related to board control 
role 
 
Positive, but weak relationship is found Rejected 
H5b Board commitment is positively linked to board service role 
 
Positive and statistically significant 
relationship 
 
Accepted 
H5c Challenge has a positive influence on board control role 
 
Positive and strong relationship is found Accepted 
H5d Challenge is positively related to board service role 
 
Positive and significant effect is found Accepted 
H5e Knowledge utilisation is positively associated to board control role 
 
Positive and significant relationship is 
discovered 
 
Accepted 
H5f Knowledge utilisation has a positive effect on board service role 
 
Positive and significant influence is 
found 
Accepted 
H6a Board control role influences corporate social responsibility 
(legal) activities 
 
Significant and positive relationship 
between the variables 
Accepted 
H6b Board control role is positively related to corporate social 
responsibility (ethical) activities 
 
Positive and significant findings are 
discovered 
Accepted 
 217 
 
H7a Board service role has a positive effect on corporate social 
responsibility (legal) activities 
 
Strong and positive relationship is found Accepted 
H7b Board service role is positively connected to corporate social 
responsibility (ethical) activities 
 
Positive and significant relationship 
between service role and CSR (ethical) 
Accepted 
H8 Board processes mediate the relationship between board 
characteristics and board tasks 
 
Board processes do not mediate the 
relationship between Board 
characteristics and board task 
 
Rejected 
H9a Board control role mediate the relationship between board 
processes and CSR (legal and ethical) activities. 
 
Control task mediates the relationship 
bewteen knowledge utilsation and CSR, 
but not other board process and CSR. 
 
Partial supported 
H9b Board service task has an indirect influence on the relationship 
between board processes and CSR (legal and ethical) activities. 
 
Service task mediates the relationships 
between board commitment, 
knowledge utilisation and CSR, but 
serves as supperssors on the link 
between challenge and CSR 
Partial supported 
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6.3 Contributions 
There is abundant literature on board effectiveness, however what makes a board effective is 
still a puzzle. Hence, there is a need to clearly and unambiguously understand what makes 
these corporate leaders effective. A large number of studies on this subject relied heavily on 
board characteristics as the main determinants of board effectiveness and findings are 
inconclusive. These mixed results were attributed to the traditional input-output approach 
followed by the researchers (Daily et al., 2003). This study makes a contribution to board 
effectiveness beyond the traditional approach that solely depends on board characteristics 
variables and therefore, contributes to the existing board literature. 
 
In addition, the majority of board literature treat boards as a ‘black box’ (Daily et al., 2003), 
whereby board characteristics are expected to directly influence corporate performance. 
Recently, researchers were called to open the ‘black box’ and investigate the influence of 
board processes on the structure-performance relationship (Pettigrew, 1992; Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005; Huse et al., 2011). The current study makes a contribution to this streamline 
of research, as an input-processes-output approach is employed to study board effectiveness.  
Although some researchers open the ‘black box’ to investigate board effectiveness, findings 
are relevant mostly for the developed countries. The only exception is a doctoral thesis of 
Ogbechie (2012) which limits its inquiries at board-level effectiveness and used limited 
variables. The current study contributes by providing evidence relevant to the developing 
market. Moreover, despite the fact that corporate governance scholars are increasingly 
conducting research on boards, much emphasis is given to examining the influence of boards 
either on board-level or firm-level effectiveness. Studies that consider both levels of board 
performance are rare. This study investigates the influence of boards on board level (board 
task) and firm-level (CSR activities). Therefore, a comprehensive picture of board 
effectiveness is presented.  
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As mentioned earlier, the importance of linking corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility is highlighted by many researchers (Sánchez et al., 2011; Jizi et al., 2014; 
Harjoto et al., 2015). Consistent with these scholars, this study argues that a board’s ability to 
improve CSR activities should be considered as firm-level effectiveness, rather than narrowly 
focusing on short-term financial performance. Therefore, the study introduces a new input-
processes-output model that includes CSR activities. Most of the studies on these streamline 
of research investigate the relationships between board structure, processes and task 
effectiveness (Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Bettinelli, 2011). This thesis is an 
extension to these studies, therefore making a relevant contribution to this literature.  
 
Moreover, the findings of this research provide information to policymakers and boards on 
what directors do to influence their effectiveness and what the impacts are of board task on 
corporate social responsibility activities in the Nigerian corporate environment. The 
methodology employed, specifically, partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-
SEM), a non-parametric analysis tool, makes this study the first in Nigeria that investigates 
direct and indirect relationships between board characteristics, board processes, board task 
and corporate social responsibility activities of the firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
6.4 Policy Implication 
Post corporate scandals of a number of large firms, both in Nigeria and elsewhere around the 
world, the Nigerian government intensified efforts to ensure best governance practices are 
established and companies comply with such practices, in order to prevent reoccurrence of 
similar abuses that led to previous corporate crises. The board of directors’ effectiveness is 
the main target of various corporate governance codes issued by the Security and Exchange 
Commission for the Nigerian public listed firms.  For example, SEC code (2011) code 
recommends board size not be less than five, but should be an appropriate size relative to the 
complexity of the firm’s operations. The code also recommends boards to be composed of 
executive and non-executive directors with the majority to be NEDs. Similarly, to ensure 
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boards are free from the influence of the executives, the code emphasises that the two 
leadership positions should be separated and more than two family members should not sit 
on a particular board at the same time. The idea behind all these provisions is to guarantee 
board independence which is assumed to aid the board in performing their duties effectively.  
However, the current study provides evidence that board internal processes, not board 
structure, are the prime determinants of board effectiveness (Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and 
Zattoni, 2007), which in turn improves firm-level effectiveness. Specifically, this study finds 
that in Nigeria, board size, the proportion of NEDs, board gender diversity and separation of 
duties between CEO/MD and chairman, are less important than boards internal working 
process in determining board effectiveness. Consistent with Roberts et al., (2005), this study 
argues that board characteristics are conditions that may necessarily lead to board 
effectiveness, but it is the actual directors’  commitment, ability to challenge and adequate use 
of knowledge available in the boardroom that serve as a prerequisite of board effectiveness. 
Therefore, policymakers should not restrict their focus on board structure instead, other factors 
such as internal functioning need to be considered. 
6.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
Studies that investigate the inner working of boards and similar groups suffered limitation 
associated with low response rate (Zona, 2015). Nigerian board members are very difficult to 
reach, the majority of these corporate leaders are high caliber individuals in the society with 
tight schedules on a daily basis. Recent cases of kidnapping and insecurity, which is so 
rampant in Nigeria, make access to board members extremely difficult. The usable responses 
of 189 seems low for a population of 1,430 directors of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. Future studies should consider a higher response rate. 
 
Secondly, another limitation of the current study is the number of variables used. the research 
is limited to only those board characteristics variables termed as ‘usual suspect’. Future 
studies should consider using other board structure variables such as directors’ educational 
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background, board ethnicity and age diversity. Similarly, a limited number of board processes 
variables were used. Future scholars to assess the influence of other board functioning 
variables. Moreover, only ethical and legal corporate social responsibility dimensions are 
considered as dependent variables in this study. Future studies should include other 
dimensions of CSR.  
Other limitations of this study include those associated with the shortcomings of the self-
reporting survey and generally, the quantitative methodology adopted. The responses 
collected from directors may not represent reality, but rather misleading answers. Moreover, 
the research could have collected data of independent, mediators and dependent variables 
from different sources (such as secondary data), rather than a single source in order to 
minimise common method bias. Similarly, collecting archival data to measure some variables 
could have provided enough space to measure other concepts/variables on the quationnaire. 
Additionally, despite the model is complex and has series of mediators, some variables such 
as industry type and firm size could have been controlled. Future research should address 
these limitations. Lastly, other scholars should study board internal functioning through 
different methodologies, such as in-depth qualitative interview and participant observations. 
6.6 Concluding Comments 
Research on board of directors has continued to receive condemnation due to a narrow focus 
on the direct relationship between board structure and firm performance. This direct input-
output approach has been challenged by many scholars and calls have been made to open 
the ‘black box’ to clearly understand board functioning.  Ideally, studies that focused on distal 
measures of board effectiveness, relied on firm-level performance, such as financial outcome, 
while scholars that open the ‘black box’ focus on proximal measures of board-level 
performance (Pugliese et al., 2015) such as task performance. Nonetheless, the importance 
of opening the ‘black box’ to know exactly how boards of directors function is recently 
emphasised, as the reliance on distal measures led to ambiguous findings.  
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Roberts et al., (2005) claimed that board structure serves as a condition that determined board 
effectiveness, but further argue that it is not the structure per se that determines board 
effectiveness, rather the actual conduct or behaviours of directors. The current research 
agrees with this view and argues that it is not the board structure per se that determines board 
effectiveness, rather the level of directors’ commitment, challenge and knowledge utilisation. 
The study opens the ‘black box’ of the boards of listed firms in Nigeria. Specifically, the 
relationships between board characteristics, board processes, board task and corporate social 
responsibility (legal and ethical) activities are examined. The results of this study show that 
board processes are more antecedents of board effectiveness than board structures, which is 
consistent with what Andrés‐Alonso et al. (2010) and other scholars reported.  
Andrés‐Alonso and his colleagues find that traditional board structures, such as board size 
and board composition has a questionable impact on the organisational efficiency of 119 
Spanish Foundations, but the availability of diverse knowledge and experience in the 
boardroom and active engagement attitudes of directors to utilise the knowledge improve the 
Foundations’ efficiency (effective resource allocations).  Similar findings were also reported 
by previous scholars, such as Wan and Ong (2005) from Singapore, and Zona and Zattoni 
(2007), and Minichilli et al., (2009) from Italy. These unambiguous findings coming from Spain, 
Singapore, Italy and now Nigeria, which suggest that board’ internal working processes are 
important factors that any researcher investigating board effectiveness should not ignore.  
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Appendix B: Consent letter 
 
Beyond the surface: Board of Directors’ effectiveness relating to task and 
corporate social responsibility activities in Nigeria 
 
This is a study which serves as part of my doctoral research in collaboration with the Business 
Management Research Institute (BMRI), University of Bedfordshire, United Kingdom. The 
main purpose of this survey is to find what actually makes boards effective in emerging 
economies like Nigeria. The study intends to investigate the impact of board processes on the 
relationship between board characteristics, board task and corporate social responsibility 
activities in Nigeria. 
 
Board effectiveness has a significant impact on the corporate environment and country’s 
economy especially in a developing country like Nigeria. Therefore, understanding the factors 
responsible for board effectiveness is imperative. The study aims at investigating and 
providing a profound insight into what makes boards effective in the Nigerian context. 
 
Therefore, I would like to ask your cooperation in order to achieve the aim of this study. Kindly, 
answer all questions on this questionnaire, it should not take you more than seven minutes to 
complete. It is important to know that participation is voluntary and that any information 
provided will remain absolutely confidential and will only be disclosed to the academic 
researchers involved in this study. Your name and that of your organisation will not be 
mentioned in this report. 
 
If you require additional information regarding this research, please feel free to contact me at 
the following address. If you would like to receive an executive summary of this study’s 
findings, please do let me know. 
 
Abubakar Mohammed Zayyana 
Department of Law and Finance 
Luton Campus, University of Bedfordshire 
Bedfordshire, United Kingdom 
LU1 3JU 
Tel:08036833207, + (44)07553775272 
Email: abubakars.gobir@yahoo.com 
Abubakar.zayyana@study.beds.ac.uk 
 
For further inquiry about this study, kindly contact the research supervisor at the following 
contact address: 
 
 Dr Sandra Win 
 Senior Lecturer in Banking and Finance 
 Department of Law and Finance 
 Luton Campus, University of 
 Bedfordshire, United Kingdom 
 Email: Sandar.win@beds.ac.uk 
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Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet (PIS) 
 
1. Research project title 
Beyond the Surface: Board of directors’ effectiveness relating to task and corporate social 
responsibility activities in Nigeria 
 
2. Invitation  
I would like to invite you to take part in a research that intends to investigate the factors 
responsible for board effectiveness in Nigeria. When making your decision about 
participation, it is essential to understand the reason behind the choice of this subject, and 
the research aims. Kindly read the following information and feel free to enquire in case 
you need further clarification. 
  
3. Purpose of the research 
The purpose of this research is to investigate board effectiveness in Nigeria. The study 
intends to establish a relationship between board characteristics, internal board 
processes, board task and corporate social responsibility activities for the case of Nigerian 
listed firms. This research is part of my doctoral dissertation. 
 
4. Choice of participant 
The target participants are directors of firms listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE). 
You are chosen because your company is among those companies listed on the NSE and 
the choice of participants has been made on the basis of expertise, knowledge and 
experience about the topic under investigation.  
 
5. Participation 
If you choose to participate, an interview will be conducted and it will not be more than 45 
minutes long. 
 
6. Withdrawal 
Participation is voluntary. If you agree to take part, you will be asked to sign a consent 
form. Choosing to participate in this study does not restrict your right to withdraw at any 
time without disclosing the reason for doing so.  If you decide to withdraw from this study, 
the information and data collected from you to date will be destroyed. Similarly, your name 
will be removed from the study files. 
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7. Risks 
There are no potential risks, anticipated discomfort or inconvenience should you choose 
to participate in this study. 
 
8. Benefits 
The information gathered from the study will help the researcher to understand the board 
internal processes and board task applicable in the Nigerian context. Although a direct 
effect on participants is difficult to be precisely identified, the study will produce results that 
will provide important insight and will contribute to the understanding of the corporate 
governance system in Nigeria particularly in terms of board effectiveness.  
 
9. If there is a problem 
Please contact me at 08036833207 if you need to raise a concern/complain. For more 
formal complaints you can contact the director of this study Dr Sandar Win at 
Sandar.Win@beds.ac.uk.  
 
10.  Confidentiality  
All the information you provide will remain absolutely confidential, and would only be 
disclosed to the academic researchers involved in this study. 
 
11.  Study results 
The findings of this study will be used for my PhD thesis and may be published in some journal 
articles. If you want have a copy of the findings please do let me know through my contact 
below. 
 
12. Further information 
For further information about this study contact me at the following contact address: 
Abubakar Mohammed Zayyana 
Department of Law and Finance 
Luton Campus, University of Bedfordshire 
Bedfordshire, United Kingdom 
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LU1 3JU 
Tel:08036833207; + (44)07553775272 
Email; abubakars.gobir@yahoo.com;  
abubakar.zayyana@study.beds.ac.uk 
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Appendix D: Informed consent form 
 
I have read and understood the foregoing information. I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions and I received satisfactory answers about the study. I consent voluntarily to be a 
participant in this study. 
 
Name of participant: 
Signature of participant: 
Date: 
 
I confirm that the consent has been given freely and voluntarily by the participant. I confirm 
that the participant was given the opportunity to seek clarification about the study, and all 
questions asked by the participant have been answered correctly and to the best of my ability. 
A copy of this informed consent form has been provided to the participant. 
 
Name of researcher:  
Signature of researcher: 
Date: 
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Appendix E: Questionnaire  
 
goo.gl/SfHFyw 
Welcome to the survey on board effectiveness by Abubakar M Zayyana. 
 
This study serves as part of my doctoral research in collaboration with the Business 
Management Research Institute (BMRI), University of Bedfordshire, United Kingdom. 
The main purpose of this survey is to find what actually makes a board effective in 
emerging economies like Nigeria. Specifically, the study intends to investigate board 
effectiveness relating to board tasks and CSR activities, with evidence from directors 
of listed firms in Nigeria.  
Kindly, answer all questions on this questionnaire, it should not take more than 7 
minutes to complete. If you are serving on more than one board, kindly complete only 
one questionnaire for the board of your choice. It is important to know that participation 
is voluntary and your responses are anonymous. Any information provided will remain 
absolutely confidential and will only be disclosed to the academic researchers involved 
in this study. Your name and that of your organization will not be mentioned in this 
report. Please, click on the next page if you are ready to continue. 
 
Demographic 
 
What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
Your company is from which industry? 
1. Oil and Gas 
2. Industrial Goods 
3. Consumer Goods 
4. Conglomerates 
5. Financial services 
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6. Healthcare 
7. Natural science 
8. Services 
9. Construction 
10. ICT 
11. Agriculture 
 
What type of director are you? 
1. Executive 
2. Non-executive 
3. Independent non-executive 
4. Others (please specify)…………………………………………. 
 
The following statements seek to obtain some opinions regarding board processes, board control and 
service tasks, and corporate social responsibility (legal and ethical) activities. Kindly indicate the extent 
to which you agree or disagree with the statements on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 mean strongly agree and 5 
means strongly disagree. Please, click next to continue at the end of each page. 
 
 Strongly  
agree 
   Strongly  
disagree 
      
Board members critically 
analyse any information 
provided by the managers prior 
to board meetings 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Board members take notes 
during meetings 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Board members participate 
actively in discussion during 
meetings 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Board members are available 
when needed for emergency 
meetings at both committee 
and board levels 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Board members acquire 
knowledge on issues that are 
relevant to the firm before 
attending board meetings 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
There are frequent 
disagreements about ideas and 
opinions in the boardroom 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
There are frequent debates 
before board agrees on a 
particular decision 
1 2 3 4 5 
There are different views in the 
boardroom on how to pursue 
the firm’s objectives 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The best alternatives for the 
firm are critically discussed 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
There are frequent debates on 
the interests of shareholders 
and stakeholders 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Board members are aware of 
each other’s knowledge and 
area of expertise 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
There is quick information flows 
among board members 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
There is a clear division of labor 
among board members 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Knowledge and skills available 
in the boardroom are 
coordinated to achieve more 
constructive discussions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
When discussing issues in the 
boardroom, the most 
knowledgeable directors have 
the most influence 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
      
Your board decides 
remuneration of CEO and other 
internal directors 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Your board is fully informed 
about the financial position of 
the firm 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Your board ensures substantial 
expenditures are justifiable 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Your board establishes plans 
and budget for the firm’s 
operations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The board sufficiently monitors 
the activities of CEO/MD and 
other managers 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Your board provides useful 
advice on management 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
This board positively links the 
firm with the society 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
This board provides useful 
advice on financial issues 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Your board makes initiatives on 
strategy proposal 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
This board makes long-term 
strategy plans 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
      
Directors of this firm try to 
comply with the environmental 
laws 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Our firm seeks to comply with 
all laws regarding hiring and 
benefits of employees 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
We always comply with the 
norms defined in the law when 
carrying out our activities 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our firm pays taxes and other 
tax-related as at when due 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Managers monitor the potential 
negative impact of our activities 
on society 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
We follow professional and 
ethical standard 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our firm has a confidentiality 
procedure in place for 
employees to report any 
misconduct at work 
1 2 3 4 5 
Our company has an effective 
code of conduct in place 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
We don’t give donations to 
political parties and other 
unethical activities 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
This section is about board and firm characteristics 
 
What was the total number of directors on your board last year? 
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………………………………………………………………………………… 
What was the total number of non-executive (including independent and senior independent non-
executive) directors on your board last year? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
What was the total number of female directors on your board previous year? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
Was the CEO/MD also the Chairman of the board last year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
What was the total number of full-time employees in your firm as of last year? 
1. Less than 100 
2. 100 – 500 
3. 501 – 1000 
4. 1001 – 2000 
5. 2001 – 3000 
6. Over 3000 
 
Did you serve on more than one board as of last year? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
 
Many thanks for your participation. If you require additional information regarding this 
research or would like to receive an executive summary of this study’s findings, please 
feel free to contact me on: 08036833207; +447553775272 or at 
abubakars.gobir@yahoo.com;     abubakar.zayyana@study.beds.ac.uk 
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Appendix F: Initial Assessment of the Measurement Model 
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Appendix G: Descriptive Analysis 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Industry Num_employees Prop_femaledir 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Frequencies 
Statistics 
 
Your company is 
from which 
industry 
What was the 
total number of 
full-time 
employees in 
your firm as of 
last year? 
Proportion of 
women directors 
N Valid 189 189 189 
Missing 0 0 0 
 
Frequency Table 
Your company is from which industry 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Oil and Gas 16 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Industrial goods 23 12.2 12.2 20.6 
Consumer goods 34 18.0 18.0 38.6 
Conglomerates 7 3.7 3.7 42.3 
Financial services 63 33.3 33.3 75.7 
Healthcare 5 2.6 2.6 78.3 
Natural science 6 3.2 3.2 81.5 
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Services 12 6.3 6.3 87.8 
Construction 12 6.3 6.3 94.2 
ICT 7 3.7 3.7 97.9 
Agriculture 4 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Total 189 100.0 100.0  
 
What was the total number of full-time employees in your firm as of last year? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid less than 100 36 19.0 19.0 19.0 
100-500 72 38.1 38.1 57.1 
501-1000 27 14.3 14.3 71.4 
1001-2000 22 11.6 11.6 83.1 
2001-3000 25 13.2 13.2 96.3 
0ver 3000 7 3.7 3.7 100.0 
Total 189 100.0 100.0  
 
Proportion of women directors 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 60 31.7 31.7 31.7 
8 2 1.1 1.1 32.8 
8 1 .5 .5 33.3 
9 5 2.6 2.6 36.0 
11 2 1.1 1.1 37.0 
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11 13 6.9 6.9 43.9 
12 1 .5 .5 44.4 
13 3 1.6 1.6 46.0 
13 3 1.6 1.6 47.6 
14 2 1.1 1.1 48.7 
14 10 5.3 5.3 54.0 
15 2 1.1 1.1 55.0 
16 2 1.1 1.1 56.1 
17 2 1.1 1.1 57.1 
17 1 .5 .5 57.7 
18 2 1.1 1.1 58.7 
18 4 2.1 2.1 60.8 
20 8 4.2 4.2 65.1 
21 1 .5 .5 65.6 
21 3 1.6 1.6 67.2 
22 7 3.7 3.7 70.9 
22 5 2.6 2.6 73.5 
23 1 .5 .5 74.1 
25 11 5.8 5.8 79.9 
27 1 .5 .5 80.4 
27 2 1.1 1.1 81.5 
27 2 1.1 1.1 82.5 
29 14 7.4 7.4 89.9 
30 3 1.6 1.6 91.5 
 262 
 
31 1 .5 .5 92.1 
33 1 .5 .5 92.6 
33 5 2.6 2.6 95.2 
38 4 2.1 2.1 97.4 
42 1 .5 .5 97.9 
43 3 1.6 1.6 99.5 
50 1 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 189 100.0 100.0  
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Board_size Outside_dir Female_dir Prop_NEDs 
  /STATISTICS=MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN MEDIAN MODE 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Frequencies 
Statistics 
 
What was the 
total number of 
directors on 
your board last 
year? 
What was the 
total number of 
non-executive 
(including 
independent and 
senior 
independent 
non-executive) 
directors on your 
board last year? 
What was the 
total number of 
female directors 
on your board 
previous year? 
Proportion of 
outside directors 
N Valid 189 189 189 189 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean 9.36 6.69 1.46 71.47 
Median 9.00 6.00 1.00 71.43 
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Mode 7 6 0 67 
Minimum 4 2 0 23 
Maximum 19 15 5 92 
 
Frequency Table 
What was the total number of directors on your board last year? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 4 3 1.6 1.6 1.6 
5 6 3.2 3.2 4.8 
6 11 5.8 5.8 10.6 
7 37 19.6 19.6 30.2 
8 24 12.7 12.7 42.9 
9 33 17.5 17.5 60.3 
10 15 7.9 7.9 68.3 
11 23 12.2 12.2 80.4 
12 12 6.3 6.3 86.8 
13 6 3.2 3.2 89.9 
14 12 6.3 6.3 96.3 
15 1 .5 .5 96.8 
16 2 1.1 1.1 97.9 
17 1 .5 .5 98.4 
18 1 .5 .5 98.9 
19 2 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 189 100.0 100.0  
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What was the total number of non-executive (including independent and 
senior independent non-executive) directors on your board last year? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2 5 2.6 2.6 2.6 
3 6 3.2 3.2 5.8 
4 18 9.5 9.5 15.3 
5 32 16.9 16.9 32.3 
6 34 18.0 18.0 50.3 
7 33 17.5 17.5 67.7 
8 19 10.1 10.1 77.8 
9 23 12.2 12.2 89.9 
10 7 3.7 3.7 93.7 
11 7 3.7 3.7 97.4 
12 4 2.1 2.1 99.5 
15 1 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 189 100.0 100.0  
 
What was the total number of female directors on your board previous 
year? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
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Valid 0 60 31.7 31.7 31.7 
1 39 20.6 20.6 52.4 
2 49 25.9 25.9 78.3 
3 27 14.3 14.3 92.6 
4 13 6.9 6.9 99.5 
5 1 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 189 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
Proportion of outside directors 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 23 1 .5 .5 .5 
25 1 .5 .5 1.1 
33 1 .5 .5 1.6 
40 1 .5 .5 2.1 
50 8 4.2 4.2 6.3 
56 3 1.6 1.6 7.9 
56 3 1.6 1.6 9.5 
56 1 .5 .5 10.1 
57 4 2.1 2.1 12.2 
57 9 4.8 4.8 16.9 
58 1 .5 .5 17.5 
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60 5 2.6 2.6 20.1 
62 1 .5 .5 20.6 
63 9 4.8 4.8 25.4 
63 3 1.6 1.6 27.0 
63 2 1.1 1.1 28.0 
64 2 1.1 1.1 29.1 
67 14 7.4 7.4 36.5 
67 6 3.2 3.2 39.7 
69 3 1.6 1.6 41.3 
70 6 3.2 3.2 44.4 
71 4 2.1 2.1 46.6 
71 9 4.8 4.8 51.3 
73 6 3.2 3.2 54.5 
73 1 .5 .5 55.0 
75 11 5.8 5.8 60.8 
77 1 .5 .5 61.4 
78 10 5.3 5.3 66.7 
78 5 2.6 2.6 69.3 
79 2 1.1 1.1 70.4 
79 1 .5 .5 70.9 
80 3 1.6 1.6 72.5 
82 1 .5 .5 73.0 
82 10 5.3 5.3 78.3 
83 1 .5 .5 78.8 
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83 4 2.1 2.1 81.0 
86 12 6.3 6.3 87.3 
86 4 2.1 2.1 89.4 
88 3 1.6 1.6 91.0 
88 1 .5 .5 91.5 
88 1 .5 .5 92.1 
89 3 1.6 1.6 93.7 
90 6 3.2 3.2 96.8 
91 3 1.6 1.6 98.4 
92 3 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Total 189 100.0 100.0  
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Appendix H: Output from SmartPLS software 
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Loadings: Results from bootstrapping 
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Appendix I (i): Previous Studies on the Relationship between Board Characteristics and 
Financial Performance. 
 
Name of the 
Author (s), 
Year of the 
Publication 
 
Title of the 
Paper 
Title of the  
Journal  
Methodology Country Main Findings 
Liu et al. 
(2015) 
 
 
 
Board 
independence 
and firm 
performance in 
China 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
Quantitative; 
Secondary 
data. 
A sample of 
2057 firms 
listed on the 
Shanghai and 
Shenzhen 
Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Accounting 
measures; 
Return On 
Assets (ROA) 
and Return 
On Equity 
(ROE). 
 
China 
 
Found a 
positive and 
significant 
relationship 
between the 
proportion of 
independent 
directors and 
firm operating 
performance. 
Zhu et al. 
(2016) 
 
 
 
Boar d 
Hierarchy, 
Independent 
Directors, and 
Firm Value: 
Evidence from 
China 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
Quantitative; 
Secondary 
data 
A sample of 
1,512 public 
listed Chinese 
firms.  
 
Market value; 
Tobin’s Q 
China Independent 
directors that 
are ranked 
higher 
(empowered) 
in an 
organisation 
are more likely 
to improve 
firm value 
(Tobin’s Q). 
Campbell, 
Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera 
(2008) 
 
 
Gender 
Diversity in the 
Boardroom 
and Firm 
Performance 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
68 firms listed 
on the 
Spanish Stock 
Exchange  
 
Market value; 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Spain An appropriate 
proportion of 
women on the 
board have a 
positive and 
significant 
relationship 
with firms’ 
financial 
performance. 
 274 
 
Mahadeo et 
al. (2012) 
 
 
 
Board 
Composition 
and Financial 
Performance: 
Uncovering the 
Effect of 
Diversity in an 
Emerging 
Economy 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
42 listed 
firms. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) 
Mauritius The proportion 
of women on 
the board is 
positive and 
significant with 
financial 
performance. 
Abdullah et al 
(2016) 
 
 
Does Having 
Women on 
Boards Create 
Value? The 
Impact of 
Societal 
Perceptions 
and Corporate 
Governance in 
Emerging 
Markets 
Strategic 
management 
journal 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
841 
companies 
listed on the 
main board in 
Bursa 
Malaysia for 
the year 
2008. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) and 
market 
measures 
(Tobin’s Q) 
 
Malaysia Women 
directors have 
a positive 
relationship 
with ROA, but 
negatively 
related to 
Tobin’s Q. 
Adjaoud et al. 
(2007) 
 
 
The Effect of 
Board’s Quality 
on 
Performance: 
A study of 
Canadian Firms 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
219 
Canadians 
companies. 
 
 Financial 
measures 
(ROI, ROE, 
EPS, and 
market-to-
book) and 
Value 
performance 
measures 
(EVA and 
Market Value 
Added) 
Canada  
Board 
composition 
(board 
independence, 
audit 
committee, 
nominating 
committee, 
and CEO non-
duality) is 
positively and 
significantly 
associated 
with value 
performance 
measures, but 
insignificantly 
related with 
accounting 
measures. 
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De Andres et 
al. (2005) 
 
 
Corporate 
Boards in 
OECD 
countries: Size, 
Composition, 
Functioning 
and 
Effectiveness 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
Sample of 450 
large non-
financial firms 
from ten 
OECD 
countries. 
 
Market value 
(Equity 
market-to-
book ratio, 
and financial 
q). 
 
Belgium, 
France, 
Germany, 
Italy, 
Switzerland, 
Spain, UK, 
Holland, 
Canada, and 
the US 
The larger 
board has a 
negative and 
significant 
relationship 
with firm 
performance. 
 
No significant 
relationship is 
found 
between the 
proportion of 
independent 
directors and 
firm value. 
 
Mangena et 
al. (2012)  
 
 
Corporate 
Boards, 
Ownership 
Structure and 
Firm 
Performance in 
an 
Environment 
of Severe 
Political and 
Economic 
Crisis 
British 
Journal of 
Management 
Quantitative;  
Archival data 
A sample of 
53 non-
financial firms 
listed on the 
Zimbabwe 
Stock 
Exchange for 
the period 
2000-2005. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) and 
Market value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Zimbabwe Board size is 
positively and 
significantly 
related to firm 
performance 
in the post 
presidential 
election in 
Zimbabwe, not 
before,. 
 
The proportion 
of non-
executive 
directors 
(NEDs) has a 
negative and 
significant 
effect on firm 
performance 
in both post 
and pre-
presidential 
election 
periods. 
 
Carter et al. 
(2010)  
 
 
The Gender 
and Ethnic 
Diversity of US 
Boards and 
Board 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
Sample of 641 
firms in the 
S&P 500. 
US No significant 
effect found 
between 
board gender 
diversity, 
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Committees 
and Firm 
Financial 
Performance 
 
 
Financial 
measure 
(ROA) and 
Market value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
 
board 
committees 
and corporate 
financial 
performance. 
Cho and Kim 
(2007) 
 
 
Outside 
Directors, 
Ownership 
Structure, and 
Firm 
Profitability in 
Korea 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
347 firms 
listed on the 
Korean Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) 
Korea Find a positive 
relationship 
between the 
proportion of 
NEDs and 
firm’s 
profitability, 
but the 
strength of the 
relationship is 
reduced due 
to higher large 
shareholder 
rate in the 
sample. 
 
Jackling and 
Johl (2009)  
 
 
Board 
structure and 
Firm 
Performance: 
Evidence from 
India’s Top 
Companies 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
180 firm-
years 
observation 
of top non-
financial 
India’s 
companies 
listed on the 
Bombay Stock 
Exchange.  
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) and 
Market value 
(Tobin’s Q). 
 
India The proportion 
of NEDs and 
large board 
size has 
positive and 
significant 
relationships 
with firm 
performance. 
 
CEO duality is 
positively 
related to 
corporate 
performance. 
 
 
Setia-Atmaja 
(2009) 
 
 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
and Firm 
Value: The 
Impact of 
Ownership 
Concentration 
and Dividends 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
316 
companies 
listed on the 
Australian 
Stock 
Australia Found a 
positive link 
between the 
proportion of 
NEDs and firm 
value. Firm 
ownership 
concentration 
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Exchange 
over the 
period 2000-
2005. 
 
Market value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
and low 
dividend pay-
outs 
moderated the 
relationship 
between 
board 
independence 
and firm 
performance. 
 
Kaymak and 
Bektas (2008) 
 
 
East meets 
West? Board 
Characteristics 
in an Emerging 
Market: 
Evidence from 
Turkish Banks 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
All the 27 
Banks from 
Turkish for 
the period 
2001-2004.  
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA, and 
Growth in 
total assets) 
Turkey NEDs have a 
negative 
influence on 
firm 
performance.  
 
Executive 
directors are 
found to have 
a positive and 
significant 
effect on 
corporate 
performance. 
 
CEO Duality is 
negatively 
related to 
ROA. 
 
Large board 
size is 
positively 
connected to 
performance. 
 
Essen et al. 
(2013)  
 
 
Does “Good” 
Corporate 
Governance 
Help in a 
Crisis? The 
Impact of 
Country-and 
Firm-Level 
Governance 
Mechanisms in 
the European 
Financial Crisis 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
from a sample 
of large firms 
across 26 
European 
countries 
(2004-2009).  
 
Measurement 
of dependent 
variable: 
Cumulative 
26 European 
countries 
Small board 
size, the 
proportion of 
NEDs, non-CEO 
duality, 
meeting 
frequency and 
board’s 
committee's 
structure are 
negatively 
related to firm 
performance. 
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adjusted 
stock return. 
 
 
 
 Klein et al. 
(2005) 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance, 
Family 
Ownership, 
and Firm 
Value: The 
Canadian 
Evidence 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A Sample of 
263 Canadian 
Firms. 
 
Market value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Canada Board 
composition 
and 
independence 
are negatively 
related to firm 
performance 
 
 
Veltrop et al. 
(2015)  
 
 
A Tale of Two 
Factions: Why 
and When 
Factional 
Demographic 
Faultlines Hurt 
Board 
Performance 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Questionnaire 
and archival 
data 
A sample of 
318 Dutch 
pension fund 
boards 
registered 
with DNB in 
2009. 
 
Accounting 
measure (ROI) 
 
Netherlands Board factional 
demographic 
faultlines have 
a negative 
effect on firm 
performance. 
Yeh et al. 
(2011) 
 
 
Committee 
Independence 
and Financial 
Institution 
Performance 
during the 
2007-08 Credit 
Crunch: 
Evidence from 
a Multi-
Country Study 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
Sample from 
20 largest 
financial 
institutions 
from G8 
countries. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA and 
ROE) and 
Market value 
(stock 
returns) 
Australia, 
Canada, 
France, 
Germany, 
Italy, Japan, 
UK, and the 
US 
The proportion 
of NEDs on 
audit and risk 
committees is 
positively 
related to firm 
performance 
during the 
2007-08 
financial crisis 
 
Civil law and 
excessive risk-
taking 
moderate 
NEDs-
performance 
relationship 
 
Kiel and 
Nicholson 
(2003) 
 
Board 
Composition 
and Corporate 
Performance: 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
Sample from 
348 
Australia Larger boards 
and proportion 
of inside 
directors are 
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How the 
Australian 
Experience 
Informs 
Contrasting 
Theories of 
Corporate 
Governance 
International 
Review 
Australian 
largest listed 
companies. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) and 
market value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
positively and 
significantly 
related to 
Tobin’s Q, but 
not 
significantly 
associated 
with ROA 
 
CEO Duality 
has an 
insignificant 
relationship 
with firm 
performance 
Grove et al. 
(2011) 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
and 
Performance in 
the Wake of 
the Financial 
Crisis: Evidence 
from US 
Commercial 
Banks 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
236 public US 
commercial 
banks. 
 
Accounting 
measure 
(ROA), 
Market-based 
(future excess 
return-alpha) 
and Loan 
quality (Non-
performing 
assets ratio) 
US Find a negative 
and positive 
relationship 
between 
board size and 
firm 
performance 
(ROA and 
alpha). 
 
Small board 
size has a 
positive and 
significant 
effect on firm 
performance 
(Loan quality) 
 
No evidence to 
show a 
negative 
relationship 
between the 
proportion of 
inside 
directors and 
firm 
performance. 
 
CEO Duality 
has a negative 
and significant 
impact on ROA 
and alpha, but 
the negative 
 280 
 
effect on loan 
quality is not 
significant. 
 
Singh and 
Gaur (2009) 
 
 
Business 
Group 
Affiliation, 
Firm 
Governance, 
and Firm 
Performance: 
Evidence from 
China and 
India 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
from top 500 
for India and 
China. 
A sample of 
400 Indian 
firms and 413 
Chinese firms. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA, ROE, 
and Return on 
Sales). 
 
India and 
China 
The proportion 
of NEDs is 
negatively 
related to firm 
performance. 
 
 
Ramdani and 
Witteloostuijn 
(2010) 
 
  
 
The Impact of 
Board 
Independence 
and CEO 
Duality on Firm 
Performance: 
A Quantile 
Regression 
Analysis for 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
South Korea 
and Thailand 
British 
Journal of 
Management 
Quantitative; 
Questionnaire  
A sample of 
listed firms 
from Stock 
Exchanges in 
four East 
Asian 
countries. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) 
Indonesia, 
Malaysia, 
South Korea, 
and Thailand 
 
 
CEO duality 
and proportion 
of inside 
directors have 
a positive 
effect on the 
firm with low-
performance. 
 
CEO non-
duality and 
proportion of 
NEDs have a 
positive 
influence on 
high-
performing 
firms. 
 
Elsayed 
(2007) 
Does CEO 
Duality really 
affect 
Corporate 
Performance?  
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
92 Egyptian 
listed firms 
from 19 
industries. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) and 
Egypt The 
relationship 
between CEO 
duality and 
corporate 
finance is 
negative, 
positive, and 
neutral 
depending on 
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Market value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
 
the industry 
type. 
Rose (2005) 
 
 
The 
Composition of 
Semi-Two-Tier 
Corporate 
Boards and 
Firm 
Performance 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
Sample from 
non-financial 
Danish listed 
firms 
 446 firm-
years 
observation. 
 
Market value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
Denmark Board size has 
a negative 
influence on 
firm 
performance 
 
The 
relationship 
between 
inside 
directors and 
corporate 
performance is 
insignificant 
 
Dulewicz and 
Herbert 
(2004) 
 
 
Does the 
Composition 
and Practice of 
Boards of 
Directors Bear 
any 
Relationship to 
the 
Performance 
of their 
Companies 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data, 
sample of at 
least 86 firms 
from FAME 
and QUEST 
databases. 
 
Cash Flow 
Return on 
Total Assets 
(CF ROTA) 
and Sales 
Turnover 
(sales) 
UK The proportion 
of NEDs has an 
insignificant 
effect on 
CFROTA and 
negative 
(significant) 
influence on 
sales 
performance 
 
Board size is 
not 
significantly 
related to both 
performance 
measures. 
 
Erhardt et al. 
(2003)  
 
 
Board of 
Directors 
Diversity and 
Firm Financial 
Performance 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
Sample from 
112 large US 
firms. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA and 
ROI). 
 
US Board diversity 
has a positive 
and significant 
effect on firm 
performance 
Iyengar and 
Zampelli 
(2009)  
Self-Selection, 
Endogeneity, 
and the 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Quantitative;  
Archival data 
US The 
antecedents of 
duality 
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Relationship 
between CEO 
Duality and 
Firm 
Performance 
Sample from 
non-financial, 
non-utility 
S&P 
companies in 
the 
ExeuComp 
database for 
1995 to 2003 
1,880 firm-
years 
observations. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA and 
EPS), Market 
value (Tobin’s 
Q) and 
Market return 
leadership 
structure 
moderates the 
relationship 
between CEO 
duality and 
firm 
performance 
relationship 
 
Selective bias 
leads to a 
negative 
relationship 
between CEO 
duality and 
firm 
performance 
measured with 
market return 
and EPS, but 
not with ROA 
and Tobin’s Q 
 
 Luan and 
Tang (2007)  
 
 
 
Where is 
independent 
director 
efficacy? 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
259 
Taiwanese 
firms in 
electronic 
industry. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROE) 
 
Taiwan The proportion 
of outside 
directors on 
the board has 
a positive and 
significant 
effect on firm 
performance. 
 
Rose (2007) 
 
 
Does Female 
Board 
Representation 
Influence Firm 
Performance? 
the Danish 
Evidence 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
from 1998 to 
2001 
The sample 
consists of 
non-financial 
firms listed on 
the 
Copenhagen 
Stock 
Exchange 
Denmark The 
relationship 
between the 
proportion of 
women 
directors on 
the board and 
corporate 
performance is 
negative, but 
not 
significantly 
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443 firm-
years 
observations. 
 
Market value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
 
different from 
zero 
Chapple and 
Humphrey 
(2014) 
 
 
Does Board 
Bender 
Diversity have 
a Financial 
Impact? 
Evidence using 
Stock Portfolio 
Performance 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
577 S&P/ASX 
3000 
The period 
from 2004 to 
2011. 
 
Overall 
market 
outcome 
(capital 
market gains) 
 
Australia Find no 
significant 
relationship 
between the 
proportion of 
women 
directors on 
the board and 
corporate 
performance 
Ali et al. 
(2014) 
 
 
Board Age and 
Gender 
Diversity: A 
Test of 
Competing for 
Linear and 
Curvilinear 
Predictions 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
288 large 
companies 
listed on the 
Australian 
Stock 
Exchange as 
of 2012. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) and 
Employee 
productivity 
 
Australia Gender 
diversity is 
positively and 
significantly 
related to 
employee 
productivity, 
but 
insignificantly 
effect ROA 
Ellwood and 
Garcia-Lacalle 
(2015) 
 
 
 
The Influence 
of Presence 
and Position of 
Women on the 
Boards of 
Directors: The 
Case of NHS 
Foundations 
Trusts 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
NHS 
Foundation 
Trusts (FTs) in 
England 
316 firm-
years 
observations. 
 
England 
 
Presence of 
female 
directors on 
the board has 
an insignificant 
effect on both 
measures of 
firm 
performance.  
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Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) and 
Service 
quality 
(Clinical 
negligence 
costs) 
Woman as 
CEO or Chair of 
the board has 
a positive and 
significant 
impact on 
service quality, 
not on ROA. 
 
  
Haß et al. 
(2016) 
 
 
 
Is Corporate 
Governance in 
China related 
to 
Performance 
Persistence? 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
1,384 firms 
listed on the 
Shanghai and 
Shenzhen 
Stock 
Exchanges 
from 2001 to 
2011. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROA) 
The sum of 
ROAs and 
Volatility ROA 
China Board size has 
a positive 
effect on 
performance 
persistence. 
 
CEO duality is 
negatively and 
significantly 
related to 
short-term 
performance 
persistence. 
 
NEDs have a 
positive effect 
on poor 
performing 
firms. 
 
Ryan and 
Haslam (2005)  
 
 
 
 
The Glass Cliff: 
Evidence that 
Women are 
Over-
Represented in 
Precarious 
Leadership 
Positions 
British 
Journal of 
Management 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
FTSE 100 
companies on 
the London 
Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Share price 
(percentage 
of movement 
over 12 
months 
preceding 12 
December 
2003) 
UK Firm 
performance 
was relatively 
stable in both 
before and 
after the 
appointment 
of male 
directors. 
However, 
those firms 
that appointed 
women 
directors had 
experienced 
continually 
poor 
performance 
in the months 
before the 
appointment. 
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In a stable 
market, the 
appointment 
of female 
directors 
improves firm 
performance 
 
Ferris and Yan 
(2007)  
 
 
 
Do 
Independent 
Directors and 
Chairmen 
Matter? The 
Role of Board 
of Directors in 
Mutual Fund 
Governance 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
448 fund 
families listed 
in the CSRP 
database. 
 
Fund’s total 
return within 
each 
investment 
objective 
during 2001 
US The proportion 
of NEDs and 
the presence 
of an 
independent 
chairman have 
no significant 
effect on 
preventing the 
likelihood of a 
fund scandal. 
 
A large board, 
multiple 
directorships 
of NED and 
unexplained 
independent 
directors’ 
compensation 
are positively 
and 
significantly 
related to fund 
scandal 
 
Francoeur et 
al. (2008) 
 
 
 
 
Gender 
Diversity in 
Corporate 
Governance 
and Top 
Management 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
230 
companies 
from Financial 
Post’s List of 
the 500 
Canadian 
largest firms. 
 
Firm’s return 
by its beta, 
size and book-
Canada There is a 
positive and 
significant 
relationship 
between 
women as 
officers of a 
firm that 
operates in a 
complex 
environment 
and abnormal 
return. 
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to-market 
ratio 
 
The proportion 
of female 
directors has 
no significant 
relationship 
with financial 
performance. 
 
 
Hutchinson 
and Gul 
(2004) 
 
 
Investment 
Opportunity 
Set, Corporate 
Governance 
Practices and 
Firm 
Performance 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
437 from top 
500 firms 
listed on the 
Australian 
Stock 
Exchange for 
1998 to 1999. 
 
Accounting 
measures 
(ROE) 
 
Australia The proportion 
of NEDs on the 
board 
decreases the 
negative effect 
of growth 
opportunity 
and firm 
performance 
Combs et al. 
(2007) 
 
 
The 
Moderating 
Effect of CEO 
Power on the 
Board 
Composition-
Firm 
Performance 
Relationship 
Journal of 
Management 
Studies 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
Event study 
(CEO’s death) 
methodology 
A sample of 
73 US firms. 
 
Abnormal 
returns 
US CEO power 
moderates the 
relationship 
between 
board 
composition 
and firm 
performance. 
 
The stock price 
falls when a 
powerful CEO 
dies with an 
outside 
dominated 
board or less 
powerful CEO 
with executive 
dominated the 
board. 
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Appendix I (ii): Previous Studies on the Relationship between Board and Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
 
Name of 
the Author 
(s) and  
Year of the 
Publication  
Title of the paper Tittle of the  
Journal 
Methodology 
and 
Performance 
(CSR) Measure 
 
Country  Main findings 
Walls et al. 
(2012)  
 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Environmental 
Performance: Is 
There Really a 
Link? 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Quantitative; 
Archival data, a 
sample of 313 
firms cutting 
across 29 
industries from 
S&P 500 firms. 
 
Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and 
Dominis’s 
(KLD) dataset. 
 
US Board 
independent, 
less diverse 
board and 
larger board 
have a 
significant 
negative 
effect on 
environmental 
performance 
 
Bear et al. 
(2010) 
 
 
  
 
The Impact of 
Board Diversity 
and Gender 
Compensation on 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
and Firm 
Reputation 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
 
A sample of 51 
health care 
firms drawn 
from Fortune’s 
2009 Most 
Admiral List.   
 
 
CSR measure  
(KLD) 
US CSR is 
positively 
related to 
corporate 
reputation 
 
 
Female 
directors are 
positively and 
significantly 
associated 
with 
institutional 
and technical 
strengths  
 
A positive, but 
weak link is 
found 
between the 
diversity of 
directors’ 
resources and 
environmental 
performance. 
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An additional 
number of 
female 
directors on 
the board 
improve CSR 
activities. 
 
Jo and 
Harjoto 
(2012)  
 
 
 
 
The Causal Effect 
of Corporate 
Governance on 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
From a sample 
of 2,952 firms 
for the period 
1993 to 2004. 
 
CSR 
performance 
(KLD), 
Firm 
value(Tobin’s 
Q) 
US CSR does not 
affect 
corporate 
governance 
variables, but 
governance 
variables 
positively 
influence CSR 
activities. 
 
CSR positively 
and 
significantly 
affect firm 
financial 
performance. 
 
Jo and 
Harjoto 
(2011) 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Firm Value: The 
Impact of 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
A sample of 
2,952 US firms 
from 1993-
2004. 
 
CSR 
performance 
(KLD), 
Firm 
value(Tobin’s 
Q) 
US Choice of CSR 
engagement 
varies with the 
internal and 
external 
governance 
mechanisms 
 
CSR 
engagement 
improves firm 
value 
 
CSR activities 
that improve 
firms’ value 
are mostly 
from firms’ 
internal social 
enhancement, 
not the 
external 
enhancement. 
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Harrison 
and 
Coombs 
(2012) 
 
 
The Moderating 
Effects from 
Corporate 
Governance 
Characteristics on 
the Relationship 
between 
Available Slack 
and Community-
Based Firm 
Performance 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source (from 
1990-2004). 
A sample of 
1,060 from a 
population of 
44 two-digit 
SIC code 
industries.  
 
KLD 
US Available slack 
has a positive 
and significant 
link with 
community-
based 
performance. 
 
The 
proportion of 
NEDs has a 
negative and 
significant 
impact on 
available slack 
and this 
decreases the 
effect of slack 
on 
community-
based 
performance. 
 
Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013). 
 
 
Black Economic 
Empowerment 
Disclosure by 
South African 
Listed 
Corporations: the 
Influence of 
Ownership and 
Board 
Characteristics 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source (from 
2003 to 2009). 
A sample of 75 
listed South 
African non-
financial and 
utility firms at 
the end of 
2009. 
 
Black 
Economic 
Empowerment 
(BEE) scores 
(content 
analysis) 
South 
Africa 
Board 
diversity, 
(excluding 
gender), 
board size and 
the proportion 
of NEDs have 
a positive and 
significant 
relationship 
with the level 
of BEE 
disclosure. 
 
CEO duality 
and 
proportion of 
women 
directors have 
an 
insignificant 
effect on BEE 
disclosure. 
 
 Bai (2013) 
 
 
How does Board 
Size and 
Occupational 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
sources, 
US Board size is 
positively 
related to the 
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Background of 
Directors 
Influence Social 
Performance in 
For-Profit and 
Non-Profit 
Organisations? 
Evidence from 
California 
Hospitals 
 
Sample 363 
(137 for-profit 
and 226 non-
profits) 
Californian 
hospitals  
 
Hospital’s 
expenditures 
for community 
benefits. 
 
firm value of 
non-profit 
hospitals. 
 
Board size is 
negatively and 
significantly 
associated 
with the 
performance 
of for-profit 
hospitals. 
Jia and 
Zhang 
(2013) 
 
 
Critical Mass of 
Women on BODs, 
Multiple 
Identities and 
Corporate 
Philanthropic 
Disaster 
Response: 
Evidence from 
Privately Owned 
Chinese Firms 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
492 listed and 
913 
observations 
related to 
Wenchuan and 
Yushu 
earthquakes.  
 
Corporate 
philanthropic 
disaster 
response CPDR 
(Donations and 
Giving). 
 
China The 
proportion of 
women (at 
least 3) is 
positively and 
significantly 
related to 
CPDR. 
Arora and 
Dharwadkar 
(2011) 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility: 
the Moderating 
Roles of 
Attainment 
Discrepancy and 
Organisational 
Slack 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data, 
A sample of 
518 US firms. 
 
KLD 
US Effective 
governance 
mechanisms 
mitigate 
negative CSR 
in high-
performing 
firms (positive 
slack) and 
curtail positive 
CSR in low-
performing 
firms 
(negative 
slack). 
 
Brammer et 
al. (2009) 
 
Corporate 
Reputation and 
British 
Journal of 
Management 
Quantitative; 
Archival data, 
UK The 
proportion of 
women 
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 Women on the 
Board 
 
A sample of 
199 UK FTSE 
100 
companies. 
 
Corporate 
reputation 
(Britain’s most 
admiral 
companies’ 
survey from 
management 
today, 2002) 
 
directors is 
positively 
related to the 
reputation of 
firms from 
consumer 
services, but 
negatively 
related to 
firms from 
producer 
services. 
 
 Musteen et 
al. (2010) 
 
 
Corporate 
Reputation: Do 
Board 
Characteristics 
Matter? 
British 
Journal of 
Management 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
324 firms from 
manufacturing 
and service 
sectors in 
Fortune’s list 
of most 
admired 
companies in 
the US. 
 
Corporate 
reputation 
(Fortune’s 
reputational 
rankings). 
 
US Independent 
outside 
directors and 
larger boards 
are 
significantly 
related to 
corporate 
reputation. 
 
CEO non-
duality is 
negatively 
associated 
with corporate 
reputation. 
 
Brown et al. 
(2006) 
 
 
Corporate 
Philanthropic 
Practices 
Journal of 
Corporate 
Finance 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
207 firms from 
Fortune 500 
firms identified 
in the 1998 
issue.  
 
Giving (cash 
contribution to 
charity) 
 
US Larger boards 
are positively 
and 
significantly 
related to 
corporate 
giving. 
 
Board 
composition 
has no 
significant 
effect on 
corporate 
giving. 
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 Jamali et al. 
(2008) 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Synergies and 
Interrelationship. 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Qualitative; 
In-depth semi-
structured 
interviews (2 
hours) with 8 
medium and 
large 
companies 
operating in 
Lebanon. 
 
Lebanon Corporate 
governance 
serves as the 
pillar of CSR 
and 
governance in 
developing 
markets is 
shifting 
towards 
sustainable 
CSR. 
 
Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013). 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Performance in 
Socially 
Responsible 
Corporations: 
New Empirical 
Insight from a 
Neo-Institutional 
Framework. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source (from 
2002 to 2009). 
A sample of 75 
non-financial 
firms listed on 
the 
Johannesburg 
Stock 
Exchange. 
 
CSR Index 
South 
Africa 
Effective 
corporate 
governance 
(board size, 
diversity and 
NEDs) 
mechanisms 
improve CSR 
practice. 
 
CG and CSR 
jointly have a 
strong and 
significant 
influence on 
financial 
performance. 
 
Hafsi and 
Turgut 
(2013). 
 
 
 
Boardroom 
Diversity and Its 
effect on Social 
Performance: 
Conceptualization 
and Empirical 
Evidence.  
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 95 
firms listed in 
the S&P 500 
(manufacturing 
and service 
industries). 
 
CSR (KLD) 
US Differences 
within the 
board 
(diversity in 
boards) have a 
positive and 
significant 
effect on CSR 
performance.  
 
The diversity 
of boards has 
no direct 
effect on CSR 
performance. 
 
Khan et al. 
(2013). 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Corporate Social 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; Bangladesh Board 
independence 
and presence 
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 Responsibility 
Disclosures: 
Evidence from an 
Emerging 
Economy. 
 
Archival data 
source (2005-
2009). 
A sample of 
116 
manufacturing 
companies 
listed on the 
Dhaka Stock 
Exchange, 
Bangladesh. 
 
of audit 
committee 
have positive 
and significant 
relationships 
with CSR 
disclosures. 
 
CEO duality 
has an 
insignificant 
effect on CSR 
disclosures. 
 
Zhang et al. 
(2013). 
 
 
Board 
Composition and 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility: An 
Empirical 
Investigation in 
the Post-
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Era. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
516 of the 
largest firms 
(64 industries) 
listed on the 
US Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Fortunes 
Magazine’s 
America’s 
Most Admiral 
Corporations 
(FAMA)and 
KLD. 
 
US Proportions of 
NEDs and 
women on the 
board have a 
positive and 
significant 
effect on CSR 
(FAMA) 
performance. 
 
Women 
directors (not 
NEDs) have a 
positive effect 
on CSR (KLD) 
performance. 
 
Jizi et al. 
(2014).  
 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure: 
Evidence from 
the US Banking 
Sector. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
291 firm-year 
observations 
of US-listed 
banks from 
2009 to 2011.  
 
CSR rating 
scores. 
 
US The 
proportion of 
NEDs, board 
size and CEO 
duality are 
positively and 
significantly 
related to CSR 
disclosure. 
 
Isidro and 
Sobral 
(2015). 
 
 
The Effect of 
Women on 
Corporate Boards 
on Firm Value, 
Financial 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
922 firm-year 
observations 
16 
European 
countries 
 
The 
proportion of 
women on the 
board has an 
indirect effect 
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Performance, and 
Ethical and Social 
Compliance. 
 
(16 countries 
and 3 year 
period) drawn 
from The 
Financial Times 
2011 
classification of 
the 500 largest 
European 
firms.  
 
on firm value 
through 
influence on 
ethical and 
social 
compliance. 
Harjoto et 
al. (2015). 
 
 
Board Diversity 
and Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
1,489 US firms 
from 1999 to 
2011.  
 
KLD 
US Board 
diversity has a 
positive and 
significant 
influence on 
CSR 
components 
in the 
community, 
environment, 
product and 
corporate 
governance 
areas, but not 
in the 
employees 
and human 
rights areas. 
 
The effect of 
gender 
diversity is 
stronger in the 
firms that 
operate in 
consumer-
oriented 
product and 
those openly 
in more 
competitive 
markets. 
 
Shaukat et 
al., (2016).  
 
 
Board Attributes, 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Strategy, and 
Corporate 
Environmental 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source from 
Asset4 and 
DataStream 
Universe of UK 
UK CSR 
orientation 
boards are 
found to have 
a positive and 
significant 
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and Social 
Performance. 
 
listed firms 
cutting across 
10 industries 
from 2002 to 
2010 
2,028 firm-year 
observations. 
 
influence on 
CSR strategy, 
which in turn 
improve 
environmental 
and social 
performance, 
but the 
relationship is 
endogenously 
determined 
and self-
reinforcing. 
 
Lau et al. 
(2016). 
 
 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility in 
China: A 
Corporate 
Governance 
Approach. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source with a 
sample of 471 
Chinese firms. 
 
CSR rating 
scores 
China Board 
structure 
(proportion of 
NED and 
female 
directors) 
does not have 
a significant 
effect on CSR 
performance. 
 
Galbreath 
(2016). 
 
 
When Do Board 
and Management 
Resources 
Complement 
Each Other? A 
Study of the  
Effects on 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
295 Australian 
firms from 
Australian 
Securities 
Exchange 300 
(ASX300).  
 
Sustainability 
Investment 
Research 
Institute 
(SIRIS)-CSR 
Index. 
 
Australia Proportions of 
NEDs and 
women 
directors 
jointly have a 
greater 
influence on 
CSR, than 
individually. 
Hong et al. 
(2016). 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Executive 
Compensation for 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
Sample of 
2,561 
executive-
observations. 
US Better 
governed 
firms are more 
likely to 
provide 
compensation 
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 KLD 
contracts 
linked to CSR. 
 
Compensation 
with ties to 
CSR is 
positively and 
significantly 
related to CSR 
activities. 
 
Hussain et 
al. (2016). 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Sustainability 
Performance: 
Analysis of Triple 
Bottom Line 
Performance. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source,  
The sample 
involved 100 
US companies 
from the high-
performing 
Global Fortune 
2013 list, 152 
reports issued 
by selected 
firms during 
the period 
2007 to 2011.  
 
GRI 
information 
(content 
analysis). 
 
US Board 
independence, 
women 
directors, CEO 
duality and 
board 
meetings have 
no significant 
relation to the 
economic 
bottom of 
sustainability 
performance. 
 
NEDs 
positively and 
significantly 
influence the 
environment 
and social 
sustainability 
performance. 
 
CEO duality 
has a negative 
and significant 
effect on 
environmental 
performance. 
Diversity 
influences 
positively the 
social, but not 
environmental 
sustainability 
performance. 
 
Board 
meetings and 
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board size 
have no effect 
on 
environmental 
sustainability 
performance. 
 
 Muttakin et 
al. (2016). 
 
 
The Effect of 
Board Capital and 
CEO Power on 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Disclosure. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
non-financial 
companies 
listed on the 
Bangladesh 
Dhaka Stock 
Exchange from 
2005-2013 
(1,005 firm-
year 
observations). 
 
CSR disclosure 
index. 
Bangladesh. Board capital 
is positively 
and 
significantly 
related to CSR 
disclosure. 
 
Powerful CEO 
is negatively 
associated 
with the level 
of CSR 
disclosure and 
may likely 
decrease the 
impact of 
board capital 
on CSR 
disclosure. 
 
Liao et al. 
(2016). 
 
 
 
Corporate Boards 
and Corporate 
Social 
Responsibility 
Assurance: 
Evidence from 
China. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
2,054 firm-year 
observations 
of Chinese 
listed firms.  
 
CSR assurance 
(dummy 
variable). 
 
China. Board size, 
women 
directors and 
CEO non-
duality have a 
positive and 
significant 
effect on CSR 
assurance. 
 
Proportions of 
independent 
NEDs and 
supervisory 
directors have 
negative 
impacts on 
CSR 
assurance. 
 
Ibrahim et 
al. (2003). 
 
Board Members 
in the Service 
Industry: An 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
US Outside 
directors are 
positively and 
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 Empirical 
Examination of 
the Relationship 
between 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Orientation and 
Directorial Type. 
 
A sample of 
307 US board 
members (198 
outside and 
109 inside 
directors). 
 
 
significantly 
related to 
discretionary 
CSR activities, 
but have a 
weaker effect 
on economic 
CSR activities. 
 
Outside and 
inside 
directors have 
no significant 
difference in 
regard to 
ethical and 
legal CSR 
activities. 
 
Prado-
Lorenzo and 
Garcia-
Sanchez 
(2010). 
 
 
The Role of the 
Board of 
Directors in 
Disseminating 
Relevant 
Information on 
Greenhouse 
Gases. 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics. 
Quantitative; 
Archival data 
source, 
A sample of 
283 non-
financial and 
insurance 
companies 
listed on the 
FTSE Global 
Equity Index.  
 
Carbon 
Disclosure 
Project (CDP) 6 
scores on 
GHGE. 
28 
countries 
(cutting 
across both 
developing 
and 
developed 
countries) 
with the 
largest 
sample 
(115) from 
the US. 
 
CEO duality 
has a positive 
and significant 
effect on the 
dissemination 
of greenhouse 
gases 
information, 
but the firm’s 
environmental 
behaviour and 
sensitivity of 
the industry 
eliminate the 
effect. 
 
Independent 
NEDs 
encourage less 
greenhouse 
emission 
information 
disclosure in 
firms with 
lower 
environmental 
behaviour and 
in those firms 
that operate 
in industries 
with a higher 
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risk of 
litigation. 
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Appendix I (iii): Summary of the Previous Empirical Studies on the Board Processes 
 
Name of the 
Author (s) and 
Year of 
Publication 
 
Title of the 
paper 
Title of the 
Journal 
Country 
of the 
Study 
Methodology Main findings 
Huse et al. (2009) 
 
Women and 
Employee-
Elected Board 
Members and 
Their 
Contributions 
to Board 
Control Tasks 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
Norway Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
Responses 
from 840 
board 
members of 
Norwegian 
firms 
Women directors 
have a positive and 
significant effect on 
strategic types of 
control and CSR 
control tasks, but 
insignificantly 
related to 
behavioural and 
budget control 
tasks. 
 
The ratio of women 
has no significant 
effect on creative 
discussions, but 
women’s 
backgrounds and 
esteem have a 
significant impact 
on the creative 
discussion. 
 
Andrés‐Alonso et 
al. (2010) 
 
Beyond the 
Disciplinary 
Role of 
Governance: 
How Boards 
Add Value to 
Spanish 
Foundations 
 
British Journal 
of 
Management 
Spain Quantitative; 
The 
questionnaire 
received 119 
responses 
from Spanish 
foundations 
listed in a 
national 
register. 
Board size and 
proportion of NEDs 
have a weak effect 
on organisational 
efficiency, but 
diverse knowledge 
in the boardroom 
and active 
engagement of 
directors have a 
strong impact on 
firm efficiency. 
 
Pugliese et al. 
(2015). 
 
An 
Observational 
Analysis of the 
Impact of Board 
Dynamics and 
Directors’ 
British Journal 
of 
Management. 
Australia  Qualitative; 
Direct 
observation 
and interview 
Smooth turn-taking 
between directors 
in the boardroom 
may likely be the 
best way to assess 
whether board 
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Participation on 
Perceived 
Board 
Effectiveness. 
 
members have the 
opportunity to 
question and 
monitor executive, 
rather than the 
ratio of outside to 
inside directors. 
 
Taking fewer 
amounts of turns by 
the main 
contributor in the 
boardroom 
provides ample 
opportunity for 
other directors to 
be more engaged 
and give sufficient 
contributions in an 
open environment. 
These are 
associated with 
perceived board 
effectiveness. 
 
Melkumov et al. 
(2015). 
 
Directors’ 
Social 
Identifications 
and Board 
Tasks: Evidence 
from Finland. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Finland Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
92 responses 
from Finland’s 
largest 
industrial 
firms. 
 
Directors’ 
identification with 
the focal 
organisation has 
positive effects on 
financial monitoring 
and strategic 
evaluation, but has 
an inverted-U shape 
relationship with 
top management 
monitoring. 
 
Directors’ 
identification with 
the organisation has 
a positive impact on 
external legitimacy, 
networking, advice 
and counsel, and 
strategic 
participation tasks. 
 
Directors’ 
shareholder's 
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identification is 
positively related to 
only management 
monitoring tasks. 
Further, it has a 
negative effect on 
strategic 
participation. 
 
 Tuggle et al., 
(2010). 
Attention 
Patterns in the 
Boardroom: 
How Board 
Composition 
and Processes 
Affect 
Discussion of 
Entrepreneurial 
issues. 
 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
US Quantitative; 
Archival data, 
a sample of 
184 public 
listed firms 
from 18 
industries. 
Boards with weak 
(not strong) 
faultlines 
(heterogeneity) are 
more likely to 
allocate greater 
attention to 
entrepreneurial 
issues. 
 
The frequency of 
board meetings, 
venue of the 
meetings and the 
structure of the 
meetings may likely 
effect board 
member’s attention 
to the discussion of 
entrepreneurial 
issues. 
 
Informal meetings 
moderate the 
relationship 
between board 
heterogeneity and 
discussion of 
entrepreneurial 
issues. It also 
reduces the 
negative effect of 
strong faultlines 
and attention to 
entrepreneurial 
issues. 
 
Machold et al. 
(2011). 
 
Board 
Leadership and 
Strategy 
Involvement in 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
Norway Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
Board members’ 
knowledge 
utilisation, board 
development, and 
 303 
 
Small Firms: A 
Team 
Production 
Approach. 
 
International 
Review. 
Sample of 140 
Norwegian 
firms. 
board leadership 
efficacy have a 
greater influence on 
board strategy 
involvement and 
this is possible with 
boards that have 
CEO duality. 
 
Minichilli et al. 
(2009). 
 
Making Boards 
Effective: An 
Empirical 
Examination of 
Board Task 
Performance. 
 
British Journal 
of 
Management 
Italy Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
301 responses 
from the 
largest Italian 
industrial 
firms. 
 
Board critical 
debate and 
commitment have a 
positive and 
significant influence 
on advice and 
networking roles. 
 
The commitment of 
directors has a 
positive effect on 
strategic 
participation, 
output control, and 
strategic control 
roles. 
 
Firm size and 
outside directors 
are negatively 
related to strategic 
participation. 
 
Board members’ 
background 
diversity has a 
negative effect on 
advice, output 
control and 
strategic control 
roles. 
 
 Kula (2005). 
 
The impact of 
the Roles, 
Structure, and 
Process of 
Board on Firm 
Performance: 
Evidence from 
Turkey. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
Turkey Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
responses 
from 386 small 
and non-listed 
Turkish stock 
ownership 
firms. 
 
Board resource 
acquisition role, 
CEO non-duality, 
and board 
processes (board 
effectiveness and 
access to 
information) are 
positively and 
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significantly related 
to firm 
performance. 
 
CEO dualities, 
outside directors, 
service and 
monitoring roles 
have insignificant 
effects on firm 
performance. 
 
Nielsen and Huse 
(2010). 
 
The 
Contribution of 
Women on 
Boards of 
Directors: 
Going Beyond 
the Surface. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
Norway  Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
201 responses 
from CEOs of 
Norwegian 
firms having 
50 to 5,000 
employees.  
Board development 
and open debates 
have positive 
effects on board 
strategic and 
operational 
controls. Board 
level of conflict is 
negatively related 
to strategic control, 
but not operational 
control. 
 
Women directors 
are positively 
related to strategic 
control and 
decrease boards’ 
levels of conflict. 
Women directors 
have no significant 
relationship with 
open debate. 
 
 
The relationship 
between women 
and strategic 
control is fully 
mediated by board 
development and 
decreased conflict 
 
Wan and Ong 
(2005). 
 
Board 
Structure, 
Process, and 
Performance: 
Evidence from 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
Singapore Quantitative, 
Questionnaire 
and Archival 
data, 212 
responses 
Effort norms, 
presence and use of 
knowledge and 
skills are positively 
related to board 
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Public-Listed 
Companies in 
Singapore. 
 
from multiple 
respondents 
(chairmen, 
executive, 
non-executive 
directors and 
company 
secretaries) of 
Singapore 
incorporated 
firms.  
monitoring, service 
and strategic roles. 
 
The cognitive 
conflict has a 
positive influence 
on strategic roles, 
but insignificant 
effect on 
monitoring and 
service roles. 
 
There is no 
relationship 
between board 
structure and board 
processes and 
effectiveness. 
 
Zona and Zattoni 
(2007). 
 
Beyond the 
Black Box of 
Demography: 
Board 
Processes and 
Task 
Effectiveness 
within Italian 
Firms. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
Italy Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
301 responses 
from CEOs of 
the largest 
Italian 
manufacturing 
firms. 
Board size, effort 
norms and use of 
knowledge and 
skills have positive 
effects on 
monitoring task. 
Cognitive conflict is 
not significantly 
associated with 
monitoring task. 
 
Outside directors, 
cognitive conflict 
and use of 
knowledge and 
skills are positively 
and strongly related 
to networking role, 
but effort norms 
have a weak effect 
on networking task. 
 
Board processes 
variables have 
greater explanatory 
power than 
structure variables. 
 
Robert et al., 
(2005).  
 
Beyond Agency 
Conceptions of 
the Work of the 
British Journal 
of 
Management. 
U.K Qualitative, 40 
In-depth 
interviews 
While board 
structure 
contributes to 
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Non-Executive 
Directors: 
Creating 
Accountability 
in the 
Boardroom. 
 
board effectiveness, 
it is the actual 
conduct of NEDs 
that determines 
board effectiveness. 
 
No single theory is 
appropriate to 
reflect the actual 
directors’ 
behaviours and 
experience. 
Therefore, scholars 
should use 
theoretical 
pluralism to fully 
understand board 
processes and 
dynamics. 
 
Ingley and Van 
Der Walt (2005). 
 
Do Board 
Processes 
Influence 
Director and 
Board 
Performance? 
Statutory and 
Performance 
Implications. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
New 
Zealand 
Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
418 responses 
from 
population 
drawn from a 
National 
database of 
3000 
members of 
the Institute of 
Directors 
(IoD). 
 
Improving 
shareholder’s 
wealth has number 
fourth greatest 
importance in 
regard to board 
tasks. 
 
Board influence on 
key corporate 
activities: 
Fundamental 
strategic directions 
(38.7%) 
Shareholders value 
(16.4%). 
 
Relationship with 
shareholders is 
(37.2) 
Relationship with 
stakeholders is                        
(20.3%). 
 
Directors and board 
share strategy 
development (65.8), 
rather than 
management alone 
developing the 
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strategy (1.0) and 
seek approval 
(20.0). 
Board main role is 
to define the 
strategy (34.6), 
rather than approve 
(7.3), ratify (4.7) or 
monitor (3.3). 
 
Rutherford and 
Buchholtz (2007). 
 
Investigating 
the 
Relationship 
between Board 
Characteristics 
and Board 
Information. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
US Quantitative; 
Questionnaire 
and Archival 
data, 
Responses 
from 
Chairperson of 
public US 149 
firms in 
Chemicals, 
Printing and 
Publishing, 
and Industrial 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
industries. 
 
The proportion of 
non-executive 
directors increases 
the quality of 
information 
received, but NEDs’ 
tenure does not 
improve the quality 
of information. 
Bezemer et al. 
(2007). 
 
Investigating 
the 
Development 
of the Internal 
and External 
Service Tasks of 
Non-Executive 
Directors: The 
Case of the 
Netherlands 
(1997-2005). 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
Netherlan
ds 
Quantitative; 
Archival data, 
900 firm-year 
observations 
of the top 100 
listed firms in 
the 
Netherlands 
from 1997 to 
2005. 
NEDs’ service task is 
more focused on 
internal service 
tasks (advice and 
counsel), than 
external service 
(boundary spanner) 
role. 
Brundin and 
Nordqvist (2008). 
 
Beyond Facts 
and Figures: 
The Role of 
Emotions in 
Boardroom 
Dynamics. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
Sweden Qualitative; 
Observation, 
open-ended 
interviews, 
and document 
analysis (diary 
notes from 
CEOs). 
Attended five 
board 
meetings each 
Short-term and 
long-term emotions 
affect board work 
and improve or 
impede board task 
(service and control 
roles) performance. 
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lasted for 2 to 
3 hours of 
Trigon, a 
manufacturer 
of furniture 
components in 
Sweden 
 
Westphal and 
Bednar (2005). 
 
Pluralistic 
Ignorance in 
Corporate 
Boards and 
Firms’ Strategic 
Persistence in 
Response to 
Low Firm 
Performance. 
 
Administrativ
e Science 
Quarterly. 
US Quantitative; 
Questionnaire 
and archival 
data, 225 
responses 
Due to a spiral of 
silence among 
board members, 
poor strategies are 
persistently used. 
Reluctant to express 
concerns about 
strategy by each 
director as a result 
of demographic 
heterogeneity or 
fewer friendship 
ties among 
directors increases 
pluralistic 
ignorance. 
 
 
Payne et al. 
(2009). 
 
Corporate 
Board 
Attributes, 
Team 
Effectiveness 
and Financial 
Performance. 
 
Journal of 
Management 
Studies. 
US Quantitative; 
Questionnaire 
and Archival 
data, 217 
responses 
from CEOs, 
inside and 
outside 
directors of 
Fortune 1000 
companies. 
 
Knowledge, 
external 
information, power 
and time spent have 
positive and 
significant impacts 
on board 
effectiveness,(servic
e and control tasks) 
and firm 
performance.  
 
Internal information 
and incentives do 
not significantly 
influence board-
level and firm-level 
performance. 
 
Board effectiveness 
has a significant 
effect on firm 
performance. 
Mediation effect of 
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board effectiveness 
on the board-firm 
performance is not 
detected. 
 
Coombes et al. 
(2011). 
 
Behavioural 
Orientations of 
Non-Profit 
Boards as a 
Factor in 
Entrepreneurial 
Performance: 
Does 
Governance 
Matter? 
 
Journal of 
Management 
studies. 
US Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
a sample of 
140 non-profit 
New York 
organisations. 
 
Strategic, active and 
cohesive boards are 
more likely to 
manage their 
resources 
effectively through 
innovative, risk-
taking and proactive 
behaviours. These 
behaviours have 
positive and 
significant effects 
on social, not 
financial 
performance. 
 
Parker (2007). 
 
Internal 
Governance in 
the Non-Profit 
Boardroom: A 
Participant 
Observer study. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review 
Australia Qualitative; 
A longitudinal 
research 
observer study 
of two non-
profit boards 
in two years 
period. 
 
CEO-Board 
relationship: both 
boards have a 
cordial, mutual and 
supportive 
relationship with 
their CEOs, but with 
two different 
approaches; 
‘leading from the 
front’ and ‘leading 
from behind’. 
 
Deliberate agenda 
structuring can be 
done in an informal 
meeting setting. 
Informal meetings 
lead to 
transparency, 
reduce 
confrontations and 
stress and enhance 
cohesion among 
directors even when 
there is an intense 
debate or 
disagreement in the 
boardroom. 
 310 
 
 
Parker (2008). Boardroom 
Operational 
and Financial 
Control: An 
Insider view. 
 
British Journal 
of 
Management. 
Australia Qualitative; 
Longitudinal 
complete 
member 
researcher 
participant 
observer of 
two boards. 
 
Strategic 
orientation of 
directors drives the 
focus on board 
operational and 
financial controls. 
 
Both boards show 
greater attention to 
the financial 
impacts of strategic 
proposals. 
 
 
 
Liu et al. (2016). 
 
Removing 
Vacant Chairs: 
Does 
Independent 
Directors’ 
Attendance at 
Board Meetings 
Matter? 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics. 
China Quantitative; 
Archival data, 
A sample of 
12,131 firm-
year 
observations 
from A-share 
firms listed on 
the Chinese 
market from 
2004 to 2011. 
 
Firms with 
independent NEDs 
that attend board 
meetings are more 
likely to protect 
shareholders wealth 
especially in non-
state-owned 
enterprises and 
when external 
supervision is weak. 
 
 Zhu et al., 2016 
Board 
Processes, 
Board Strategic 
Involvement 
and 
Organisational 
Performance in 
For-Profit and 
Non-Profit 
Organisations. 
 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics. 
Canada. Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
373 responses 
form directors 
of for-profit 
firms and 
NPOs in 
Canada. 
Board meeting 
frequency (both 
general and 
strategic) has a 
positive and 
significant effect on 
board in strategic 
involvement for-
profit organisations 
and NPOs. Only 
strategic, not 
general meetings 
improve the 
strategic 
involvement of non-
profit organisations. 
 
Outside board 
meetings review 
has no significant 
impact on board 
strategic 
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involvement in both 
for-profit 
organisations and 
NPOs. 
 
Information 
utilisation (not 
availability) has a 
positive effect on 
board strategic 
involvement in for-
profit organisations, 
but not in NPOs. 
 
Board strategic 
involvement 
positively and 
significantly 
influence corporate 
performance in 
both for-profit 
organisations and 
NPOs. 
 
Zhang (2010). 
 
Board 
Information 
and Strategic 
Tasks 
Performance. 
 
Corporate 
Governance: 
An 
International 
Review. 
Norway Quantitative; 
Questionnaire, 
318 responses 
from CEOs in 
the year 2003 
and 2005. 
Using diverse 
information 
significantly 
improves board 
current strategy, 
but not future 
strategy. 
 
Possessing diverse 
information 
influences both 
current and future 
strategies. 
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Appendix J: Qualitative data analysis process 
 
Data Transcription  
Data transcription is an important phase in qualitative data analysis, it involves a verbatim 
account of all verbal and non-verbal utterances (Braun and Clarke, 2006). All the interviews 
conducted in this study were tape-recorded and transcribed in a word document. Transcription 
of each interview was done before the next interview took place. This helped to write exactly 
what was recorded, as the words spoken were still fresh in the mind of the researcher. The 
interviewer checked and rechecked interview transcriptions with the recorded data (verbatim) 
to ensure consistency between the spoken words and the word-processed account, this is 
known as data cleaning (Saunders et al., 2016) in qualitative research.  
Following the advice given by Saunders et al. (2016), each interview transcription has been 
saved with a separate filename, taking confidentiality issue into account. For example, Mr 
3INEDM represents participant number three, an independent non-executive director and 
male.  
The interviews were conducted in English as it is the official language in Nigeria. Therefore, 
the transcription process is less stressful as it requires no translation of the tape-recorded 
data. Transcription process is time consuming, frustrating and difficult to comprehend (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006), but it assists in the current study as the researcher familiarises and 
immerses himself with the data and through this transcription process the researcher begins 
to understand the meanings and create initial codes from the data set.  
Identifying Initial Codes and Themes 
 
After the interview transcriptions, the researcher becomes familiar with the data trends and 
patterns, then as a result generates a list of ideas about what is in the dataset. This forms the 
basis for generating initial codes from the data set. Coding is a process that involves labelling 
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each unit of data within a dataset; namely, a code summarises meaning of the data extract 
(Saunders et al., 2016). In this study, data extracts with similar meanings are coded together, 
while those that are dissimilar are separated and a different code created for them. The data 
was initially coded manually, before using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software (CAQDAS) - NVIVO, this helped the researcher to further familiarise himself with the 
data. 
As mentioned earlier, this study uses a theory-driven (deductive) technique. Therefore, the 
interview data gathered was approached with the aim of finding specific themes/categories in 
relation to the research conceptual framework. However, beyond the framework, certain 
patterns appear and were considered. Therefore, this study, though employs a deductive 
approach, it also adopts a data-driven (inductive) approach. This is essential in order to avoid 
extensive restrictions in relation to what comes up from the data and to accommodate 
meanings gathered from the participants (Saunders et al., 2016). This assists the researcher 
in making necessary changes in the proposed research conceptual framework in order to suit 
the context under study. 
The researcher read the data several times and was able to identify certain interesting 
terms/codes in the dataset which serve as potential themes. Thirty-five codes were identified 
and data extracts were allocated appropriately to each relevant code. Some data extracts are 
used once in a code, while others are allocated in more than one code depending on the 
suitability of the data extract. The 35 codes identified were organised to form different potential 
themes/nodes. Each code and its data extract(s) are collated to the relevant identified potential 
theme/node. However, it is important to note that most of the data was coded based on 
literature (theory-driven), taking into consideration categories that are common in the related 
literature (board task, board processes, and CSR activities).  
Under board processes five themes were identified, which include: directors’ commitment, 
challenge, knowledge utilisation, availability of human capital and negative conflict. Boards’ 
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control role, resources provisions and strategy advisory serve as themes under the ‘board 
task’ category. The data shows a number of themes under CSR activities which comprises of 
philanthropic, ethical, legal, economic activities, profit and CSR, CSR and task (see figure 
6.1). At this stage, different codes were merged to form main node/theme, while others serve 
as child node/theme. 
 
Figure6.1: Initial Thematic Map Indicating 3 Broad Categories, 14 Main Themes, and 21 Child Themes. 
 
                                                                                    
                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                         
Keys 
Green = Broad Categories 
Yellow = Main Themes 
Pink = Child Themes/Nodes 
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Reviewing Themes 
At this stage, the researcher reviewed and refined the main potential themes identified at the 
earlier stage in order to determine whether they really serve as an overarching theme or there 
is need to split, merge or discard the themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The views of Patton 
(1990) on internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity are considered at this stage. After 
reading carefully all the data extracts allocated to each theme, the researcher finds that data 
extracts for each parent node/theme are coherent and consistent with each other. However, 
there is no external heterogeneity between two main themes (resource provision and strategy 
advisory). There is no clear identifiable distinction between these two parent themes, they both 
contain similar meanings. For this reason, the two themes were collapsed together to form a 
single theme (service theme). Similarly, sub-themes under ‘control role’ seem to be 
problematic, as they do not have enough data extracts to support their existence and they 
need to be distinct from each other. Therefore, these child nodes were merged under the main 
theme (control theme). At the end of this process, all the themes were fully supported with 
sufficient data extracts and a candidate thematic map was achieved, as data within each 
theme was coherent. 
Some data extracts that did not fit into any theme were discarded, as such data extracts cannot 
serve as independent themes because they lack support from sufficient coded data. Similarly, 
also removed from the initial thematic map include ‘availability of human capital’ and ‘negative 
conflict’ because each of these themes either lacks relevancy in the current study or have no 
sufficient coded data unit to support its existence. Overall, a thematic map was developed at 
this stage with nine themes and all valid in relation to the data set (see figure 6.2).  
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As the interviews conducted were not many, re-reading the data set does not provide any 
other relevant theme needed in this study, thus the thematic map is accurate in regards to this 
study. The interviews were conducted with the aim to explore and obtain board members’ 
perspectives and understandings of the board processes, board task and corporate social 
responsibilities activities that are suitable to use in the context under examination (Nigeria). 
An initial conceptual framework was designed based on the previous literature and the study’s 
research questions. Hence, data were coded and themes were identified in a way to answer 
the research questions. 
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Figure6.2: Developed Thematic Map with 3 Broad Categories, 11 Main Themes and 8 Child Themes 
 
Naming Themes 
At this stage, the final parent and child nodes/themes were identified and finally defined. The 
working names of the themes were maintained in the final analysis, but have been considered 
under different categories identified from the literature. For instance, control and service 
themes have been discussed under board task, while challenge, commitment and knowledge 
utilisation were analysed under board processes. 
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Refined data extracts within the themes were used for the final analysis and each theme 
carries a distinct data aiming to capture exactly what the theme is all about. For example, a 
‘control theme’ captures only data related to any form of monitoring aspect of boards. Data 
extracts attached to each theme are organised into an internal coherent pattern. However, 
themes (profit and CSR as well as Task and CSR) were removed completely from the thematic 
map because the themes are beyond the objective of the current study. The appearance of 
this theme shows the importance of the relationship between profit and corporate social 
responsibility activities in the Nigerian context. This might be an interesting phenomenon to 
investigate further in the future studies.  
The main themes found under CSR activities were redefined and renamed to ethical and 
philanthropic CSR dimensions (see figure 6.3). Nevertheless, CSR legal activities were also 
apparent in the dataset. Nigerian corporations are heavily criticised by previous studies for not 
doing much on legal and ethical CSR activities. Majority of the previous studies focused on 
philanthropic dimension of social responsibility. For this, legal CSR is considered in this 
research instead of philanthropic social activities in the new research conceptual framework. 
Therefore, corporate social responsibility activities related to legal and ethical dimensions are 
recognised as the outcome variables in the current research conceptual framework.  
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Figure6.3: Final Thematic Map showing 3 Broad Categories, 7 Main Themes, and 8 Child Themes. 
                                                                                 
                                                                                                       
             
                                                                                                                    
                                        
 
 
 
Keys 
Green = Broad Categories 
Yellow = Main Themes 
Pink = Child Themes/Nodes 
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Reporting Findings 
Under the main research categories (board task, processes and CSR activities), themes and 
sub-themes emerged from the data set. For board task, control and service roles are the main 
themes. Three major board processes factors emerged, which include board commitment, 
challenge and knowledge utilisation. Participants of the interview mentioned the various type 
of CSR activities that their company’s engaged with, this involves positive CSR (philanthropic 
and economic activities) and negative CSR (legal and ethical activities). However, only 
negative CSR dimensions are considered in this study. 
 Board Task 
It is quite evident from the data that Nigerian boards’ main focus are to monitor the activities 
of managers. This is consistent with the aim of agency theory which is to monitor and prevent 
the opportunistic agent from utility maximisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The Nigerian 
Corporate Governance Code emphasises that boards of directors shall effectively protect 
companies’ assets and ensure corporations are run effectively. The results from the interview 
show that directors in Nigeria consider the control role as the main task of the board with the 
majority of respondents emphasising on this idea. For example, an independent non-executive 
director states that: 
‘Board controls and monitors the managers…the monitoring  aspect is number one, because 
you don’t establish a business and just leave the manager on his own, you have to, that is 
why I said we meet quarterly, the management….submit in quarterly management report 
which encompasses all activities in the company. The production figures will be there, in fact, 
at the…at the…beginning of a year, we have a budget of how many tonnes we have to produce 
that year…and what is the expected revenue. The selling cost, the expected revenue…then 
the expenditure….then the bottom line. So if the management couldn’t make the target for that 
quarter…..it has to explain why’ (3INEDM). 
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 Another participant (7NEDM) narrates that all major planned expenditures have to secure 
approval from the directors before management engages in such spending, but the executive 
can go ahead with expenditure that involves meagre amounts of money. 
A managing director (Mr 2MDM), who also serves as chairman of the same company, explains 
that ‘board looks at what I and other directors are doing regularly…..and if there is an area of 
concerns they raise it and ensure it is addressed’. Similarly, another executive director 
mentioned that their board oversees the activities of the managers and they make sure that 
the company is run according to the suggestions made at the board meetings (Mr 6EDM). 
Provision of resources, useful strategy advice and good guidance are other themes that 
appear under board task. Put together, these themes were merged and entitled ‘service role’.  
This role is equally important for firms to survive in Nigeria. One participant discusses how 
their board strategizes to ensure sufficient production: ‘right now, we are planning to expand 
the plant, production. Our capacity is now 500,000. So we are now, in term of production, we 
are the smallest cement company in Nigeria. Strategy has been made now to increase the 
capacity to 1.5 million tonnes per annum…from 500,000’ (3INEDM). 
Another participant who is non-executive director stated that board task is “to give good 
guidance to the firm. As you know, our work is not to run the day-to-day activities of the firm 
rather give advice and ensure those advice are adhered to. You see….what our board is all 
about is to serve as a good guide to managers” (Mr 5NEDM). 
The two board tasks that emerged from the data indicate that in order to perform their duties 
effectively, boards should go beyond control role. In addition to monitoring, boards are 
expected to provide strategic advice and resources, which complement agency theory 
assumptions. Therefore, both control and service tasks are equally important roles to be 
performed in the Nigerian context. According to the SEC (2011) code, “it is the responsibility 
of the board to oversee the effective performance of the management in order to protect and 
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enhance shareholders value and to meet the company’s obligations to its employees and other 
stakeholders” (p.8). The code also recommends that the board should set firm’s strategy and 
provides strategic advice and guidance, ensure that human and financial resources available 
are utilised towards attaining those goals.  
Board Processes 
The main themes found under this category are similar to those introduced in the theoretical 
work of Forbes and Milliken (1999). Effort norms, cognitive conflict and use of knowledge and 
skills are the common traits found in almost all the board processes literature (see for example 
Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). However, evidence from the interviews show 
that the wording needs to be changed in the Nigerian context. For example, directors 
interviewed dislike the word ‘conflict’ in the boardroom, instead they prefer to have different 
views: “it’s not conflict, but we do have our differences and challenges” (4NEDF). Another 
participant states: “I cannot call it disagreement and conflict as such, I think it is different 
views…that is what I will call it” (2MDM). In a similar vein, Mr 5NEDM argues: “we don’t have 
conflicts in our board instead we have different opinions, views or perspectives. If you 
say…….we have…eh…eh…..conflicts, it means we are quarreling with each other”.  
Basically, themes that appeared from the interviews under ‘board processes’ are ‘challenge’ 
instead of ‘cognitive conflict’ and ‘commitment’ instead of ‘effort norms’.  Although both terms 
are the same, the wording was misunderstood by the participants. Therefore, in order to 
achieve the research aim, changing the wording is necessary and important in the Nigerian 
context.  
It is essential for a non-executive director to ask probing questions and challenge anything he 
is not clear with and this attitude is of benefit to the board. One non-executive director from 
the participants explains that: ‘When a new idea or opinion is introduced in the board meeting, 
I will listen and ensure I really understand what he or she is saying, then see if I have any 
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concerns or issues regarding this opinion, and if there is a concern, I would challenge the 
ideas or at least seek clarification from the person who brings the idea’ (7NEDM). 
However, challenging the executives should be done with caution in order to avoid 
confrontations and instigating a lack of trust among board members. The current study 
investigates whether, as a result of challenging each other’s opinions, there is negative effects 
on interpersonal relationships among board members. An executive director said not at all, 
because both executives and non-executives have the same goal ‘we are all firing from 
different angles towards the goal post. If one of an executive member is shooting wrongly, 
maybe the chairman would say…ah…let us weight the other opinions from two members, 
maybe we are four or five” (Mr 1EDM).  
Speaking on the same vein, an independent non-executive director says that “at the end of 
the meeting, after the challenge and disagreement, an agreement will be reached, so that is 
the most important thing. It is normal, it is just like what you see on the television, the National 
Assembly debate on issues (laugh), but by the end of the meeting, people must have 
understood, maybe something you have not understood from the beginning. By the time you 
go to the meeting and ask questions…then things are explained to you…and things are put in 
proper perspective…..then you may….you may agree’ (Mr 3INED). 
The commitment of board members, especially those that serve as part-time directors is 
crucial to achieving the board aim. Empirical evidence emerged that board composition with 
NEDs improves board level of involvement and effort norms (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; 
Bettinelli, 2011).  
A non-executive director explains his level of commitment: ‘although I am too busy with other 
outside schedules, but I am committed to my roles here. I always ensure that I do everything 
possible to attend the board’ needs, for example, I missed not many, maybe just one board 
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committee meeting throughout last year. I also try to maintain a cordial relationship in and 
outside the boardroom with other board members’ (Mr 5NEDM).  
Mr 3INEDM states that, ‘under normal circumstances, each board or company is supposed to 
be fully committed and have at least four meetings per annum….that is quarterly. The 
management, of course, will bring in their proposals, circulate the papers before the meeting’ 
and he continues “that will enable the board members to go through the papers, come up with 
any suggestion’.  
Similarly, a female non-executive director shows commitment toward completing her 
homework before attending a board meeting, she states: ‘I always prefer to have agenda of 
the meeting communicated to me in details and such document to be given to me before…..at 
least a day or two….to the meetings’ (Mrs 4NEDF). Broadbridge et al. (2006) suggest that 
because of their inexperience in the board work, women directors prepare more for board 
meetings, seek knowledge about the nature of the board work and identify areas of 
improvements.  
Another board process factor identified from the interview is the ability of board members to 
utilise the knowledge available within them. Data from the interview suggests that Nigerian 
boards comprise of people with different knowledge backgrounds: ‘we have eight board 
members and almost all came from different educational background and some serve in 
different boards as executive or non-executive directors. Beside me as a professional lawyer, 
we have those who specialised in finance, engineering’ (Mr 5NEDM). Similarly, another 
participant said: ‘We have different people under the current board. We have the engineers, 
we have financial experts, we have strategist; which am one’ (Mrs 4NEDF). 
However, availability of human capital does not guarantee utilisation of such resource and the 
important factor that determines board effectiveness is the utilisation, rather than availability 
of such human capital. The interview participants indicate their readiness to put the resources 
available to use. Mr 3INEDM described how they utilise knowledge available in their board: 
 325 
 
‘It’s important to have people from different background. If you are discussing compliance of 
the company, you will see that, maybe, the lawyer will talk more than the others. If you are 
discussing finance, the accountant will talk more; if you are talking about the plant…..like I told 
you one director was a former managing director of this company, so he knows the plant very 
well and he can advise you…even if you call him on the phone in the night….because he 
knows what you are talking about’. Overall the participant summarised his views as ‘anybody 
with background knowledge of the topic in question will have more influence because his views 
will be more in line with what is required, because he is more knowledgeable, yeah”. 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
The four main layers of the CSR pyramid developed by Carroll (1991) serve as common 
themes identified in this interview. This includes CSR activities related to economic, ethical, 
legal and philanthropic. The interview data shows that Nigerian corporations engage in both 
positive and negative CSR, however, more emphasis is given on positive CSR, especially 
philanthropic activities, such as building schools, donations to charity and constructions of 
water boreholes to host communities.  Mr 7NEDM narrates that their firm has ‘a sustainability 
report published annually on its website, yes. We constructed so many feeder roads and built 
wells for our host community and we also built and renovated schools. For example, we just 
completed 2-8km and 1.6km paved asphalt roads in Ebendo and Umusan communities 
respectively. Also, we just constructed four water borehole projects in Obodugwa community’. 
 Another interviewee states that ‘I can tell you that we do a lot of corporate social 
responsibilities by building dispensaries around our area of population that is Wamakko local 
government, which is our base. And I don’t know, you know, there is Cement school at Wurno 
road where the school is supported by the company, yes. We have a primary, junior secondary 
school and senior secondary school’ (3INEDM) 
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In a similar way a female non-executive director explains that their company ‘engages in 
philanthropist activities, there are some communities we provided with electricity, water, 
pumps and build schools sometimes for the communities that are around the quarry site of the 
company, yes’ (4NEDF). 
For negative CSR activities, thought data shows evidence that Nigerian firms engage in legal 
and ethical CSR activities, but are not as prevalent as theme related to positive CSR activities. 
This implies that Nigerian boards are more engaged with positive CSR, specifically 
philanthropist activities. However, this is just a preliminary finding, further investigation is 
needed before drawing a final conclusion.  
Notwithstanding, themes identified in relation to negative CSR include compliance with laws 
by paying taxes, reducing the impact of firm operations on the environment, non-donations to 
political activities/parties and diversity in the workforce.  An executive director states that ‘our 
company is a law-abiding, comply with all environmental laws and pay tax, we have SUDA 
here, land fees, environmental fees…or all those kind of things apart from the tax itself. There 
are other taxes or resemblance in taxes that the government charged; we pay, we don’t waste 
time for that’ (Mr 1EDM). 
Mr 2MDM a managing director and also chairman of a construction company states that ‘we 
do not do anything that has to do with political activities at all and is clearly stated in our 
regulations. We don’t contribute to any political issues, no’.  
Similarly, an independent non-executive director explains that ‘we try to mitigate any negative 
effect we caused to our host community. Even if there is no any, I told you, every year the 
corporate social responsibility committee comes in with requests that include roads, 
wells……like I told you” (3INEDM). 
The interviews data shows evidence on the relationship between board task and CSR 
activities. For example, it was found that the control task of the board helps a company in 
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Nigeria to actively engage in CSR activities. One respondent explains that it is only through 
effective monitoring, which ensures management complies with the laid down initial proposals, 
that CSR activities are performed: ‘we have a corporate social responsibility committee and 
they bring in their proposals on where they want the firm to assist the host community through 
corporate social responsibility. If approval is given by the board, then we meet every three 
months to discuss performance of management to see if there are implementations of such 
approvals regarding many areas including proposals from CSR committee’ (3INEDM). 
In summary, the findings from the interview indicate three board processes, two board tasks, 
and different activities related to the corporate social responsibility of Nigerian boards. The 
board processes identified are directors’ commitment, challenge and knowledge utilisation. 
These factors are similar to those used in previous literature such as Zattoni et al. (2015), 
Zona and Zattoni (2007) and Wan and Ong (2005). Similarly, board tasks (control task and 
service task) found from the interviews are dominant in the board processes literature see, for 
example, Huse et al. (2009), Minichilli et al. (2012) and Pugliese et al. (2014). All the four 
layers of CSR developed by Carroll (1991) were salient from the interview’ data. This includes 
economic, philanthropic, ethical and legal CSR activities. However, for the purpose of this 
study, ethical and legal social responsibility activities are considered as the interested CSR 
dimensions that Nigerian board of directors should improve upon. Arora and Dharwadkar 
(2011) criticised previous studies for much emphasis on positive CSR activities, such as 
economic and philanthropic CSR dimensions with little or no attention on negative corporate 
social responsibility activities, such as legal and ethical activities. A complete and new 
conceptual framework and hypotheses to be tested quantitatively are presented in the next 
section. 
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Appendix M: Results of the moderation effects of board processes on the relationships 
between board characteristics and board tasks. 
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